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NOTES
Antitrust-Tying Arrangements-A Re-examination of the Per Se
Rule and Identification of Tying Arrangements
It is axiomatic to antitrust law that "tying arrangements serve hardly
any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."' Despite the ap-
parent simplicity of this statement, the problems confronted in identify-
ing tying arrangements and in establishing standards for measuring
anticompetitiveness, once a tie-in has been identified, have confounded
the courts2 and antitrust authorities.'
Tying arrangements generally have involved a situation in which
a single seller markets two separate products (or services) together, with
one, the tying item, acting as a lever in the selling of the other, the tied
product." As other forms of economic leverage, tying arrangements
have been treated by the courts as inherently anticompetitive5 because
I Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). For a
succinct introduction to the law of tying arrangements, see E. KINTNER, AN ANTI-
TRUST PRIMER 47-58 (1964).
2 Identification of tying arrangement: Compare Carvel Corp., TRADE REG. REP.
17,298 (FTC 1965) (defendant's franchise agreements not regarded as tying ar-
rangements because the trademark license could not constitute a "tying product")
with Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964) (trademark license could
conceptually constitute a "tying product"). See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (advertising sold by defendant for both
morning and evening newspapers only a "single product" and, therefore, no
tying arrangement found), and compare, Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp.,
340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965) (AP's Ohio regional wire circuit held separate and
distinct from other AP circuits and AP's argument that the "news" was the only
product involved in the agreement rejected).
Suppression of competition: Compare Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) with Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958).
Identification of tying arrangement: Compare Turner, The Validity of Tying
Arrangements under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50, 62-64 (1958) with
Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-29
(1957).
Suppression of competition: Compare Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique
and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 96-126 with Day, Exclusive
Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 539, 539-54(1968).
'Austin, supra note 3, at 89. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 5 (1958); cf. Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
'See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Despite the condemnation of tying arrangements, it is clear that they are not al-
ways anticompetitive in nature. See Bowman, supra note 3, at 25-29.
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the seller's use of economic power in an extraneous market to bring
about sales in another market, in which his power may be slight, intro-
duces an artificial element into the competition in that other market.
Buyers, who may want to purchase only the tying product from the seller,
are forced to purchase, as a package, items that they might rather obtain
separately.6 Thus, they must forego their free choice between competing
products. Competitors of the seller in the tied market are faced with an
anomalous situation in which they are forced to compete on a basis en-
tirely divorced from the quality or price of the goods that they offer." Be-
cause of their smaller size, they may be in no position to offer the similar
package; or if they are able to offer the same package, doing so may
divert their efforts at improving their single product.
Obviously, the successful tying arrangement has deleterious effects
on competition. Thus, the Supreme Court has promulgated a per se
rule8 for determining if a tying arrangement has sufficient impact on
competition to bring the seller within the sanctions of sections one' and
two"0 of the Sherman Act, section three11 of the Clayton Act, or section
five' 2 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. At least with respect to
actions under the Sherman or FTC Acts,'" that rule has been stated as
follows: "They [tying arrangements] are unreasonable in and of them-
selves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for
the tied product and a "not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce
' See Austin, supra note 3, at 99.
See Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REv.
626, 627-38 (1965).
8 Actually, the "per se rule" might more accurately be described as "per se rules";
historically the "rule" has involved different elements depending upon whether the
Sherman or Clayton Act was the basis of the action. See Times-Picayune Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953). See also Mattson, Con-
dition that the Lessee or Purchaser Shall Not Deal in the Goods of a Competitor,
in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 181-88 (1958).
°26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §2 (1958).
1138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1952).
1238 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §45 (1958).
"6 Section 1 of the Sherman Act is subsumed by section 5 of the FTC Act
(prohibition of unfair methods of competition). See Austin, supra note 3, at 89;
Turner, supra note 3, at 58 n.33. Thus, for purposes of the material examined in
this note, it may be assumed that reference to application of the Sherman Act
also includes application of the FTC Act, section 5. In fact, there is some authority
for the proposition that section 5 is broader in application than section 1, under a
"quasi-tying" theory (see Day, supra note 3; at 555-56) or under an "incipiency"
doctrine (see Note, Use of Section 5 of the FTC Act to Reach "Incipient" Viola-
tions of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 79-88 (1967)).
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is affected."' 4 As is often the case with a doctrinal approach, however,
establishing this qualified per se rule has done little to alleviate the prob-
lems encountered by the Court in dealing with tying arrangements. A
recent case, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,"5
emphasizes the difficulty that courts have in identifying tying arrange-
ments and applying the per se rule. Consequently, the decision also serves
to point out the deficiencies in the established doctrine and, thereby, to
redirect inquiry into the actual economic problems in the tie-in area.
Fortner involved an action by a private party seeking treble damages
and an injunction for violations of sections one and two of the Sherman
Act.'" The plaintiff, Fortner Enterprises, alleged that the defendant,
U. S. Steel, had instigated an illegal tying arrangement whereby the de-
fendant through its wholly owned credit corporation, U. S. Steel Homes
Credit Corporation, required the plaintiff to purchase unreasonably high-
priced prefabricated houses, manufactured by the defendant, as a pre-
requisite for obtaining low-cost, one-hundred-per-cent financing for the
purchase and development of land.' The agreement required the plaintiff
to erect one of the prefabricated houses on each of the lots purchased with
the proceeds of the loan."
The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant, 9
and held that although the agreement was a tying arrangement, the
plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to establish the prerequisites for
application of the per se rule, "namely sufficient market power over the
tying product [credit] and foreclosure of a substantial volume of com-
merce in the tied product [houses]."" The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed without opinion." The Supreme Court on
certiorari 22 reversed and remanded the action for trial on the merits.
Justice Black spoke for the five member majority; Justices White and
Fortas wrote separate dissents. The Court held that "the conduct chal-
lenged .. . involves a tying arrangement of the traditional kind" 23 and
that the plaintiff had made sufficient allegations to go to trial on the issue
" Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (emphasis added),
citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
15394 U.S. 495 (1969).
1 Id. at 496.
'"Id. at 497.
Is Id.
Is See id.
20 Id. at 497-98.
"Id. at 498.
"393 U.S. 820 (1968).
"11394 U.S. at 498.
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of unlawful suppression of competition under both the general standards
of the Sherman Act2" and the per se rule.25
The district court and a majority of the Supreme Court were in
agreement that the defendant's conduct could be identified as a tying
arrangement. The dissenters, however, were by no means convinced.
Justice Fortas, in particular, based his dissent on his conviction that there
was no tying arrangement involved in the case.
Whether the credit and houses constituted two separate products
was Justice Fortas' chief concern."' In any action allegedly concerning
a tie-in, the court's determination of what constitutes the lawful com-
mercial package has the practical effect of molding competition.27 For
example, if the Court in Fortner had established, as Justice Fortas sug-
gested, that the credit and homes were a single unit, U. S. Steel's com-
petitors, in order to compete, would either have had to produce a similar
package or else manipulate the sale of homes in such a manner as to en-
tice buyers out of the market for the combined credit-homes package.28
Without examining the possible effects of a single-product determina-
tion, Justice Fortas concluded that the agreement in question was
"... a sale of a single product with the incidental provision of financing.
It [was] not a sale of one product on condition that the buyer . . .
[would] buy the other product exclusively from the seller."2 He argued
that the facts did not support the conclusion of the majority that the
financing was for the purchase and development of land. Rather, he felt
that "[t]he financing [was] solely and entirely ancillary to [the de-
fendant's] sale of houses." 30 His dissent also emphasized the economic
2I !d. at 500.
r Id. at 500-01.
" The problem of the "single seller" could have arisen in Fortner since U.S.
Steel and the credit corporation were separate legal entities, but the Court had held
in previous cases that such a subterfuge was not a defense. See Leitch Mfg.
Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Carbice Corp. of America v. American
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); cf. Perma Life Mufflers v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). Obviously, if the Court were to allow a seller to
incorporate subsidiaries to avoid the consequences of imposing a tie-in, the result
would be tantamount to repealing all legal prohibitions against tying arrangements.
In fact, Justice Black used the separateness of the defendants as an argument for
finding separate products. See 314 U.S. at 507.
"'See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), afgd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
"See Pearson, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. REV.
626, 627 (1965) ; Turner, supra note 3, at 62-64.
2 394 U.S. at 522 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
" Id.; see Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th
Cir. 1962) (developing the concept of the reasonably ancillary restriction on a
license as a valid method of protecting trademark rights). See also Carvel Corp.,
[Vol. 48
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factors81 that might have been involved in the case and questioned
whether there would be any opportunity for the defendant at trial to
present justification for the arrangement.3 2
Justice White alluded to the issue of identification of the tying ar-
rangement when he characterized the majority's logic as "dictat[ing]
the same result if unusually attractive credit terms had been offered sim-
ply for the purchase of the houses themselves." ' One possible argument
is that allegedly separate products, if sold in fixed proportions, are in
fact often economically interdependent and, thus, merely portions of the
same product. 4 Justice Black, however, made clear that he could not
view the defendant's arrangement as a single product:
Sales such as [those generally made on credit] are a far cry from
the arrangement involved here, where the credit is provided by one
corporation on condition that a product be purchased from a separate
corporation, and where the borrower contracts to obtain a large sum
of money over and above that needed to pay the seller for the physical
products purchased. Whatever the standards for determining exactly
when a transaction involves only a "single product," we cannot see how
an arrangement such as that present in this case could ever be said
to involve only a single product.3 5
The importance of a finding that an alleged tying arrangement in-
volves only a single product is obvious under the doctrinal approach;
conceptually there can be no way for a product effectively to act as a
"lever" for the sale of itself. More precisely, the per se rule rests upon
the premise that tie-ins involve an extension of power into a new or sec-
ond market rather than merely an expansion of power within a market
in which the defendant already holds sway.3 In reality, however, the
TRADE REG. REi'. 17,298 (FTC 1965); cf. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1964).
-1 394 U.S. 523-25 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
'
2 Id. at 523-24 n. (Fortas, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 511 (White, J., dissenting). It is possible so narrowly to state the hold-
ing in Fortner that it would have meaning only when credit was offered for the
financing of land with houses tied thereto. So stated, this holding would add
nothing to the law of tying arrangements enunciated in Northern Pacific; and
U.S. Steel could avoid the holding simply by giving low-cost, one-hundred-per-cent
financing on the homes and not the land. However, as Justice White suggests, the
majority opinion does seem to apply to credit, regardless of its form, so long as it
is used in an anti-competitive manner.8 See Bowman, supra note 3, at 25-27; Turner, supra, note 3, at 67-72.
394 U.S. at 507 (footnote omitted).
"Bowman, supra, note 3, at 19-20. Professor Bowman suggests that "leverage"
is an ambiguous term that should be restricted to cases involving extension of
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cases are replete with examples of conduct that the courts readily could de-
fine as involving either a single product or two separate ones.37 Particular-
ly in those cases involving determination of the appropriate unit of sale for
a given product are the courts faced with definitional alternatives.88 In
other cases, a court may have to determine whether a particular item
may be deemed so ancillary to the alleged tying product as to form a
part of a single product.8 9 Thus, the courts are often faced with a
dilemma; and doctrines, definitions, and rules provide little, if any, aid.
If a defendant can offer some economic justification for his alleged
unlawful conduct, it is advantageous for him to offer it in his argument
on the issue of tie-in identification. 40 This approach may provide courts
the opportunity to recognize the defendant's policy argument and to ap-
ply a balancing test to the rights of the buyer, seller, and the seller's
competitors without entering the linguistic maze of the per se rule.
Justifications that may prove palatable to the courts include the fol-
lowing: economies in production and marketing of the total package ;41
the need to maintain the "good will' established for the primary product ;"'
price competition within a "hard" market for the tied product ;48 tech-
power into a new or second market. See Day, supra note 3, at 539-41. Professor
Day distinguishes between tying arrangements and exclusive dealing on the "sec-
ond market" basis.
"See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
"See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953);
See also Burstein, A Theory of Fudl-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960).
'9 See cases cited note 30 supra.
Despite the fact that the majority had no trouble labelling the tying arrange-
ment in Fortner, the identification issue presents an opportunity for the defendant
to offer justification, unlike the conclusory procedure involved in application of the
per se rule. Cf. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545(E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Note, Newcomer De-fenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises, Territorials, and Excusives, 18
STAN. L. Rsv. 457 (1966).
"' See Bowman, supra note 3, at 29; Turner, supra note 3, at 66-67. Of course
there is the concomitant requirement that the economies in cost result in a lower
price for the package. See Pearson, supra note 28, at 627. See Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
"' Compare International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131(1936) with FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923). See S. OPPEN-
REIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws 600-01 (3d ed. 1968). But see
Austin, supra note 3, at 123.
"'See 394 U.S. at 519 (White, J., dissenting). A "hard" market exists when
there are only a few sellers in the market, all of whom are powerful, and there
is great resistance to price competition among them. (E.g., a price cut by any one
of the sellers will be matched by the others.) In such a market, competion must
take other forms in order to be effective. The "hard" market consideration should
have been particularly relevant in Fortner since there is a likelihood of an oligopo-
listic market in prefabricated steel houses. Thus, if U.S. Steel's only competitors
were the few other giants of the steel industry, it is probable that the credit offered
[Vol. 48
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nological interdependence of the products ;44 custom and usage within the
markets of both products;45 patterns of consumer demand;46 and, of
primary importance, the availability and feasibility of similar techniques
for the seller's competitors in the tied market.'
The second major issue in Fortner, the application of the per se
rule4" under the facts (i.e., the examination of the anticompetitive effect
of the defendant's conduct, given its identification as a tying arrange-
ment), was the focal point of both the majority opinion and Justice
White's dissent. The doctrines established by the Court in prior cases49
placed two conditions on the application of the per se rule in "nonpatent,
Sherman Act" ' cases: sufficient economic power of the seller in the
tying product's market and a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce
affected in the tied market. These two conditions had been set forth as
a means of testing the impact of a tying arrangement on competition.
Without any impact on the tied market, the tying arrangement could
hardly be called anticompetitive because it would be obvious that buyers
were not foregoing their freedom of choice among products and com-
petitors were not losing a substantial market. These conditions amount
to a cause and effect test of impact: the defendant's power in the tying-
product market representing the cause and the amount of commerce af-
fected in the tied-product market indicating the effect.
It is arguable after Fortner, as indeed it was arguable after Northern
Pacific Railway v. United States"- and United States v. Loew's, Inc.,52 that
the Court has done away with the requirement of "sufficient economic
power." Justice Black's opinion provides language to support almost any
by U.S. Steel was competition and in no way prejudicial to its competitors with
equally "deep pockets." It seems almost incredible that none of the opinions in
Fortner posed the question of who constituted defendant's competition in the hous-
ing market.
"Bowman, supra note 3, at 27-29.
"Pearson, supra note 28, at 627-31.
'Id. at 631, interpreting Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 235 F. Supp.
751 (E.D. Ky. 1962), aff'd, 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
954 (1965).
"This issue actually forms the basis for inquiry in the tying-arrangements
area. See Pearson, supra note 28, at 627-31. For an examination of "justifica-
tions" in general, see Note, Blsiness Justification for Tying Agreements: A Re-
treat from the Per Se Doctrine, 17 W. RESERv L. REv. 257 (1965).
48 See Turner, supra note 3, at 64-75, for an examination of the positive at-
tributes of a per se rule and an explication of when it should apply.
,See Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
80 See Turner, supra note 3, at 50-55.
01356 U.S. 1 (1958). See Day, supra note 3, at 545.
82371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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conclusion on the issue. What is still clear after Fortner is that the de-
fendant need not dominate the tying market.5" The effect that the "dis-
tinctiveness" or "uniqueness" of the tying product has on the issue of
the defendant's power is very unclear. Justice Black quoted with approval
the dictum from the Loew's case: "[T]he crucial economic power may
be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from
uniqueness in its attributes." '54 However, later in his opinion, Black
offered the following remark: "We do not mean to accept petitioner's
apparent argument that market power can be inferred simply because
the kind of financing terms offered by a lending company are 'unique and
unusual.' , He attempted to resolve this apparent contradiction by es-
tablishing different classifications of "uniqueness."55
Despite the battle of words in the opinion, one clear principle emerges:
when the seller establishes an appreciable number of tying arrangements,
"sufficient economic power" in the tying product is conclusively pre-
sumed.57 Obviously this principle is based on the number of buyers that
a defendant can attract; thus, it is apparent that Justice Black has de-
creased the possibility for large corporate defendants to avoid the con-
sequences of the per se rule once a tying arrangement has been found.
Similarly, the principle enunciated by Fortner on the issue of the
amount of commerce necessary for application of the per se rule effec-
tively prejudices large defendants attempting to tie products. What
amounts to "not insubstantial" is determined by looking at the total dol-
lar value of the tied products for all similar tying arrangements that
the defendant has initiated, regardless of whether the action may be (as
in Fortner) a private one between the seller and only one buyer. This
statement of the "quantitative substantiality" test is quite similar to that
previously followed by the Court."8 However, Fortner alters the tradi-
tional test in two important ways. First, it dilutes the requirement for
a substantial dollar amount by implying that a figure of two hundred thou-
sand dollars (less than half the amount found to be "not insubstantial" in
394 U.S. at 502-03.
" Id. at 503. The confusion arising on the role of "distinctiveness" is probably
due to language derived from cases involving a patented tying product. See Turner,
supra note 3, at 50-55.
' 394 U.S. at 505.TMId. at 505 n.2.
" See 394 U.S. at 504. See also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958) (sufficient economic power shown by the "host" of tying agreements the
defendant had entered).
"' See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 3.56 U.S. 1 (1958). See also
Day, supra note 3, at 540-43.
[Vol. 48
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International Salt Co. v. United States,59 which had originated the
per se doctrine in 1947) would be enough 0 and by explicitly holding
that an individual plaintiff in a treble-damages action can lump together
all the values of tied products for all arrangements similar to his own."'
Second, Fortner removes any consideration, in the majority of cases, 2
of the percentage of the "relevant market" for the tied product:
The requirement that a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce be
involved makes no reference to the scope of any particular market
or to the share of that market foreclosed by the tie .... [N]ormally
the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of busi-
ness, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be
merely "de minimis," is foreclosed to competitors by the tie .... 63
Thus, given a reduction in dollar-volume requirement and an expansion
of market considerations, one inevitable result of Fortner would seem
to be an increase in the size of the class of potential defendants in tie-in
cases, with the large nationwide corporation being the most susceptible
to suit. Perhaps the Court was heeding the words of Justice Cardozo
that ". . . size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be
ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the
past."64
The significance of Fortner with respect to the per se rule is ob-
viously quite great. It serves to abolish almost completely the distinc-
tions in application of the Clayton and Sherman Acts to tying arrange-
ment cases."5 The "missing link" in cases under the Clayton Act had
been that the tie-ins of "services" were not subject to the proscriptions of
section three while tie-ins of "products" were.66 This fact would almost
G 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (five hundred thousand dollars in contracts a "not in-
substantial" amount of commerce).
GO 394 U.S. at 502 (dictum).
01 Id.
02 Id. at 501 ("relevant market" may be important in cases involving a small
dollar volume of commerce if the defendant's sales represented a large percentage
of the market).
" Id. This holding may have been derived from Northern Pacific, see Day,
supra note 3, at 544-45. However, the validity of that precedent had become ques-
tionable, see Austin, supra note 3, at 88-95, commenting on the Atlantic Refining
cases: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964); Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309 (1961).
"United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) (dictum).
"See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09(1953). See also Turner, supra note 3, at 50-55.
GO Mattson, Condition that the Lessee or Purchaser Shall Not Deal in the Goods
of a Competitor, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 181-88 (1958).
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undoubtedly have forced a different result in Fortner if the action had
been brought under section three.6 7 Since there is no economic distinc-
tion between goods and services, experts have universally condemned the
artificial distinction in the application of the per se rule, established by
Times-Picayune Publis-hing Co. v. United States," for actions involving
products under the Clayton Act and those involving services, neces-
sarily under the Sherman Act.69 The distinction resulted in the anomalous
situation wherein actions against the tie-ins of services placed a heavier
burden of proof on the plaintiff than that required for actions against
tie-ins of products.
Fortner also makes clear the presumption against large sellers in
tying arrangement cases. It now seems doubtful that these sellers will
be able to offer any justification for their action sufficient to prevent
application of the per se rule once the tying arrangement has been identi-
fied.70 This conclusion is emphasized by the fact that both the "power"
and "amount of commerce" requirements are, after Fortner, quantita-
tatively measured. The "number of buyers" test for power and the "dol-
lar volume" test for amount of commerce may best be viewed as twin
corollaries of a rule that completely forecloses the tie-in as a marketing
technique for large sellers regardless of its competitive effect.
After examining the majority's careful explication of doctrine in
Fortner, one might seriously ask (as, indeed, Justice White's dissent
seems to ask in part)71 the following question: Although there are now
standards established on all fronts, how do these standards relate to
", See United States v. Investors Diversified Serv., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn.
1951) ("credit" not a "commodity" under the Clayton Act). See 52 CoLum. L.
Rv. 1066 (1952).
" 345 U.S. 594 (1953). The Court established the following distinction for ap-
plication of the per se rule under the Clayton and Sherman Acts:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the
"tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" prod-
uct is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower standards ex-
pressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor the requisite
potential lessening of competition is inferred. And because for even a lawful
monopolist it is "unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any
substantial market," a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman
Act whenever both conditions are met.
Id. at 608-09.
"o See, e.g., Turner, supra note 3, at 58.
" Cf. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reason-
able Use of Tie-ins, Franchises, Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REv.
457 (1966); Note, Business Justification for Tying Agreements: A Retreat from
the Per Se Doctrine, 17 W. RESERvE L. REV. 257 (1965).
71394 U.S. at 514-18 (White, J., dissenting).
[Vol, 48
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anticompetitiveness, and what is the actual policy and factual basis for
finding the defendant's conduct unlawful? The most blatant answer to
this question is that once the standards are fulfilled, anticompetitiveness.
exists. Obviously, this is an answer based on the sheer power of the
courts and made without any conscious attempt to balance interests; but
it helps to underscore the conclusory nature of the per se rule as applied
in Fortner.72
The answer that the Court would undoubtedly give is that these stan-
dards act as unerring indicia of the foreclosure of a substantial amount
of business to the defendant's competitors in the tied product and that
this foreclosure, at the hands of large business, is usually founded
on anticompetitive design. justice Black might also add that, even if
there be no anticompetitive design and although there exists justifica-
tion for the arrangement, this method of competition is so inherently de-
structive of competition by other, usually smaller, businesses in the tied
market that the Court is justified in making the defendant find another
method of competition. 73 However, the very problem with this approach
is that a seller may well find another method of competition-one that
will not be given the label of "tying arrangement" but that will bring
about the same effects. 4
It is suggested that the courts may best be able to effectuate the
policies of the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts in the area of tying
arrangements by consciously examining and balancing the interests in-
volved: those of the seller, the buyer, and the seller's competitors. The
seller may have many motives for conduct similar to that in Fortner,
some of which may not be anticompetitive in design or practice. justice
White suggested a number of salutary interests that the defendant in
Fortner may have had: the conduct may have been merely price com-
petition in a different form, effected by a reduction in the economic price
of the credit rather than of the houses; the defendant may have been
competing in a "hard" market in which there was great practical resis-
tance to price competition; or the defendant may have been expanding
the scope of the market by bringing in buyers who would otherwise be
unable to purchase the prefabricated homes at any price.75 In addition
' See Austin, supra note 3, at 123.
'3 Id. at 122-26.
" See J. ScoTT & E. RocKEFELLER, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATIOx To-
DAY: 1967, at 78 (1967), suggesting that the Standard Oil case, 337 U.S. 293
(1949), had only resulted in the refiner buying retail locations and then leasing
them to retail dealers who were still required to use only the refiner's gasoline.
75 394 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
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to interests previously examined in relation to identification of tying ar-
rangements, sellers may evince other lawful reasons for their action.76
Some, such as business expediency and similar methods used by others
in the defendant's situation, are not likely to be accepted by the courts.77
Others, particularly the interest of a newcomer to an established market,
who is using the tie-in to break into the market,7 and the interests of
those sellers who are within a nascent, technical market requiring them
to have particular expertise,79 may prove to have some significance out-
side personal interest and may thus warrant some type of protection.
Despite the fact that the majority in Fortner took pains to show how
the interests of the plaintiff-buyer were damaged by the tying arrange-
ment, it seems that, on the whole, the plaintiff was actually benefitted
to the extent that he was unable to receive any credit from any source
outside the defendant.80 Of course, the interests of the buyer are not un-
important; those interests-having a free choice of sellers and products
and obtaining quality goods and services at optimum prices-are actually
the public-policy bases for maintaining competition.8 ' The problem with
examining the buyer's interest is that it may be, as in Fortner, so elusive
that it merely compounds the difficulties involved in the balancing process.
The most important interest in tying arrangement cases is that of
the seller's competitors.8 2 The progenitor of the present per se rule
made clear this bias, for in International Salt the Court stated that "[i]t
is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market."83 In Fortner Justice Black suggested that the defendant's com-
petitors in the market for prefabricated homes might find it not only
economically but also legally impossible to provide buyers credit terms
similar to those offered by the defendant.8 4 This factual decision should
Materials cited note 70 supra.
See Austin, supra note 3, at 122.
But see Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-ins, Franchises,
Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. Rnv. 457, 473' (1966).
" Id. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See also Austin, supra note 3,
at 122 (suggesting that a combination of interests may weigh heavily on a
court's decision).
80394 U.S. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
"
1See Austin, supra note 3, at 99.8 See Pearson, supra note 28, at 627-38. Cf. Signode Steel Strapping Co. v.
FTC, 132 F.2d 48, 53 (4th Cir. 1942).
U.International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
8,394 U.S. at 505-06 nn.2 & 3. Justice Black suggested that credit agencies
may be precluded by law from giving one-hundred-per-cent credit in the Fortner
situation. He added that this type of competitive pre-emption would invariably
be unlawful.
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logically have formed the basis of the Court's decision. Thus, had Jus-
tice Black not chosen to embark on a tortuous linguistic search for
"power," he might well have found the answer to the foreclosure issue
by asking three simple questions: Did the defendant's questionable con-
duct result in any sales within the prefabricated home market? If so, were
there enough of these sales to make the defendant's competitors in that
market seek to establish a similar mode of conduct? Finally, was that
mode of conduct unavailable to these competitors? An affirmative answer
to these questions would establish foreclosure; if the defendant were un-
able to provide some overriding justification, the balance could be log-
ically struck against him, and his conduct declared unlawful.
KENNETH B. Hipp
Attorney and Client-Dealing with Clients' Property-the ABA
Revision of Canon Eleven
Historically, the attorney-client relationship has been one of delicate
trust, as observed by Justice Nelson in 1850:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher
trust and confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally
speaking, one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more
anxiously guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them
in a corresponding spirit .... 1
A recent Iowa case, Nadler v. Treptow,2 illustrates the ethical ques-
tions arising when an attorney becomes interested in his client's property.
Attorney Nadler represented Elease Treptow in, among other matters, a
contract for the purchase of real property from the estate of one Pappas.
Financial difficulties prevented Mrs. Treptow's meeting her three-hundred-
dollar-per-month contractual obligation to the estate. Because the "prob-
lem was complicated,"' 3 Nadler was able to purchase from the Pappas
estate at an eight-hundred-dollar reduction the interest that his client
had sought. At least one complication of which the court spoke was the
prior contract with Mrs. Treptow. Through it, presumably, Nadler
learned of the factors that caused the reduction in price: The attorney-
client relationship became one of debtor-creditor/contract vendor.4 Nadler
Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
'- Iowa -, 166 N.W.2d 103 (1969).
Id. at - , 166 N.W.2d at 108 (dissenting opinion).
'Id.
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then brought an action against his client for his full fee; she defended by
asserting a breach of the fiduciary duty stemming from the lawyer-client
relationship. The trial court found that the attorney's purchase was not
against the interest of his client5 and granted him recovery of one thousand
dollars, which was fifty-four per cent of the fee sought. A majority of the
Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed, commenting, "[w]e cannot say that
the [trial] court's findings and conclusions were without support in the
evidence."'
Four members of the court disagreed: "Both the municipal court and
the majority opinion completely ignore the fiduciary relationship of this
plaintiff to defendant, his client."7 The dissent would have applied Canon
Eleven of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics,
which provides:
Dealing with Trust Property. The lawyer should refrain from any
action whereby for his own personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.8
The basic policy underlying the dissent in Nadler as well as Canon
Eleven is that once the client's confidence is reposed in his attorney, the
latter should not be able to use it to his client's detriment or prejudice.'
Otherwise stated,
In America, where the stability of the courts and of all departments of
government rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly es-
sential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be ...
so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the in-
tegrity and impartiality of its administration.... It cannot be so main-
tained unless the conduct and motives of [the men] of our profession
are such as to merit the approval of all just men.' 0
The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Professional
Ethics has stated that generally it is improper for an attorney to purchase
Id. at - 166 N.W.2d at 104.0 Id. at - 166 N.W.2d at 105.
Id. at - 166 N.W.2d at 106 (dissenting opinion).
I ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 11. The Supreme Court of Iowa
has adopted the ABA Canons, with the exception of a portion of Canon 27. IowA
CODE ANN., appendix to § 610, rule 119 (Supp. 1969). Prior to August, 1969, forty-
one states and the District of Columbia had adopted the ABA Canons. Letter
from Frederick R. Franklin, ABA Staff Director for Professional Standards, toJ. Michael Brown, November 13, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Franklin Letter].
'Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850).
" Preambk to ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.
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assets from an estate that he is representing." The New York City Bar
Committee has commented that the entire area of an attorney's dealing in
his client's property is "fraught with danger."'" Suspension of the at-
torney by a state bar association for breach of the fiduciary duty has been
upheld in several instances."
The practical application of Canon Eleven often places stringent re-
quirements on the attorney. Courts are particularly inquiring when an
attorney purports to represent a client and then takes title to property in
his own name. 4 The purchase of a client's property has been allowed in
several cases in which no confidence was breached and the attorney-client
relationship had ended. 5 But courts have invoked the fiduciary relation-
ship in patent infringement suits by clients against their attorneys, 6
and attorneys have been denied the right to purchase a client's real prop-
erty at a foreclosure sale17 or from an estate.' The protection extends to
corporate clients; 19 an attorney may not purchase interests adverse to
those of the corporation he represents. 20 Courts have likewise unmasked
the subterfuge of third-party purchases for the attorney's benefit.2
Transactions between attorney and client, if disputed, have been con-
sidered prima facie fraudulent and invalid. Recurrently, a presumption
"ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 667 (1963) ; accord,
id. No. 250 (1943).
"' WILLIAM NELSON CROMWELL FOUNDATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW
YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' AssociATIoN 291 (1956).
" Lowe v. State Bar, 40 Cal. 2d 564, 254 P.2d 506 (1953) ; Sunderlin v. State
Bar, 33 Cal. 2d 785, 205 P.2d 382 (1949) ; In re Sandblast, 210 Ore. 65, 307 P.2d 532
(1957).
" Mebane v. Broadnax, 183 N.C. 333, 111 S.E. 627 (1922).
"Waters v. Bruner, 355 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1962); Minchen v. Arment, 266
S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
" Reush v. Fischer, 49 F.2d 818 (C.C.P.A. 1931); Goodrum v. Clement, 277
F. 586 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Bumgardner v. Hudson, 277 F. 552 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
" Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 90 N.E.2d 785 (1950) ; Vrooman v. Haw-
baker, 377 Ill. 428, 56 N.E.2d 623 (1944) ; Carson v. Fogg, 34 Wash. 444, 76 P. 112
(1904). Contra, Kelly v. Weir, 243 F. Supp. 588 (E. D. Ark. 1965). In this case
an attorney was allowed to purchase his client's real estate at a foreclosure sale that
commenced when the client, against the advice of the attorney, repeatedly refused
to comply with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited crop pro-
duction per acre and gave the government the right to foreclose for non-com-
pliance with the Act.
"Healy v. Gray, 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222 (1918); Deal v. Migoski, 122
So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1960); In re Sandblast, 210 Ore. 65, 307 P.2d 532 (1957).
" Oil, Inc. v. Martin, 381 Ill. 11, 44 N.E.2d 596 (1942).
"Sea Cove Marina, Inc. v. Uhlendorf, 18 App. Div. 2d 1021, 239 N.Y.S.2d 29,
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 714, 204 N.E.2d 499, 256 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1965).
" Demmel v. Hammett, 360 Mo. 737, 230 S.W.2d 686 (1950) ; Gragg v. Pruitt,
179 Okla. 369, 65 P.2d 994 (1936).
"See, e.g., Baker v. Otto, 180 Md. 53, 55, 22 A.2d 924, 925 (1941).
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of fraud arises,23 and the burden is on the attorney to show that no ad-
vantage has been taken. 4 The transaction may be saved only if the
attorney has fully informed his client of his intentions25 and obtained his
consent,26 and if adequate consideration supports the exchange of prop-
erty. 7 One court has gone as far as to say that without consent the
transaction "is vitiated by the law, irrespective of its merits, fairness, or
good faith.' 28
Although the dissent in Nadler pointed out that "[n]ot once did
plaintiff clearly show just when and under what circumstances he ad-
vised defendant he was going to become her creditor-contract vendor, '20
the trial court found as a fact that full disclosure was made and that the
purchase could actually be to her benefit.8 0 The supreme court recognized
that disclosure to the client was required and affirmed the trial court's
findings, but neglected in its discussion to detail just how Nadler met
the standard. Nadler, therefore, received lenient treatment by the ma-
jority: He was not required to show affirmatively either his disclosure
or the lack of harm to his client; it is uncertain whether he in fact com-
pletely revealed his interest in the property to Mrs. Treptow ;31 and he
concededly did not pay adequate consideration.
If Nadler's conduct violated or was at least questionable under the
ethical standards of his profession, what was the appropriate remedy?
The procedural setting complicates this question, for Mrs. Treptow first
complained of her attorney's ethics when he sued her for his fee. One
remedy could have been a declaration by the court that the property be
held in a constructive trust in favor of the client, as illustrated in Healy
v. Gray.82 Gray, an attorney, represented Healy to secure his appoint-
8 Lawrence v. Tschirgi, 244 Iowa 386, 57 N.W.2d 46 (1953) ; Reeder v. Lund,
213 Iowa 300, 236 N.W. 40 (1931); Baird v. Laycock, 94 S.W.2d 1185 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
2, Swaim v. Martin, 158 Ark. 469, 251 S.W. 26 (1923); G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS
rn LEGAL ETHIcs 155-56 (2d ed. 1920).
" Allison v. Caruthers, 205 Okla. 582, 239 P.2d 759 (1952).
.Demmel v. Hammett, 360 Mo. 737, 230 S.W.2d 686 (1950); It re Sandblast,
210 Ore. 65, 307 P.2d 532 (1957).
2' "It is essential that the sale should be at a price which is fair and reasonable."
Littleton v. Kincaid, 179 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1950); see Deal v. Migoski, 122
So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1960).
28 Gragg v. Pruitt, 179 Okla. 369, 372, 65 P.2d 994, 997 (1936).
21 Iowa at - , 166 N.W.2d at 108 (dissenting opinion).80 Id. at - , 166 N.W.2d at 104.
"The majority (id. at - , 166 N.W.2d at 104) and the dissent (id. at -,
166 N.W.2d at 108) disagreed on this point.
"2 184 Iowa 111, 168 N.W. 222 (1918).
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ment as executor of his father's estate. As a result of this attorney-client
relationship, Gray became aware of and purchased property, which had
first been offered to his client, at five-hundred sixty dollars below the
market price. The court declared a constructive trust in favor of the
client. Arguably, had Mrs. Treptow pursued this course of action, she
might have prevailed as did the plaintiff in Healy; however, she sought
only to deny Nadler his fee.
Perhaps the best deterrent to questionable conduct is to deny the at-
torney compensation. Courts in various situations have followed the
maxim that "[a]n attorney's right to compensation may be defeated by
fraud or misconduct on his part.""3 In Donaldson v. Eaton & Estes"
the plaintiff was allowed to reclaim a large part of an attorney's fee that
the court determined to be in excess of just compensation. The court
stated that "[a]n attorney who acts in bad faith and seeks to secure his
personal advantage to the prejudice of his client may properly be denied
compensation for his services."" Perhaps the majority in Nadler in-
vented its own solution, the fifty-four per cent recovery being its Solomonic
estimate of just compensation. 0
The entire realm of legal ethics, including the attorney-client rela-
tionship, was re-examined by the American Bar Association at the 1969
Dallas Convention; and the existing canons were revised into a new Code
of Professional Responsibility.37 The Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards noted four dissatisfactions with the old Canons: (1)
incomplete coverage of attorney misconduct; (2) a need for editorial re-
vision; (3) a lack of practical sanctions; and (4) modern social changes
23 7 C.J.S. Attorwy and Client § 167(c) (1937). See, e.g., Shelton v. Gwathemy,
201 Misc. 75, 107 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Duffy v. Colonial Trust Co., 287
Pa. 348, 135 A. 204 (1926); Royden v. Ardoin, 160 Tex. 342, 331 S.W.2d 206(1960).
136 Iowa 650, 114 N.W. 19 (1907).
Id. at 656, 114 N.W. at 21.
'0 The trial court gave great weight to testimony that Nadler told Mrs. Treptow
that she owed him one-thousand dollars. - Iowa at - , 166 N.W.2d at 105.
"' The new Code will become effective only if courts and bar associations in
individual states choose to adopt it. The Franklin Letter, supra note 8, states:
As for the Code of Professional Responsibility, our information is that to
date the bar associations of Arkansas, Vermont, and New York have adopted
the Code. However, it is actively being considered by numerous other states
and, as noted in the attachment, several states [Arizona, Nevada, New
Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and perhaps Kentucky]
automatically adopt the rules of ethics of the American Bar Association as
they are promulgated from time to time. Therefore, on January 1, 1970, the
date on which the Code of Professional Responsibility will become effective
for ABA members, the Code will automatically go into effect in those states.
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demanding re-evaluation of ethical standards.3 A totally new format
evolved, embodying three levels of rules with varying degrees of speci-
ficity. First are the nine "Canons," intended as "statements of axiomatic
norms [or] . ..general concepts." 9 The "Ethical Considerations" ap-
plicable to each Canon attempt to offer more specific guidance. Finally,
the "Disciplinary Rules" provide a "minimum level of conduct below
which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action,"4
although no specific procedures and penalties are prescribed. 1
What has become of the old Canon Eleven under the new Code?
It now exists as Canon Four,42 Ethical Consideration 4-5,'18 and Dis-
ciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) .4 Ethical Consideration 4-5 creates two cat-
egories of violations, use of confidential information to the disadvantage
of the client, which is expressly forbidden, and use to the advantage of
the attorney, permitted only if the client consents after a full disclosure.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) includes the traditional mandates of con-
sent and disclosure,45 but any requirement of full consideration is
omitted. 6
Concerning exchanges of information that must be kept secret, the
Ethical Consideration in point is conveniently vague. It refers only to
"Preface to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY at v (Final Draft,
July 1, 1969) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
" Preliminary Statement to CODE at 2.
40 Id.
1 "The code makes no attempt to prescribe either disciplinary procedures or
penalties for violation . .. " Id.
' Canon Four provides: A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client.
'
3 Ethical Consideration 4-5 provides:
A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer
should not use, except with the consent of his client after a full disclosure,
such information for his own purposes. Likewise, a lawyer should be dili-
gent in his efforts to prevent the misuse of such information by his em-
ployees and associates ....
"Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) provides:
Except as permitted by DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself
or of a third person, unless the client consents after a full disclosure.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (C) deals only with minor exceptions to part (1) of the
above.
"CODE, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) (3).
"A plausible explanation is that the Code does not deal specifically with the
purchase of a client's property. Instead, the Code limits generally the use of a
confidence or secret.
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"information acquired during the course of representation. .. ."47 The Dis-
ciplinary Rules are more descriptive: They establish two categories of in-
formation, confidences and secrets, that may not be misused or revealed.
A "confidence" is defined as "information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law."48 One writer sets forth the general law
of privilege as follows:
It is the essence of the [attorney-client] privilege that it is limited
to those communications as to which the client either expressly made
confidential or which he could reasonably assume under the circum-
stances would be understood by the attorney as so intended.
A mere showing that the communication was from client to at-
torney does not suffice, but the circumstances indicating the intention
of secrecy must appear.49
On the other hand, a "secret" refers to "information gained in the pro-
fessional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detri-
mental to the client."50
Thus it appears that the definitions of "confidence" and "secret" both
require an intent on the part of the client that the communication remain
confidential. Would the situation in Nadler have fit either definition?
Probably not. It is unlikely that Mrs. Treptow would have been con-
cerned that her purchase agreement with the Pappas estate remain strictly
confidential; the agreement may even have been general knowledge in the
community.
Apparently adding some form of mens rea to the elements of an at-
torney's misconduct, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) prohibits a lawyer
from "knowingly" abusing his client's confidence. Perhaps this rather
perplexing requirement was included to protect a lawyer in those un-
usual instances in which he unknowingly transmits confidential informa-
tion to a third party, has no reason to believe that use of the information
will disadvantage his client, or is unaware that such information is a
"confidence" or "secret" within the definition. This third possibility is
most unlikely, in that it would be arguable that if Nadler did not know
that the information he received was a "confidence" or "secret," he could
not have violated the Code. Such a rule makes ignorance of the law a
'7 CODE, Ethical Consideration 4-5.
"Id., Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (A).
"C. McCoRmi IcK, HANDBOOK OF TME LAW oF EVIDENCE § 95, at 190-91 (1954).
CoDE, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (A).
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permissible defense, and such an interpretation of the Code was probably
unintended since an even stricter standard is normally required of at-
torneys than of others. The rule should be more explicit in its use of the
word "knowingly."
Why did the justices in Nadler believe that the attorney's conduct
was unethical? Mrs. Treptow was not harmed; she was financially un-
able to complete her purchase of the property in any event.' The answer
is that such conduct causes injury to the integrity of the legal profession
and judicial system. The essence of the fiduciary relationship is the trust
and confidence a client places in his attorney. Such trust must be pro-
tected by the law, or the effectiveness of the judicial system declines.
Given his unique access to information regarding a client's property, an
attorney should not be allowed to use such information to his own advan-
tage-if for no other reasons than basic notions of fairness and equity.
If, as occurred in Nadler, the lawyer becomes his client's creditor, he can
hardly be expected to conduct the client's affairs with the objective zeal
demanded of the advocate-the lawyer's own pecuniary interests become
bound with those of his client.
In summary, the American Bar Association recently has clarified and
strengthened the fiduciary duties of the attorney wishing to deal in his
client's property. Unfortunately; the revision of the ABA Canons prob-
ably would not aid a court in dealing effectively with the situation before
the Iowa court in Nadler. The concept of breach of a fiduciary duty
owed by an attorney to his client, however, should be used by courts in
the future. Such a court-formed doctrine could be developed as a basis
for allowing a defense seeking reduction or disallowance of an attorney's
fee. Instead of passing lightly over the acts required for fulfillment of the
attorney's fiduciary duty, the Iowa court in Nadler should have established
an explicit precedent in fiduciary misconduct by penalizing the lawyer
financially.
J. MICHAEL BROWN
Constitutional Law-First Amendment Rights-
Flag-Burning As Symbolic Expression
In a period when the first amendment's' protection of the individual
from governmental power is being challenged by new and bizarre methods
t1 - Iowa at - , 166 N.W.2d at 104.
'The first amendment binds the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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of communicating protests,2 the Supreme Court in Street v. New York'
declined to decide whether one such method-burning an American
flag-is protected as symbolic free speech. The defendant Street4 was
found guilty under a New York law making it a misdemeanor "publicly
[to] mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon or cast contempt upon
either by words or act. .." any flag of the United States.5 The majority,
through Justice Harlan, held that since he might have been convicted for
his words' and since such a conviction would be unconstitutional, the
judgment must be reversed. By refusing to reach the flag-burning issue,"
the majority failed to settle conclusively a nagging, emotional problem8
and to clarify the relationship between symbolic conduct and the first
amendment.
The dissenting opinions chastised the majority for construing the facts
to find that Street's spoken words ever were in question. Chief Justice
Warren emphasized that the defendant was not convicted for his words
because the lower courts and both parties on appeal addressed themselves
to the issue of the defendant's act of flag-burningf Justice White went
farther in stating that Street's alleged conviction for his words would not
'The recent self-immolations by high school students to protest the Vietnam
War were a form of symbolic communication.
394 U.S. 576 (1969).
'The defendant was a Negro who, having heard of the shooting of James
Meredith in Mississippi, went to a street comer and burned a forty-eight star
American flag that he formerly had displayed on national holidays.
IN.Y. PENAL LAW § 1425(16) (d) (McKinney 1944). This section was re-
pealed in 1967, ch. 791, § 50 [1967] N.Y. LAws 2151, and superseded by N.Y.
GEIN. Bus. LAw § 136 (McKinney 1968), which defines the offense in identical
language. Flag desecration statutes have been enacted by all states and by Con-
gress. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. IV, 1964). There is also a Uniform Flag Law
covering flag desecration. 9B UmIF Ow LAWS ANNOTATED 37-40 (1957).
'The policeman who arrested the defendant across the street from the burning
flag overheard him say to a small crowd, "We don't need no damn flag." Then
Street said to the policeman, "Yes, that is my flag; I burned it. If they let that
happen to Meredith we don't need an American flag." 394 U.S. at 578-79.7 Id. at 576, 581, 594.
' Note Chief Justice Warren's dissent:
In a time when the American flag has increasingly become an integral part
of public protests .... [B]oth those who seek constitutional shelter for acts
of flag desecration perpetrated in the course of a political protest and those
who must enforce the law are entitled to know the scope of constitutional
protection. The Court's explicit reservation of the constitutionality of flag
burning prohibitions encourages others to test in the streets the power of
our States and National Government to impose criminal sanctions upon
those who would desecrate the flag.
Id. at 604-05.
'Id. at 595 (dissenting opinion).
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matter because he was properly convicted for his acts.1" The four dis-
senters were in agreement that flag-burning can be proscribed constitu-
tionally."
Had the majority dealt with the flag-burning issue, it would have
found that Street's argument that such action is protected speech encoun-
ters serious obstacles. Before any communication can be protected, it
must be in a form that is consistent with the first amendment. Although
the Court has long defined the amendment's protection of free speech to
encompass methods of communication other than traditionally recog-
nized political oratory and distribution of pamphlets, it has made clear
that an otherwise illegal act cannot be given first-amendment protection
merely because the act was intended to express an idea. 2 And though
the Court has recognized the communicative value of tangible symbols,'8
it has emphasized that communicative tendency is not alone sufficient to
warrant first-amendment protection.' 4 Nevertheless, such activities as
the display of a red flag,15 a forced flag salute,'" a civil rights parade,1 7
picketing by labor groups,' 8 a lunch counter sit-in, 9 and the wearing of
black armbands in opposition to the Vietnam war" have been held
methods of expression 2' protected under the first amendment.
In cases in which the Court has decided to extend the free-speech
concept to non-verbal means of expression, it has dealt with two basic
and often competing concerns-a concern in avoiding disruption and a
concern in assuring to all members and groups in society the ability to
influence the government by appealing to the public conscience. The
former touches traditional governmental police power; the latter is the
basis of the first amendment. Street's contention that the first amendment
10 Id. at 614-15 (dissenting opinion).
" Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, Justice Fortas and Justice White dis-
sented.
" United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): "Sym-
bolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an
emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a
short cut from mind to mind." Id. at 632.
,See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
17 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
19 Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
"oTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
2' See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation as free speech);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion pictures as free
speech).
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should be extended to include flag-burning ultimately must be consistent
with both considerations.
Stromberg v. California,22 which held that an individual's display of
a red flag in opposition to organized government was protected as free
speech, was the first case extending the first amendment to cover symbolic
activity. The Court in that decision expressed the underlying objective
of the first amendment as "[t] he maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means .... ,2 3
With this objective in mind the Court has greatly expanded the definition
of speech to meet the exigencies of society. From Stromberg's original
extension to include an individual's passive display of a tangible symbol,
the Court expanded the definition to accommodate labor and civil rights
protests when the mass human behavior is symbolic in itself.24 Such group
demonstrations have been called "the poor man's printing press"25 be-
cause they provide a means of expression for groups in society that are
often unable to exert pressure adequately through the normal channels of
communication.2 6 The Court's decisions to include such activities under
the first amendment's protection have certainly been motivated at least in
part by the deprivations that both labor and the Negro have struggled to
overcome. 
2
22-283 U.S. 359 (1931).
2  Id. at 369.
"'E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring): "Such a demonstration, in the circum-
stances . . .is as much a part of the free trade in ideas . . .as is verbal expres-
sion .... It, like speech, appeals to good sense and the power of reason as ap-
plied through public discussion just as much as, if not more than, a public oration
delivered from a soapbox at a street corner."
"- H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRsT AmENDMENT 133 (1965).
" Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut off
to large groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal
complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; courts
may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly. Those who do not control
television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers or
circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited type of access
to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of ob-
struction and harassment as long as the assembly and petition are peace-
able....
"' Velvel, Freedom of Speech and the Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 KAN. L.
REv. 149, 151 (1968), advances the idea that the growing strength of labor unions
was a factor in the eventual cutback of protection given to picketing. See also
Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO
AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 6 (1965): "[A]s a thumbnail summary of the last
two or three decades of speech issues in the Supreme Court, we may come to see
the Negro as winning back for us the freedoms the Communists [in cases such as
1970]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Similar compensatory factors may be present in Street's case. His ex-
pression was aimed at racial intolerance, a cause having constitutional
as well as ethical underpinnings. Furthermore, his protest was individual
in character rather than associated with mass activity. In today's mas-
sive, bureaucratic society, the power of most individuals to communicate
is indeed small. Bizarre, symbolic behavior may be the only way for an
individual to make his beliefs heard.2" Moreover, individual conduct is
generally less likely to concern the police power, for it does not involve
the mass coercion and intimidation that group behavior often does. Since
fewer people are likely to be present, there are fewer problems with traffic
control, litter, and permits, as well as less potential for violence. 20
Even if the Court were to decide that flag burning should be in-
corporated as an avenue of expression encompassed by the first amend-
ment, protection of such a method would not be automatic. Traditional
oral methods of communication may be abridged if there are overriding
governmental interests in doing so.80 Justice Harlan's majority opinion in
Street included four possible interests of the government in the defen-
dant's oral activity:
(1) an interest in deterring appellant from vocally inciting others to
commit unlawful acts; (2) an interest in preventing appellant from
uttering words so inflammatory that they would provoke others to re-
taliate physically against him, thereby causing a breach of the peace;
(3) an interest in protecting the sensibilities of passers-by who might
be shocked by appellant's words about the American flag; and (4) an
interest in assuring that appellant, regardless of the impact of his words
upon others, showed proper respect for our national emblem.31
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961)] seemed
to have lost for us."
28 It might be argued that behavior such as flag desecration would be less
bizarre and therefore would receive less publicity if there were no laws against it.
Such an assertion, however, overlooks that contemporary attitudes of the majority
are more relevant in determining whether an action is considered bizarre than
is the illegality of the conduct.
9Justice Douglas seemed to recognize such a distinction between group be-
havior and individual behavior in his concurring opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969):
Picketing can be regulated when it comes to the "plus" or "action" side of
the protest. It can be regulated as to the number of pickets and the place
and hours because traffic and other community problems would otherwise
suffer. But none of these considerations are implicated in the symbolic pro-
test to the Vietnam war in the burning of a draft card.
"o Cf. State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 341, 25 A.2d 491 (1942), in which a convic-
tion was said to be proper when based on oral criticism of the flag. The judgment
was reversed on other grounds.81394 U.S. at 591.
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The first three interests, the Court concluded, were not applicable to the
facts in Street. 2 The fourth interest, while applicable to the facts, was the
very type of governmental interest against which the first amendment
offers protection. "[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do
not matter much." 8
Although the Court concluded that these interests were not sufficient
to permit state action to abridge Street's oral exhortations, it does not
necessarily follow that they are insufficient to prohibit flag-burning; the
Court has said that the first amendment does not give the same protection
to those who communicate by "conduct" as to those who communicate by
"pure speech." '34 While there may be good reasons for not giving all
forms of expression the same amount of protection,8 5 such a dichotomy
should not be over-emphasized; there can be no such thing as "pure
speech." As a scholar in the field points out: "[A]ll speech is necessarily
'speech plus.' If it is oral, it is noise and may interrupt someone else;
if it is written, it may be litter."36 The only true line between what is
and what is not subject to regulation lies between beliefs and ideas, on
the one hand, and actions of any form, on the other.37
Underlying this dichotomy between "pure speech" and "speech plus"
seems to be the assumption that "speech plus" is potentially more dis-
ruptive than "pure speech." In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District,38 the Court held that school children wearing
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War were engaging in a symbolic
act protected by the first amendment. Terming the activity "closely akin
to 'pure speech,' 9 justice Fortas emphasized the silent and passive na-
ture of these protests and the absence of any fear of a disturbance. Soon
after his Tinker decision, he concurred in upholding the suspension from
college of students who engaged in an "aggressive and violent demonstra-
"° Id. at 591-92.
" West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943),
quoted in Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 593 (1968).
" Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
"Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (Jackson, J., concurring):
"The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound
truck and the street comer orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dan-
gers. Each, in my view, is a law unto itself."
H. KALvEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 201 (1965).
"Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940): "[This] Amendment em-
braces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute,
but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society."
8393 U.S. 503 (1969).
80 Id. at 505-06.
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tion, and not in a peaceful, nondisruptive expression, such as was in-
volved in Tinker."4 There have been similarly distinguishable results in
civil rights demonstration cases 41 and in picketing cases42 in which certain
activity was labeled within the scope of the first amendment while similar
but potentially more disruptive activity was not.
The New York Court of Appeals relied on the disruption factor in
sustaining Street's conviction." Terming Street's activity "incendiary," 44
Judge Fuld quoted the Supreme Court's language in Halter v. Nebraska :
"Insults to [the] flag have been the cause of war, and indignities put
upon it . . . have often been resented and sometimes punished on the
spot."'40 Furthermore, the New York court likened flag-burning to an
abusive epithet, a category of communication that receives no first-
amendment protection because of its offensive nature and because its con-
tent is not of public importance.47
However, in United States v. O'Brien,"8 the case most similar to
Street on its facts, the Supreme Court made clear that governmental in-
terests less primary than the maintenance of order may be sufficient to
foreclose expressions such as Street's. In holding that burning of draft
cards is not within the first amendment's protection, the Court said that
even if such activity was a form of expression protected by the first amend-
ment, a "substantial" 49 state interest would warrant an incidental abridge-
ment of that expression. Although the Court in O'Brien possibly could
have relied on the disruptive potential of public draft card burning, it did
o Barker v. Hardway, 394 U.S. 905 (1969) (concurring opinion).
41 Compare Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) with Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
" Compare Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) with Milk Wagon Drivers
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
"People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 229 N.E.2d 187, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1967).
"Id. at 237, 229 N.E.2d at 191, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
"205 U.S. 34 (1907).
"Id. at 41.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1941).
"391 U.S. 367 (1968).
"Id. at 377. Such a governmental regulation is justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an
important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restric-
tion on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
Id. In his concurring opinion Justice Harlan added the caveat that these interests
must not "foreclose considerations of First Amendment claims in those rare in-
stances when an 'incidental' restriction upon expression ... has the effect of en-
tirely preventing a 'speaker' from reaching a significant audience with whom he
could not otherwise lawfully communicate." Id. at 388-89 (concurring opinion).
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not do so. Rather, it found that the governmental interest in the admin-
istrative efficiency of the Selective Service was sufficiently compelling to
deny this avenue of communication.
By similar analysis the Court in Street would have had to make the
determination whether the government's interest in prohibiting flag-burn-
ing is "substantial." Divested of its symbolic value, the flag is merely a
piece of cloth and does not serve a substantial purpose as was found for
draft cards in O'Brien. The government's interest in preventing breaches
of the peace, which the New York Court of Appeals stated was the tradi-
tional basis for flag-desecration statutes,5 ' should not be sufficient to fore-
close completely this form of expression. Such an interest can be served
more adequately by other statutes directly aimed at preventing breaches
of the peace51 or by regulation of the time, place, and manner of such
communication.5 2 Thus the question remains whether the government's
interest in protecting its national symbols is sufficiently substantial to pro-
hibit the use of these symbols in a desecrating, but communicative, man-
ner.
5 3
By striking down statutes requiring flag salutes and pledges of al-
legiance in schools, the Court in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette5j4 seemed to negative the assertion that the government
can compel conformity and patriotism for the purpose of promoting na-
tional unity.55 National unity is a legitimate end, but it must be pro-
moted "by persuasion and example""0 rather than by means of compulsion.
ro People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 236, 229 N.E.2d 187, 190, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491,
495 (1967). But see Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 43 (1907), for the assertion
that the flag-desecration statute also "had its origin in a purpose to cultivate a feel-
ing of patriotism."
r Such statutes as breach of the peace and disorderly conduct could serve to
punish the defendant if he causes disruptive activity.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (picketing).
' There seems to be governmental acceptance of the use of such symbols in a
manner that supports the government, e.g., the widespread use of flag decals on
automobile windshields.
1319 U.S. 624 (1943).
" Barnette expressly overruled Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940). Note justice Frankfurter's statement in Gobitis concerning the public
policy behind compulsory flag-saluting:[T]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind
and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people. ...
The flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal dif-
ferences.
310 U.S. at 596. See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), in which the Court
speaks of the "object of maintaining the flag as an emblem of National Power and
National honor." Id. at 42.
" West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
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Although the prohibition of the desecration of national symbols is not the
same as compelling acts of allegiance, such a prohibition may be going be-
yond the limits of persuasion and example.
Despite Barnette, however, the dissenters in Street seem to have as-
serted that there is a legitimate and substantial governmental interest in
promoting patriotism by means of national symbols. In saying that
desecration of the flag can be proscribed, Chief Justice Warren spoke of
the "power to protect the flag from acts of desecration and disgrace" 7
rather than a power to avoid the disruption attendant an act of abusing
the flag. Justice Fortas, moreover, termed the flag "a special kind of per-
sonalty ...burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions."5 8
From the emphatic nature of the dissenting opinions, from lower court
decisions sustaining flag-desecration statutes and from the lack of any
strong precedent upholding such activity, the majority's refusal to meet
the issue of flag-burning should be taken as a rejection of Street's con-
tention that such an avenue of expression is protected by the first amend-
ment. Nevertheless, the Court should realize that there are many factors
in favor of expanding the first amendment's protection to include peaceful
symbolic communication of any kind. Moreover, the recognition of an
interest in promoting patriotic values should be a very limited one, for
such an interest could lead to the kind of enforced conformity that is ab-
horrent to a system of government founded upon individual rights.
WILIAm M. TROTT
Corporations-Voting Trusts-Should Trust Principles Apply
to Close Corporations?
Ever since the corporate form of doing business became prevalent
around the turn of the century, the attorney for the close corporation has
been troubled by many difficult problems; and in trying to solve them, he
has been "hampered by doctrines which are meaningful only in the con-
text of the large, publicly held company."' One of these problems is that
of providing some method for ensuring continuity and stability of man-
agement when no one stockholder, or faction of stockholders, owns a ma-
jority of voting stock. Another is that of providing means for resolving
5 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 605 (1968).
58 Id. at 616-17.
'Note, Close Corporations: Voting Trust Legislation and Resolution of Dead-
locks, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 590 (1967).
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deadlocks if two stockholders or factions each own half of the voting
stock, or if there are high voting or quorum requirements with no stock-
holder or faction owning enough stock to meet them. As a practical
matter, such difficulties do not arise in the widely-held corporation,
"[w]here the shareholder . . . is rarely able to exercise any meaningful
control"2 and the "ability of management... to sustain itself.., is a fact
of economic life."' In the close corporation, however, a slight shift of
stock ownership or the lost alliance of only one voting shareholder can
transfer control of the corporation to a competing faction; and if the
voting power resides in two equally-divided groups, deadlock is always a
threat. Furthermore, when close corporations have been unsuccessful in
preventing such deadlocks or crippling disputes and litigation results, the
courts generally have been unable satisfactorily to resolve them because
of inadequate statutory remedies.4
A recent Massachusetts case, Selig v. Wexler,5 presents a classic ex-
ample of an unsuccessful use of the voting trust to prevent deadlock and
ensure stability. It also illustrates the inability of the court to satisfac-
torily deal with the problem because it felt constrained to apply trust law
in the absence of other statutory provisions dealing specifically with this
area of corporate control.
Selig involved a manufacturing corporation whose stock was owned
equally by plaintiff Selig and defendant Wexler. The two owners, often
unable to agree on the management policy of the corporation, entered into
a voting trust agreement whereby all of the stock was placed in trust,
and the owners and the corporate counsel, Mr. Riemer, were selected
trustees. Riemer was considered a neutral trustee-director possessing the
tie-breaking vote. This arrangement allowed the corporation to function
smoothly, even to prosper, for about eight years. Selig, however, was not
content. Riemer, the "neutral" trustee, constantly sided with Wexler.6
Two years before the agreement was to expire, Wexler and Riemer
urged that it be renewed; and after extensive negotiations, during which
both parties were represented by counsel and business advisors,1 a new
'Note, The Voting Trust: California Erects a Barrier to a Rational Law of
Corporate Control, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1210, 1215 (1966).
aId. 1212.
'In most states the only remedy is dissolution. See 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE COR-
PoAviOxs § 9.29 (1958).
'- Mass. - , 247 N.E.2d 567 (1969).
0 Id. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 569.
"Brief for Appellant at 25, Selig v. Wexler, - Mass. - , 247 N.E.2d 567
(1969).
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voting trust agreement was executed. It provided for an additional di-
rector to resolve deadlocks by means of a rather intricate formula.8 Both
Selig and Wexler entered into lifetime employment contracts with the
corporation, and the agreement provided that the trust was to continue at
least until the death of the survivor.9 Thus both Selig and Wexler, who
apparently had complete knowledge of what the agreement entailed, ir-
revocably bound themselves to abide by it for the remainder of their lives.
The trust remained in effect for about two years. Selig again grew
dissatisfied because Riemer and Silverman, the two supposedly neutral
directors, always sided with Wexler." After Selig attempted without
success' to take control at the annual meeting, when the terms of the
two neutral directors were to expire, he brought suit against Wexler and
Riemer and asked the court to terminate the trust.
The trial court, apparently without authority to provide specific posi-
tive relief, ordered that if the voting trust could be amended within sixty
days so as to provide for a truly neutral trustee and one or more neutral
directors, the bill would be dismissed.12 Since no amendment was made,
the court granted the termination requested by Selig, and the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts affirmed. 8
After finding that the neutral directors had in fact been partial, and
that this lack of impartiality frustrated the trust's purposes, the court set
forth the principles of law on which it based its decision to terminate the
trust:
'The agreement provided that there would continue to be eight directors,
three chosen by Selig, three by Wexler, plus Riemer and Silverman [the
company accountant]. . . . The neutral directors were to be chosen by a
vote of four of the five trustees. In the event of an impasse, the Com-
pany's by-laws were to be amended to provide for an [sic] ninth director.
The directors then in office would attempt to choose the seventh, eight,
and ninth directors from six nominees, three nominated by Selig and three
by Wexler. Each such nominee had to be either a Company officer earning
at least $15,000 a year or a former director. Every director was required
to cast a vote for four different nominees. If this procedure also produced
a deadlock, then a selection was to be made from the nominees by lot.
The voting trustees, as required by the agreement, would then elect the
candidates so chosen.
- Mass. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 570.
Id.
0Id. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 571.
Id. Selig had the two members of his family who were directors resign in
order to be eligible for election as "neutral' directors under the deadlock-breaking
plan. These vacancies were to be filled by other members of the Selig family.
Wexler prevented this action by adjourning the meeting.
22 Id. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 572.
13 Id.
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There is no question that voting trusts are valid in this Common-
wealth. The rules of trust law in general apply to voting trusts,
unless the terms of the trust agreement provide otherwise. Undoubted-
ly a trust may be terminated if the purposes for which it was created
become impossible of accomplishment. We are of the opinion that
under this principle a voting trust may likewise be terminated when
its purposes have become frustrated or impossible. 14
The court then stated that impossibility and frustration are not exactly
the same, and that although it was not impossible to carry out the terms
of the trust, its objectives had been defeated. In order to support its de-
cision, the court resorted to contract law and a Connecticut case holding
that
[t]he doctrine of frustration of purpose, which has more modern
origins . . . [than the doctrine of impossibility] excuses a promisor
in certain situations where the objectives of the contract have been
utterly defeated by circumstances arising after the formation of the
agreement .... Excuse is allowed under this rule even though there
is no impediment to actual performance. 15
It is important first to point out that the court did not declare this
trust to be invalid but held only that its purpose had been frustrated.
Assuming this determination to be correct, and assuming that the court
was justified in following the established,16 though questioned,17 authority
that the rules of trust law in general apply to voting trusts, it is necessary
to determine whether such law was correctly applied. There is much au-
thority supporting the termination of regular trusts if the purpose has been
accomplished or if such accomplishment has become impossible or il-
legal.' But the treatises, including the ones cited by the court, do not
mention frustration of purpose as a ground for termination, and Selig
appears to be the first case expressly holding that a voting trust is ter-
minable for such a reason.
I4 d. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 572-73. (Citations omitted).Hess v. Dumouchell Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 350-51, 225 A.2d 797, 801
(1966).
"° G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRuSTES § 251 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
BOGERT]; Gose, Legal Characteristics and Consequences of Voting Trusts, 20
WAsH. L. REv. 129 (1945).
"See Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 59 A. 773 (Ct. Err. & App. 1904);
National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, 126 Misc. 753, 214 N.Y.S. 643
(Sup. Ct. 1926).
" Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 193, 196-97, 124 N.E.2d 226, 229 (1954);
BOGERT, § 1002 (2d ed. 1962) ; A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 335 (3d ed. 1967) ; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TRiuSTS § 335 (1959).
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It is true that both impossibility and frustration are grounds for dis-
charge of the duty to perform a contract,'1 but no authority has been
found for extending the excuse of frustration to trust law. The case20
cited by the court in support of its analogy to contract law does not
justify such an extension: It dealt exclusively with a contract, and no
trust was involved.
The court in Selig distinguished between the partiality of the trustee
and the frustration of the purpose of the trust as grounds for termina-
tion.21 It emphasized that the reason for termination was not Riemer's
lack of independence as a trustee, but the frustration of the trust's pur-
poses.
The decision that the trust's purposes had been frustrated was based
on the conclusion that the neutral trustee [and] the neutral directors
... were not in fact independent or impartial [and since the] existing
neutral directors . . .would be entitled to vote [and since] Riemer
and Silverman were in fact not neutral directors; therefore the pro-
cedure could not have been carried out as intended, and the purpose
of the trust was frustrated.22
Since the frustration of purpose resulted from the partisan alliance of the
neutral trustee and directors, the distinction seems technical at best. The
fiction was necessary, however, since under trust law the lack of inde-
pendence of the trustee would be grounds only for his removal23 and not
for termination of the trust since equity will not permit a trust to fail for
lack of a trustee.24 The court applied its interpretation of trust law not
only to the trustee but also to the directors; a distinction between the func-
tion of the two should have been made. That two of the existing directors
were no longer neutral would not seem to impeach the validity of the
underlying agreement by which they were elected, but would raise only
the question of their competency as directors and whether they had vio-
lated their fiduciary duty as such. Trust law would certainly not be ap-
plicable to resolve such a question. 5
" 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1322 (1950).
"
0Hess v. Dumouchell Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 225 A.2d 797 (1966).
2 Mass. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 572 n.5.
22 d. at - , 247 N.E.2d at 573.
" BOGERT § 527 (2d ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 107 (1950).
"'Attorney Gen. v. Goodell, 180 Mass. 538, 62 N.E. 962 (1902); BOGERT § 150(2d ed. 1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 32 (1959).
"According to corporation law, however, a removal-for-cause action can be
brought against a director by the corporation itself or by a shareholder. Cause
includes incompetency and breach of fiduciary duty. W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS §§ 351-56 (perm. ed. rev. 1969).
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The most significant aspect of Selig is the fact that the court felt
constrained to apply trust law in the first place. Without a single reference
to the principles of corporation law, the court "solved" ' what was es-
sentially a corporate power struggle. While it is true that the legal me-
chanism employed in this case was a voting "trust," substance rather than
form should control.
The voting trust was devised to avoid the effect of the anti-separation
doctrine, which invalidates any agreement or device separating irre-
vocably the voting power of stock from its ownership. Use of a trust
transfers the legal ownership of the stock, including the voting rights, to a
trustee; the stockholder receives trust certificates evidencing his "bene-
ficial ownership."2
The voting trust was designed and eventually sanctioned to effectuate
a binding separation of voting power from ownership, although re-
liance was placed on the fiction that the anti-separation doctrine is not
violated by the trust device because the vote remains with the legal
owner. This fiction only impedes analysis and should be abandoned.29
Since there is considerable evidence that such separation is no longer con-
trary to public policy when there are valid reasons for it,"0 the fiction
of the voting trust is no longer justified. When such a device is encoun-
tered, the courts should look past the trust form and consider the sub-
stance of the agreement itself.
Furthermore, it is at least questionable whether voting trusts are true
trusts."' Although the courts have generally stated that they are and
that trust law applies,"2 there is authority to the contrary. In Warren v.
Pim83 the court said:
But in truth and in essence, and for all purposes of a court of equity,
a voting trust that has for its sole object the permanent separation
2' It is quite possible that the parties are in a worse situation than before since
continued litigation is almost certain and the continued existence of this profitable
company is placed in jeopardy.
1 F. O'NEALi, CLosE CooIATioNs § 5.04, at 227 (1958).
.Id. § 5.31.
29 18 STAN. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1217.
o "[C]onsistency does not permit the conclusion . . . that the present public
policy of this state condemns the separation of voting rights from beneficial stock
ownership." Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 229, 222 A.2d 800, 807 (Sup. Ct.
1966). See, e.g., W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoxs § 2080, at 395-96 (perm.
ed. rev. 1969) ; 18 STAN. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1212-14.
91See note 17 supra.3
"See note 16 snpra.
8'66 N.J. Eq. 353, 356, 59 A. 773, 776 (Ct. Er. & App. 1904).
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of the voting power from the substantial ownership of the shares is
not a putting of the shares in trust.
A New York court has agreed.
Equally untenable is the suggestion that the court should treat this
as a genuine trust agreement, and under general equity powers desig-
nate a trustee to effectuate its purposes. It is not a real trust agree-
ment under which equity exercises such function, but a mere voting
trust agreement.3 4
Legislatures, by commonly using the word "trustee," have implied
that voting trusts are true trusts; however, they have not been satisfied
to permit these voting agreements to be governed solely by common
trust law but have imposed restrictions completely repugnant to estab-
lished trust-law principles. Typical is the North Carolina statute" limit-
ing the duration of voting trusts to ten years and preserving for the
"beneficial owners" many of the attributes of legal owners or stock-
holders. In California the legislature has made voting trusts terminable
at will by a majority of the beneficiaries.86
Attitudes surrounding the voting trust and the restrictions placed
on them have little relevance to the close corporation.
A close corporation is, in essence, a contractual agreement among a
few shareholders; hence freedom of contract has exerted a strong in-
fluence upon the law's attitude toward such enterprises. The emerging
view is that a unanimous agreement of the shareholders should be
permitted to accomplish any lawful objective37
The basic tests of the validity of any provisions of a shareholders' agree-
ment are whether they are compatible with public policy, whether they ad-
here to state laws and the corporate charter, and whether they adversely
affect the rights of creditors or other shareholders.8 8 In Selig, the court
failed to consider the first two of these tests, and in dealing with the third,
it gave no weight to the fact that the agreement was the result of unani-
mous stockholder action.39
" National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, 126 Misc. 753, - , 214
N.Y.S. 643, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
"N.C. GE1x. STAT. §55-72 (1967).
"CAL. CoRp. CoDE §2231 (1965).
' 67 COIuLU. L. REv., supra note 1, at 596.
Morganstern, Agreements for Small Corporation Control, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L.
REV. 324, 327 (1968).
" See Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309, 314 (1882), in which the court
held that agreements resulting from unanimous shareholder action should be given
weight against attack. See also 1 'NAL, supra note 27, at § 5.24.
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There is evidence of a trend toward a more realistic and enlightened
view that increased contractual flexibility and freedom will be allowed
and enforced in situations involving close corporations.4" Furthermore,
indications are that the more enlightened state legislatures have recog-
nized the need for statutory provisions dealing specifically with control
problems of close corporations.41 California has a procedure42 whereby a
provisional director may be appointed by the court in case of deadlock.
This provisional director has all of the powers of other directors and is
thus able to cast the tie-breaking vote and break the deadlock.
A more far-reaching remedy is the compulsory buy-out of shares of a
dissenting stockholder. This provision was developed under section 210
of the English Companies Act of 1948,"3 and has been substantially en-
acted in Connecticut.44 It authorizes the court to order the majority
stockholder or "oppressor" shareholder to buy the injured stockholder's
shares at a fair price as determined by the court. While this remedy may
seem harsh, it does prevent the possible dissolution of a viable corpora-
tion and at the same time insures that the injured shareholders are fairly
compensated.
A third remedy, and by far the most comprehensive, is also taken
from section 210 of the English Companies Act. This provision, which
has been adopted only by South Carolina in the United States, allows the
court to "make such order or grant such relief, other than dissolution, as
in its discretion it deems appropriate."45
Selig emphasizes the need for legislation providing such remedies.
If any of these legislative solutions had been available to the court, it
would have been able to deal with the problem much more effectively and
realistically. Until such statutory remedies are available, however, court
analysis in situations involving voting trusts should deal with the sub-
" See Weil v. Beresth, 154 Conn. 12, 220 A.2d 456 (1966), in which the court
specifically enforced a shareholder agreement; Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch.
222, 222 A.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1966), in which the court upheld a shareholder agree-
ment in a situation similar to Selig; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (Supp. 1968);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1965).
"' Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise
Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 864 (1965); accord,
Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for
Reform, 55 VA. L. REv. 1043 (1969).
4- CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (1965).
's Companies Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 210 (1948).
"CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 33-384 (1961).
42 S. C. CODE ANN. § 12022.23 (Supp. 1968). Such relief includes but is not
limited to amending the by-laws; changing any resolution of the corporation;
directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation, shareholders, directors, or of-
ficers; and providing for purchase of a shareholder's stock at a fair price.
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stance of the agreement and should more accurately reflect the true nature
of the voting "trust"-a corporate control device.
TURNER VANN ADAMS
Criminal Law-Involuntary Manslaughter Arising Out of
Business Transactions
In Commonwealth v. Feinberg1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the conviction of a merchant on five counts of involuntary man-
slaughter arising out of the sale to and consumption by certain indi-
viduals of Sterno, a jelly-like substance intended for heating purposes.
Sitting without a jury, the trial court determined that the defendant knew
or should have known first, that some of his purchasers intended to con-
sume rather than to burn the substance and second, that consumption
of it could be lethal.' Evidence on the former issue was that in selling
Sterno the defendant recognized an order to "make one" as a request for
a can of Sterno to drink, often referred to Sterno as shoe polish, and fre-
quently requested customers to hide their purchased Sterno as they left
the premises.3 Directed toward the latter issue was evidence that each can
of the lethal Sterno was marked on the lid as follows: "Institutional
Sterno. Danger. Poison. Not for home use. For commercial and in-
dustrial use only."4 The chemical contents of the industrial Sterno were
not stated on the container, and the defendant was not otherwise informed
of those contents. The non-lethal Sterno that the defendant had ap-
parently been selling for some time was marked "Caution. Flammable.
For use only as a fuel."' Both containers were identical except that the
industrial Sterno did not have a paper wrap-around label.
The supreme court applied contrasting legal tests to each of these two
problems. It repeatedly stated that the defendant "knew or should have
known" that the Sterno would be lethal if consumed.' Evidence in the
nature of objective facts, such as the contrasting markings on the con-
tainers of lethal and non-lethal Sterno, supported this conclusion. Apply-
ing an objective standard, the court found that since a reasonable man
would have been aware of the poisonous nature of the Sterno, the defen-
'433 Pa. 558, 253 A.2d 636 (1969).
'Id. at - , 253 A.2d at 641.
'Commomvealth v. Feinberg, 211 Pa. Super. 100, 103 n.3, 234 A.2d 913, 914
n.3 (1967).
'Id. at 103, 234 A.2d at 914.5Id.
8433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 641, 643, 644.
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dant would be charged with that knowledge." On the other hand, the
court stated several times in Feinberg that the defendant did in fact know
that his patrons intended to consume the substance.8 Evidence support-
ing that conclusion was in the nature of subjective proof of the defen-
dant's actual knowledge such as his own actions and words. By applying
both the subjective and objective tests the court did not limit itself strictly
to either one.
Involuntary manslaughter is commonly said to be the killing of an-
other through the commission of reckless and wanton acts. Its essence is
"intentional conduct, by way either of commission or omission, where
there is a duty to act, which involves a high degree of likelihood that
substantial harm will result to another."9 In Feinberg the conduct in
question, selling Sterno, was an intentional act. There was a high degree
of likelihood that harm would result due to the lethal nature of the Sterno
and the probability that the "skid-row" alcoholics would drink it. There-
fore, whether the defendant was under a duty is the major issue in the
case.
A duty to act arises from the obligation to conform to a standard of
care.'0 Three different standards of care were proposed at various
stages in the history of this case. A merchant might be required to as-
certain how a purchaser intended to use an item purchased." If the use
were dangerous, selling the item would subject the merchant to criminal
" So far as perception is concerned, it seems clear that the actor must give
to his surroundings the attention which a standard reasonable man would
consider necessary under the circumstances, and that he must use such sense
as he has to discover what is readily apparent. He may be negligent in
failing to look, or in failing to observe what is visible when he does look.
W. PROssER, LAW or TORTS § 32, at 160 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PRossER].
8 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d 641-42. Once, however, the court unexplainably
stated that the defendant sold the substance "knowing or having reason to know"
that his patrons intended to consume rather than to burn it. Id. at - , 253 A.2d
at 642. In addition, the court quoted from the Pennsylvania intermediate appellate
court, which concluded that the defendant "might reasonably have expected" pur-
chasers to drink the substance. Id. at -, 253 A.2d at 642; quoting 211 Pa. Super.
at 110, 234 A.2d 917 (1967). This 1967 opinion is cited in 40 Am. JUR. 2d
Homicide § 86 (1968) to support the following proposition:
Thus, it has been held that a merchant in a "skid-row" district who sold a
solidified alcohol, popularly called "canned heat" which had additives speci-
fied by the United States government to render it unfit for drinking purposes,
to purchasers whom he knew or should have known intended to use the sub-
stance for drinking purposes, could be held guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter where the purchasers died as a result of drinking the substance.
o Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (1944).1
oPROSSER § 53, at 331.
11433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
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liability for the harmful consequences. Broader even than strict liability
in tort,"2 this comprehensive standard of care was rejected summarily
by the supreme court.'3 The intermediate appellate court expressed the
standard that it adopted as follows:
In light of the recognized weaknesses of the purchasers of the product,
and [defendant's] greater concern for profit than with the results of
his actions, he was grossly negligent and demonstrated a wanton and
reckless disregard for the welfare of those whom he might reasonably
have expected to use the product for drinking purposes.14
That court applied to defendant's behavior an objective standard based
on the actions of a reasonable man. The third possible standard of care
is the apparent holding of the supreme court: A merchant is bound by a
legal duty not to sell an item only if he is aware of dangerous abnormal
use "contemplated" by a purchaser.'" Although the court appeared to
choose the subjective standard (what the defendant actually knew) in-
stead of the objective standard (what he should have known), it still left
doubt by stating once in the opinion that the defendant "knew or should
have known" the intentions of his customers.'
Feinberg is novel because of the court's application of a duty to a
merchant who sells an item that may be lethal if used in an abnormal way.
The court explained that it was controlled by the "black letter law"'7 of
Thiede v. State,'" an old Nebraska case holding that a person who unin-
tentionally gave poisonous liquor to another was guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. It is important to note, however, that Thiede is distin-
guishable from Feinberg by the same facts making the latter a significant
case. Thiede involved criminal liability for the defendant who simply
offered moonshine liquor to a friend; Feinberg involved a sale by a mer-
chant. The duty of the former was to provide a nonlethal drink. The
same duty would require the latter to insure that any item out of hun-
dreds or even thousands sold would be safe for normal use. Although
" PRoSSER § 96, at 667-68. The seller is not liable in tort if a purchaser uses
an item in an unforeseen way: McCready v. United Iron & Steel Co., 272 F.2d
700 (10th Cir. 1959) (using window casements as a ladder); Schfranek v. Ben-jamin Moore & Co., 54 F.2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (stirring a wall decorating com-
pound with a finger); Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Spring-
field, Mo., Ct. App. 1944) (intentionally setting a finger nail polish on fire).
"433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
" 211 Pa. Super. at 110, 234 A.2d at 917 (emphasis added).
433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
See note 8 supra.
' 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 641.
'8 106 Neb. 48, 182 N.W. 570 (1921).
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courts have recognized such a duty to some extent in the law of torts,' 9
they have not previously carried it over into criminal law. Thiede is also
distinguishable because in Feinberg an abnormal use was the cause of
death. This fact compounds the stringent result reached by applying the
duty of Thiede to the facts of Feinberg. Under such an application, a
merchant must refrain from selling not only inherently dangerous articles
but also those that may be dangerous if used in an abnormal way if he
knows (or, possibly, has reason to know) of the intended dangerous use.
Tort liability for negligence has been applied to a vendor who fails to
exercise reasonable care in the sale.2" A defendant owner of a hardware
store has been held liable in tort for having sold ammunition to a four-
teen-year-old who accidentally shot a neighbor.21 A bartender has been
found liable for tort damages that resulted from a fight instigated by a
customer who had consumed too much of the defendant's liquor.22 Crim-
inal liability under these circumstances was not imposed on the defen-
dants.23 However, under the standard of Feinberg a criminal indictment
arguably could have been sought.
If, as in Feinberg, a court expands criminal liability into areas pre-
viously covered only by tort law, then that court should deal with policies
that may distinguish criminal law. It has been asserted that making
criminal negligence coincide with tort negligence would be too harsh ;24
criminal liability should be reserved for cases of moral fault since the im-
pending sanctions can have no effect on the inadvertent actor.2 5 Further-
"0 PROSSER § 97, at 677-78. Following Spencer v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (applying liability
without fault to a seller when a house collapsed), courts have applied liability
without fault to the sale of automobiles, tires, airplanes, an electric cable, grinding
wheels, a combination power tool, playground equipment, herbicides, insecticides, a
chair, a riveting machine, and a water heater.
20 PROSSER § 95, at 648-49.
Mautino v. Piercedale Supply Co., 338 Pa. 435, 13 A.2d 51 (1940).
Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
. Each of the cases was a civil proceeding for damages. Although none spe-
cifically held that a criminal action would not be upheld, no action was in fact
brought. In Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961), the court
stated that if the tort rule for causation were applied to criminal proceedings, then in
each of the cases the defendant would have been guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Id. at 577, 170 A.2d at 312-13. Implicit in that statement is the court's assump-
tion that no criminal action could be brought.
21 R. MOREEAD, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 112 (1952). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Root, 403 Pa. 571, 577, 170 A.2d 310, 312-13 (1961); Davis, The Development
Negligence as a Basis for Criminal Liability in Criminal Homicide Cases, 26 Ky.
LJ. 209, 223 (1938).
-G G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 99 (1961). Cf. Hart, The Aims of Criminal
Law, 23 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 401, 416-17 (1958). But see MODEL PE NAL
CODE 2.02, Comment at 126-27 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) :
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more, juries are reluctant to convict persons of criminal negligence.20
On the other hand, the high degree of culpability in this particular case
militated in favor of imposing on the defendant a duty analogous to that
in tort law. Perhaps for this reason the court, without alluding to any
of these distinguishing policies, recognized a duty for a merchant to act
in a situation in which he possessed knowledge that the item purchased
would be used in an abnormal manner.
A conviction for involuntary manslaughter requires not only that the
defendant be negligent in doing some lawful act but that his negligence
cause the harmful result.2 7 Causation has been characterized as the "de-
gree of participation that is necessary to warrant a conviction." 28 In Fein-
berg, analysis of causation is complicated by the fact that the deceased's
own acts contributed to his death.
Actual causation 29 (causa sine qua non)80 is established in Feinberg
by convincing evidence. An expert toxicologist testified that death could
have resulted from consumption of the new industrial Sterno but not
from the ordinary Sterno that the defendant previously sold.81 The de-
Knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may
follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk supplies men with an
additional motive to take care before acting, to use their faculties and draw
on their experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct.
Id.
28 The following statistics indicate clearly that more than twice as many persons
accused of criminal negligence are acquitted, or have the charges dismissed, as
those accused of all crimes.
1966 1967
Criminal All Criminal, All
Negligemce Crimes Negligence Crimes
Years
Total persons charged 865 2,170,850 857 2,310,722
Percentages:
Guilty as charged 35.2% 64.9% 36.5% 63.5%
Guilty of lesser offense 10.6% 2.6% 11.7% 2.4%
Acquitted or dismissed 45.4% 15.9% 44.3% 16.2%
Referred to juvenile court 8.8% 16.6% 7.5% 17.9%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1967 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 109; 1966 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 104.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment at 53-54 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
27 Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 574, 170 A.2d 310, 311 (1961).28 Note, Crimninal Liability of Participants in Fatal Russian Roulette, 21 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 121 (1964).2 R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 687 & n.11 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as PERKiNs].
" "[W]ithout which the result would not have occurred." State v. Des
Champs, 126 S.C. 416, 420, 120 S.E. 491, 493 (1923).
" 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
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fendant's cigar store was the only retail outlet in Philadelphia that dis-
pensed the lethal liquid. 2 If the defendant had not sold the dangerous
Sterno; no harmful results would have occurred.
In Commonwealth v. Atencio33 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
took an approach to causation which, although different from Feinberg,
might be pertinent. Relying on implicit conspiracy, the court found that
the "Commonwealth had an interest that the deceased should not be killed
by the wanton or reckless conduct of himself and others .... Such con-
duct could be found in the concerted action and cooperation of the defen-
dants in helping to bring about the deceased's foolish act."3
Although in Atencio the defendant was guilty as principal in the
second degree35 and, if the same reasoning is applied, in Feinberg as an
accessory before the fact,36 in each case guilt would be coincident with
that of the perpetrator.3" Since the perpetrators in each case were the
victims, imputing their guilt to the defendants is questionable due to the
difficulty of ascribing an unlawful act to the deceased persons. If a de-
ceased's act is suicide, it would be a felony only in a few jurisdictions.38
If his act is criminal negligence that resulted in his own death, it would
not be a crime. Atencio suggested a third possible crime, conspiracy to
create a risk.3" Conspiracy is, however, a tenuous argument in Feinberg
since the evidence presented at least implied that the deceased was not
the victim of suicide, and otherwise no recognized crime could be imputed
to the defendant.
Even though the defendant's act may have been a cause in fact of the
harmful consequence, it may not have been a "legal cause."4 Legal
" 211 Pa. Super. at 104, 234 A.2d at 915.
"' 345 Mass. 627, 189 N.E.2d 223 (1963).
" Id. at 629, 189 N.E.2d at 224-25.
" 9 VILL. L. Ruv. 134, 136-37 (1963). A principal in the second degree is one
who is guilty by reason of having aided, counseled or encouraged the commission
of a crime in his presence. PERKINS 658.
" An accessory before the fact is one who is guilty by reason of having aided
or encouraged commission of the crime without having been present at the
moment of perpetration. PmuxiNs 663. The defendant in Feinberg could be con-
sidered an accessory before the fact since he had aided the deceased by selling him
poisonous Sterno but was not present when he drank it.
"' PERKINS 684.
"E.g., Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala. App. 207, - , 194
So. 421, 423 (1940).
" "[Wanton and reckless conduct] could be found in the concerted action and
cooperation of the defendants in helping to bring about the deceased's foolish act."
345 Mass. at 629, 189 N.E.2d at 225.
" PERKINS 690-91. Among other terms used to convey the same meaning are
primary cause, efficient cause, efficient proximate cause, efficient adequate cause and
proximate cause.
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cause and its synonyms denote "what the courts will regard as the cause."41
When, as in Feinberg, legal cause is complicated by the intervening act
of the deceased, courts have had serious difficulty.
In Thiede4 the Nebraska court held that the deceased's voluntary act
of drinking poisonous liquor did not insulate the defendant from criminal
liability because that act was what the defendant had "contemplated.""
If the defendant intended44 for his friend to drink the liquor, then he should
have been responsible for any consequences. Although the standard of
care applied in Feinberg is distinguishable from that in Thiede, the chain
of causation in the two cases is similar. In fact, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Feinberg followed45 the causation argument made in
Thiede.
But that court in Commonwealth v. Root40 reversed a conviction for
involuntary manslaughter on the theory of a superseding intervening act.
The defendant in that case was engaged in an automobile race with an-
other person who, in attempting to pass the defendant, crashed head-on
into an oncoming vehicle and was killed. The court considered the de-
fendant's criminal liability to be cut off by the independent intervening
act of his competitor:
Where a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential
danger created by the negligence of an original tort-feasor, and there-
after, by an independent act of negligence, brings about an accident,
the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability, because the condition created
by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proxi-
mate cause.47
In Feinberg the independent intervening act in question was the de-
ceased's drinking the Sterno. The court held on the basis of the objec-
tive evidence offered that the defendant should have known about the
lethal nature of the substance.48 The deceased, therefore, might be equally
charged with knowledge of the danger since the only warning was on the
"x Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. Rav. 103, 104 (1911)
(emphasis added).
42 See p. 346 vtpra.
106 Neb. at 59, 182 N.W. at 574. "Contemplate signifies a purpose in respect
to the future." Reed v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 171 Pa. Super. 60, 64, 90 A.2d
371, 373 (1952).
"" "To 'intend' must be understood to mean the same with 'design' or 'con-
template.'" State v. McDonald, 4 Port. 449, 455 (Ala. 1837).
433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 642.
40403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
47 Id. at 579, 170 A.2d at 313.
'8 See p. 345 & note 7 supra.
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Sterno container itself and was as plain to him as it was to the defendant.
If the deceased was thus aware of the danger, his independent act, as
the one in Root, could insulate the defendant from criminal liability.
The court concluded that Root may be distinguished by the fact that the
intervening act in Feinberg was what the defendant had contemplated.
Although the defendant in Root had expected his competitor to try to pass,
he probably had not expected that the attempt would be performed in a
negligent manner. However, this distinction is not persuasive since the
two had engaged in a high-speed race in which any attempt to pass
might be negligent. The intervening act of the attempt to pass was there-
fore just as foreseeable or contemplated as that of drinking Sterno. Root
easily could have been controlling on the facts of Feinberg.
The result in Atencio was based not only on conspiracy but also on
criminal negligence in "helping to bring about the deceased's foolish act."49
The defendant in Feinberg by selling the lethal Sterno to those whom he
knew or should have known would drink it likewise helped to bring about
a foolish act even though he was not present when the Sterno was con-
sumed.
The decision in Feinberg could have been controlled by or distinguished
from any one of the above three decisions because it contains both the
elements on which each of the cases was based and additional elements
by which to distinguish them. What is clear is that Feinberg involved
a factual situation filled with culpability. In order to increase his already
substantial sales of Sterno to alcoholics, the defendant had purchased in-
dustrial Sterno in order to receive a larger quantity. During the time
that he had industrial Sterno available for sale, thirty-one persons in the
skid-row district of Philadelphia died from methanol poisoning.50 In
holding criminal liability on these facts, the court expanded the tort con-
cept of legal duty into the area of criminal law. It also considered the
difficult causation problem that will always be raised by imposition of that
duty. After Feinberg, a merchant might be convicted of arson for selling
gasoline in the face of a threat of riot on the theory that he knew or should
have known that purchasers intended to make fire bombs. A druggist
might be convicted for selling one of many types of common remedies if
he suspected that it might be improperly imbibed or injected. Although
it is not completely clear in which cases this legal duty is to be imposed,
"' 345 Mass, at 629, 189 N.E.2d at 225. See p. 349 supra.
50 433 Pa. at - , 253 A.2d at 638. The defendant was convicted on five counts
for those deaths.
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ground is broken for its extension to any merchant who reasonably should
know the use for which his products are intended.
RICHARD L. GRIER
Criminal Procedure-Requirements for Acceptance of Guilty Pleas
A recent study estimates that in some jurisdictions as many as ninety
per cent of all criminal convictions are obtained through guilty pleas.,
The Supreme Court has set forth explicit standards that must be followed
by both state and federal judges before a guilty plea can be accepted. The
holding in McCarthy v. United States' binds federal trial judges to the
requirements of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. And
if the dissent in Boykin v. Alabaa 3 is correct, the majority opinion in
that case compels state courts to follow the basic requirements of rule 11.
The rule provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of
the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such a plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of
the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to
plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is
satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea (as amended effec-
tive July 1, 1966).
In McCarthy the defendant was prosecuted for tax evasion in a fed-
eral district court in Illinois and entered a plea of guilty to one of three
counts. The court accepted this plea after McCarthy's counsel stated that
he had advised the defendant of the consequences of the plea. The de-
fendant expressed his desire to plead guilty and acknowledged his under-
standing of the consequences of such a plea with respect to the waiver of
jury trial and the punishment involved. At the insistence of the pros-
ecutor, the defendant further stated that the plea had not been induced by
threats or promises.4 McCarthy was convicted and appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the ground that his guilty plea
'PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 134 (1967).
289 S. Ct. 1166 (1969).
S89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969).
'United States v. McCarthy, 387 F.2d 838, 840 (7th Cir. 1968).
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should be set aside because the trial court had failed to follow rule 11.
The court of appeals, holding that the district court judge had complied
with rule 11, affirmed the conviction.5
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the ground that the
trial judge had failed to determine that there was a factual basis for the
plea.0 In the majority opinion Chief Justice Warren pointed out that
strict adherence to the requirements of rule 11 aids the trial judge in that
"he not only facilitates his own determination of a guilty plea's volun-
tariness, but he also facilitates that determination in any subsequent post-
conviction proceeding based upon a claim that the plea was involuntary."'
Failure to comply with the requirements of the rule, the Court held, re-
quired setting aside the defendant's plea and affording him an opportunity
to plead anew.'
Having explicitly interpreted rule 11, the next step taken by the Su-
preme Court was to demand adherence by the states to many, if not all,
of its requirements. In Boykin the defendant in the state court entered
pleas of guilty to five counts of robbery and was sentenced to death. On
appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, he argued that the punishment of
death was "cruel and unusual" within the meaning of the United States
Constitution.9 The Alabama court unanimously rejected this contention,
but three justices dissented on the ground that the record was inadequate
to show that petitioner had intelligently and knowingly pleaded guilty."0
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction
on the ground that it was error for the trial judge to accept the guilty
plea without first determining that the plea was intelligent and voluntary.
The Court further emphasized the necessity, for the benefit of both the
defendant and the state, of establishing a record disclosing that the plea
was voluntarily and knowingly entered."
Before McCarthy and Boykin, state and federal law was inconsistent
in setting standards for the acceptance of a guilty plea. In general, how-
ever, most courts refrained from accepting a guilty plea without first
determining that it was fair to the defendant under the circumstances of
the case.'"
rId. at 842-43.
0 89 S. Ct. at 1171.
7id.
8 Id. at 1172-74.
'U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.1oBoykin v. State, 281 Ala. 659, 207 So. 2d 412 (1968).
1189 S. Ct. at 1712.
1 Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 551 (1964.)
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The ultimate question, not yet resolved, is how much procedural for-
mality and regularity the plea of guilty process will be given and, in
this regard, to what extent formality will be consistent with the other
objectives of guilty plea process.18
The federal courts have long strived to avoid either an excess of for-
mality on the one hand or the hurried acceptance of guilty pleas without
proper interrogation of defendants on the other.'4 The decisions prior to
McCarthy fall into two rather indistinct groups. Most courts, while recog-
nizing the need for some certainty of fairness in the acceptance of guilty
pleas, did not require any specific set of inquiries to be made. A small
minority stated that a more explicit procedure should be followed.
In Waddy v. Heer5 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit de-
clined to hold that due process requires compliance with a particular
procedure when a plea is accepted from a defendant represented by coun-
sel. The court did say that the preferred practice would be to have the
fact that the accused comprehended the effect of his plea appear on the
record at the time the plea is entered.'6 Even less stringent is Stephen$
v. United States,17 in which the court stated that failure to comply fully
with rule 11 is not fatal to the entry of a guilty plea.' 8 At least one court
has noted the need for "something more than the presence of counsel
and the statement that the defendant pleads guilty. . . ."1 Several courts
have allowed the determination of the voluntariness of the plea to come
from sources other than the trial judge's questioning of the defendant.20
Foremost in the line of decisions of the distinct minority of federal
courts that demanded stricter adherence to rule 11 is Heiden v. United
1 D. NEWMAN, CONVCIoN-THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 52 (1966) [hereinafter cited as NEWMAN]. See also 20 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 109, Ill (1968).
"' Protection of the defendant who pleads guilty is not a recent idea. The con-
stitutional foundation of rule 11 was indicated in Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329
(1941). The Court indicated that notice of the true nature of the charge is "[tihe
first and most universally recognized requirement of due process ... ." Id. at 334.
Earlier, in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927), the Court said:
"Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a
plea shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with
full understanding of the consequences." Id. at 223.1' 383 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1967).
1 Id. at 795.
17376 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1967).
18 Id. at 24.
'o Rimanich v. United States, 357 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1966).
°Dorrough v. United States, 385 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1967), discussed in
Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 BosToN U.L. REv. 514, 519-23
(1969); United States v. Rizzo, 362 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Davis, 212 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1954).
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States,2 relied on in part by the majority in McCarthy.2 2 According
to Heiden, "[p] rejudice ... is established when lack of understanding in
a specific and material respect is sufficiently alleged and such asserted
lack, if it existed, would have been disclosed by a proper examination
by the trial judge."2 Several courts expressly or impliedly rejected
Heiden's rationale.24
Federal courts also differed on how far the trial judge must go in in-
forming the defendant of the consequences of his plea. Prior to McCarthy
the rule seemed to be that merely informing the defendant of the direct
consequences of the plea was sufficient.2 5
Before Boykin, the state courts employed a variety of procedures to
achieve some protection similar to that intended by rule 11. Today,
states can draw from the American Bar Association's Project on Mini-
mum Standards for Criminal Justice 6 to establish uniform rules govern-
ing acceptance of guilty pleas. While a detailed analysis of current state
procedures is not feasible in this note, examples selected from a few
states point out the disparity in their procedures for accepting guilty pleas.
Missouri requires some questioning of the defendant by the trial judge
to determine whether the plea is voluntary."' The Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee reached the opposite result in a similar situation.2" Several states
" 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965), noted in 41 TEMP. L.Q. 491, 497-501 (1968).
2299 S. Ct. at 1172-73.
353 F.2d at 55.
", Stephens v. United States, 376 F.2d 23, 24-25 (6th Cir. 1967); Halliday v.
United States, 380 F.2d 270, 272 (1st Cir. 1967); Brokaw v. United States, 368
F.2d 508, 510 (4th Cir. 1966).
' Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1967) (no need to inform
of ineligibility for parole); Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964)
(no need to inform of loss of civic privileges); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d
436 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (non-availability of probation and parole not a "conse-
quence"); United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963) (no need to
inform of loss of voting rights). But see Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d 356
(9th Cir. 1964). See also 41 TEMP. L.Q. 491 (1968).
2'ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDAIDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF
GUILTY §§ 1.4-.7 (Approved Draft 1968). The provisions are quite similar to
FED. R. CRIr. P. 11: section 1.4 provides for the questioning of the defendant by
the trial judge in order to insure that the defendant fully understands the charge
against him and the consequences of the plea; section 1.5 is aimed at insuring
that the plea is voluntary; section 1.6 requires that there be a factual basis for the
plea; section 1.7 requires that a record be made of the guilty plea proceedings.
"' State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969). The court pointed out that
proper inquiry at the trial level lessens the need for such post-conviction hearings.
Id. at 445-46.
"Richmond v. Henderson, - Tenn. - , 439 S.W.2d 263 (1969). The
court acknowledged that counsel deliberately misrepresented certain facts to the
defendant, but refused to overturn the acceptance of the guilty plea. The court
apparently felt that misconduct of defense counsel must be so obvious as to attract
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have statutes bearing on the question.20 Michigan, for example, requires
that:
Whenever any person shall plead guilty to an information filed against
him in any court, it shall be the duty of the judge of such court, be-
fore pronouncing judgment or sentence upon such plea, to become satis-
fied after such investigation as he may deem necessary for that pur-
pose respecting the nature of the case, and the circumstances of such
plea, that said plea was made freely, with full knowledge of the nature
of the accusations, and without undue influence.80
In fact, this requirement is followed only in murder cases.8 1
An apparently explicit standard governing the acceptance of guilty
pleas now exists, at least in the federal courts. A federal trial judge must
follow McCarthy's interpretation of rule 11 and can no longer "resort to
'assumptions' not based upon recorded responses to his inquiries."8 2 The
defendant in pleading guilty must relinquish a "known right or priv-
ilege."83  "Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the
elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless
the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the
facts."8 4 In addition to directing the judge to satisfy himself that the
plea is intelligent and voluntary, McCarthy requires a determination that
there is a factual basis for the plea. All of these inquiries into the defen-
dant's understanding of the plea must be demonstrated "in, the record at
the time the plea is entered.'"31 Relying heavily on Heiden the Court
noted in McCarthy that "rule 11 is designed to eliminate any need to
resort to a later fact-finding proceeding 'in this highly subjective area.' "80
the immediate attention of the trial court: "At relator's trial there would have
been nothing apparent to the court which would have indicated the underhanded
method in which the attorney shirked his duty to his client and procured a guilty
plea." Id. at 266.
2E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-60 (1958) (no provision for the question-
ing of the defendant included); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (1965) (plea must be
voluntary but no requirement that there be a factual basis for it). Several states
presently have procedural rules that closely resemble rule 11: e.g., FLA. R. CRM.
P. 1.170(a); Mo. R. CRxm. P. 25.04. Neither of these two rules require that there
be a factual basis for the plea.
" MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 768.35 (1948).
" NEWMAN, supra note 13, at 11-12. Both Wisconsin and Michigan employ
procedures other than direct questioning by trial judge. Id. 13-21.
"8 McCarthy v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969).
" Id., quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
"89 S. Ct. at 1171.
Id. at 1173 (emphasis by the Court).
oId. at 1172.
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In the future, failure to comply with the requirements of the rule will re-
sult in affording the defendant the "opportunity to plead anew. '' "T
The impact that Boykin will have on state courts is not so clear. If
one views Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion as setting forth the un-
equivocal interpretation of the decision, there is little room for disputing
the contention that rule 11 now applies to the states. "The Court thus
in effect fastens upon the states, as a matter of federal constitutional law,
the rigid prophylactic requirements of rule 11. .... "3 But it is difficult
to read such an interpretation into the majority opinion in light of the
fact that rule 11 is never mentioned. It is perhaps significant that the
case was brought to the Supreme Court on the question of cruel and un-
usual punishment; reversal of the decision below can be viewed as a
means of correcting the wrong at hand while avoiding the more contro-
versial issue of the constitutionality of the death penalty.
In Boykin, after stating that the right to trial by jury, the right to
confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination are
simultaneously waived when a defendant pleads guilty, 9 the Court simply
held that "we cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal
rights from a silent record." 40 The opinion also held that there must be
an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily
entered.41 In order to contend successfully that Justice Harlan's inter-
pretation is the correct one, it will be necessary to look beyond the opinion
itself since he gave no concrete reasons for the assertion that rule 11 now
applies to the states.
The soundest manner in which to support the dissenting opinion's
contention is to analyze Boykin in conjunction with McCarthy. The de-
cisions are apparently dissimilar; the majority in McCarthy refused to
discuss the constitutional issues involved" while the majority in Boykin
resolved them. A close reading of McCarthy, however, discloses that
these constitutional questions were prominent in the minds of the justices
voting in the majority:
These two purposes have their genesis in the nature of a guilty
plea. A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives sev-
17Id. at 1174.38 89 S. Ct. at 1713 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 1712.
"Id. The Court, quoting McCarthy, stated: "'Consequently, if a defendant's
guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation
of due process and is therefore void."' Id. at 1712 n.5.1 Id. at 1712.
"289 S. Ct. at 1169.
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eral constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront
his accusers.4
The similarity of the above language to the following excerpt from Boy-
kin is obvious:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that
takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial.
First is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states by reason of the
Fourteenth.... Second is the right to trial by jury.... Third is the
right to confront one's accusers.... We cannot presume a waiver of
these three important federal rights from a silent record. 44
Further, in perhaps the most significant portion of the Boykin decision
the Court stated:
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter
with the accused to make sure that he has a full understanding of what
the plea connotes and of its consequences. When the judge discharges
that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be
later sought.45
According to McCarthy, the two primary reasons for strict enforcement
of rule 11 are protection of the accused and the establishment of a record
adequate to sustain post-conviction attacks.40 Since the protection of the
accused is the primary aim in both state and federal courts and since the
same constitutional rights are involved, state courts will apparently be
compelled to comply with the requirements of rule 11.
There is one provision of rule 11 that arguably does not apply to the
states. Boykin does not mention any need to determine whether there is
a "factual basis" 47 for the plea. In McCarthy the Court gave two reasons
,Id. at 1171.
"89 S. Ct. at 1712.
"Id.
'6 89 S. Ct. at 1170-72.
'The meaning of "factual basis" was discussed in McCarthy:
The judge must determine "that the conduct which the defendant admits
constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense
included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty." Requiring this
examination of the relation between the law and the acts the defendant ad-
mits having committed is designed to "protect a defendant who is in the
position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the
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in support of the factual inquiry required by the rule. First, such a find-
ing by the trial court weighs against post-conviction attacks on the plea.
Second, this safeguard protects a defendant against pleading guilty to a
charge for which he could not be convicted.4"
But even the most well-advised defendant may harbor doubts as to
whether his particular acts were sufficient to fall within a particular
statutory definition of a crime. Why should a defendant with such doubts
be forced to undergo the ordeal of jury decision, which is sometimes inac-
curate, if he is willing to accept lenient sentencing for a lesser offense?
It is this type of defendant to whom the plea-bargaining process will be
most attractive. Assuming that the defendant is represented by a lawyer
interested in achieving the best results for his client, the question becomes
whether all parties concerned will best be served by waiver of trial and
acceptance of a more lenient sentence. If defense counsel feels that his
client's chances at trial are poor enough to warrant a guilty plea, then the
defendant should have the opportunity to make the choice, even though
there may be no definite "factual" basis for the plea.
The plea-bargaining process offers something for both the courts and
the defendant: By pleading guilty and waiving trial, the defendant saves
the judicial process a tremendous amount of time ;49 and most judges im-
pose more lenient sentences than would be given for conviction after a
full trial.5" There are two general types of "bargain" made between prose-
cutor and defense counsel in the typical plea-bargaining situation. The
one less common is the plea of guilty to a lesser non-included offense-
an offense that has no substantial relationship to the acts committed by
the defendant. The factual-basis requirement should now eliminate such
pleas in the federal courts. The more common plea arrangement is that
charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within
the charge."
89 S. Ct. at 1171 (quoting rule 11).
'
81d. at 1170-72.
', Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. Rmv. 865, 881-82 (1964).
"' See id. 869-70. See also Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 BosToN
U.L. REv. 514, 548 (1969), in which the author, after noting the prevalence of the
practice of discrimination in sentencing in favor of defendants who plead guilty,
states:
In this light, justification for discriminatory treatment based on the method
of guilt determination needs little elaboration. The guilty plea is only secon-
darily a means of guilt determination. It is primarily a means of law en-
forcement. Without the "carrot" and "stick" of discrimination, guilty pleas
would not be offered with desirable frequency ... In fact,, it is the over-
riding interest of society in effective law enforcement which justifies the
discrimination.
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in which the defendant enters a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense.51
Under a factual basis requirement, even pleas of guilty to lesser included
offenses may well be rejected if the judge cannot find from the facts be-
fore him a close relation to the substantive elements of the crime to which
the plea of guilty is entered. In order to accept such pleas the judge often
will be forced to conduct an extended hearing, and it is not likely that
this result is what the Court deciding McCarthy had in mind when it
stressed the need for a factual determination. 2 At any rate, state courts
should not follow a rigid factual-basis test for guilty pleas until the Su-
preme Court makes clear that this requirement is specifically binding upon
them.
A further problem in complying with the requirements of rule 11
will likely arise when the courts are forced to define "consequences of
the plea."53 Interesting questions arise when one tries to draw a line
between results that are direct enough to be considered consequences,
of which the defendant must be informed, and those more indirect results
of which the defendant need have no knowledge. For example, by
pleading guilty a defendant also waives any defenses that he may have.
Must the judge therefore explore the merits of any possible defense
available to the defendant? Must, indeed may, a judge inform the de-
fendant that one consequence of a guilty plea is the likelihood of a more
lenient sentence? Arguably, presenting a defendant with the choice of
asserting his innocence or accepting a lesser penalty would have a "chill-
ing" effect on the exercise of his constitutional rights within the mean-
ing of United States v. Jackson."'
Requiring the trial judge personally to question the defendant shifts
a portion of the task of assisting the defendant from counsel to the court.
The procedure adopted to carry out this task is crucial. The judge must
" For an excellent discussion of typical plea-arrangement situations, see Guilty
Plea Bargaining, supra note 49 at 866-70.
" The most obvious example of a situation that may well require hearing on
the question of whether there is a factual basis for the plea is that of a crime
involving a specific intent. In order to determine with precision that the specific
intent existed, the judge may be forced to review past decisions dealing with the
specific intent as well as to interrogate the defendant at length. Arguably, the
better solution would be to require the judge to determine only that there is a
probability that the requisite intent was present.
' See cases cited note 25 supra. See generally 20 SvngAcusE L. Rnv. 109 (1968).
'390 U.S. 570 (1968). Jackson involved a prosecution under the Federal
Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1948). Under the Act, the only way a de-
fendant could avoid risking the death penalty was to plead guilty and thus waive his
right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against
self-incrimination. The Court held that this provision had a chilling effect on the
assertion of these rights and was thus unconstitutional.
[Vol. 48
PROTECTION FOR SURVIVING SPOUSES
directly question the defendant to determine whether he understands the
significance of what he is doing in pleading guilty. Can one who has
not been previously informed of the consequences of a plea of guilty
(and it is this type of defendant that the rule was designed to protect)
quickly weigh all the alternatives and then make the best decision? Some
significant amount of time must be allowed him, the exact amount to be
determined by such factors as his intelligence and previous experience.
Certainly the above problems will have to be resolved in order for
the requirements of rule 11 to serve the interests of justice. In spite of
these difficulties, the decisions in lMVcCarthy and Boykin should benefit
all parties involved in the process of guilty plea acceptance. In addition
to setting forth a more or less uniform set of rules, the Court has pro-
vided significant safeguards for both the trial court and the defendant.
By requiring an explicit set of inquiries to be made at the trial stage, the
Court assured that future defendants will be better informed and thus
presumably more able to make intelligent decisions. Trial court judg-
ments will receive greater protection since a guilty plea under the re-
quirements will likely be upheld against subsequent attacks.
TRAVIS W. MOON
Decedents' Estates-Does North Carolina Law
Adequately Protect Surviving Spouses?
Although the policy of freedom to distribute property at death is
strong, a state may feel compelled to intervene if inadequate provision
is made for the surviving spouse. At common law the surviving spouse
was protected by the marital estates of curtesy and dower.1 But with
the advent of an industrial society, most state legislatures have per-
ceived that these common-law protections have become outmoded. Land
is no longer the principal asset of most estates, and, when it is, the
marital estates often impose a restraint on its alienability thought un-
desirable by modern critics.2 States have sought new means to protect
a surviving spouse.3 To this end, North Carolina has enacted the In-
testate Succession Act,4 which purports to promulgate this policy.
'See generally 25 AM. JuR. 2d Dower and Curtesy § 3 (1966).
See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5, at 332-34 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) ;
3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 189, at 351-54 (1935).
' See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.5, at 332-34 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) ;
3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 189, at 351-54 (1935).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-1 to -30 (1966) (chapter 29). See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 30-1, -2 (1966), entitled "Surviving Spouses." These statutes were en-
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The Act secures protection for a surviving spouse by two means: the
intestate share and the qualified right to dissent. The intestate share
consists of a large fraction (usually one-half or one-third) of the net es-
tate,5 the net estate being defined as "all property of a decedent. .. ex-
clusive of family allowances, cost of administration, and all lawful claims
against the estate."6 If there is a will, the surviving spouse is offered the
qualified right to dissent and to take a "forced share" generally equal to
the intestate share.' North Carolina General Statutes section 30-1 limits
the right to dissent to:
... those cases where the aggregate value of the provisions under the
will for benefit of the surviving spouse, when added to the value of the
property or interests in property passing in any manner outside the
will to the surviving spouse as a result of the death of the testator:
(1) Is less than the intestate share of such spouse ....
The Act evidences two important legislative determinations. The first
is the decision to accord financial protection to a surviving spouse while
acted together, and, although only chapter 29 is entitled the "Intestate Succession
Act," they will hereinafter be referred to collectively as the "Act." As of 1966
thirty-nine states, excluding the eight community property states and the civil-law
state of Louisiana, had enacted similar statutory provisions to protect a surviving
spouse. Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution In Search of a Prob-
lem, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 681 n.4 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-14 (1966).
Share of the surviving spouse-The share of the surviving spouse shall ...
be as follows:
(1) If the intestate is survived by only one child or by any lineal de-
scendant of only one deceased child, one half of the net estate, in-
cluding one-half of the personal property and a one-half undivided
interest in the real property; or
(2) If the intestate is survived by two or more children, or by one
child and any lineal descendant of one or more deceased children or
by lineal descendants of two or more deceased children, one third of
the net estate, including one third of the personal property and a
one-third undivided interest in the real property; or
(3) If the intestate is not survived by a child, children or any lineal de-
scendant of a deceased child or children but is survived by one or
more parents, a one-half undivided interest in the real property and
the first ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) in value plus one half of
the remainder of the personal property; or
(4) If the intestate is not survived by a child, children or any lineal
descendant of a deceased child or children or by a parent, all the net
estate.
6 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-2(2), (3) (1966).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (1966). When the testator is not survived by a
lineal descendant or parent, or if the surviving spouse is a second or successive
spouse and lineal descendants survive, the spouse, upon dissent, is entitled to only
half his or her intestate share. In the former situation, the intestate share is
computed before federal estate taxes are deducted. Id. The statute is interpreted in
Tolson v. Young, 260 N.C. 506, 133 S.E.2d 135 (1963).
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recognizing the policy of freedom to distribute property at death. A
surviving spouse can dissent from an adverse will and take an intestate
share, and the legacies of the will to others remain effective although
diminished pro rata.' The failure to consider the factor of need in the
allotment of the forced intestate share indicates that this protection is
accorded either upon the theory that the surviving spouse necessarily
made a financial contribution to the deceased's wealth or on the ground
of a post mortum extension of the deceased's lifetime obligation to sup-
port his spouse.9
The second determination is to include only property that can pass
by intestate distribution in computing the surviving spouse's share, with
one exception: A surviving spouse may dissent from the will if the
aggregate value of what the spouse receives under it and "the property
or interests in property passing in any manner outside the will" to the
spouse as a result of the death of the testator is less than the intestate
share.'0 Such property or interests always pass by contract or deed.
Section 30-1 (b) delineates some of these "outside properties":
[B]y way of illustration and not of limitation, the following shall...
be included in the computation of the value of the property or interests
in property passing to the surviving spouse as a result of the death
of the testator:
(1) The value of a legal or equitable life estate for the life of the
surviving spouse;
(2) The value of the proceeds of an annuity for the surviving
spouse;
(3) The value of proceeds of insurance policies on the life of the
decedent received by the spouse;
(4) The value of any property passing by survivorship ...
(5) The value of the principal of a trust under the terms of which
the surviving spouse holds a general power of appointment
over the principal of the trust estate;
except that no property or interest in property shall be so included
to the extent that the surviving spouse or another in his behalf either
gave or donated it or paid or contributed to its purchase price.
However, these "outside properties" can have a substantial impact
upon the promulgation of the legislature's policy, and the failure to deal
'N.C. GEx. STAT. § 30-3(c) (1966).
' See Plager, The Spouse's Nombarrable Share: A Solution In Search of a Prob-
lem, 33 U. CHi. L. REV. 681 (1966).
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1(a) (1) (1966).
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adequately with them can render the statutes irrational in light of their
purpose. In re Estate of Connor"' illustrates the inconsistent results
obtained under the Act and, more importantly, suggests a solution to
the problem of effectively implementing its policy.
Connor died testate and was survived by his widow and a parent.
Under the terms of the will his widow was named beneficiary of a trust.
The trust principal, over which Mrs. Connor had a general testamentary
power of appointment, was to be determined by a marital deduction
formula, which would provide for the corpus an amount equal to the
difference between the maximum marital deduction allowed under the
federal estate tax laws and those interests that could be used in com-
puting the deduction passing to the widow outside the trust.12 In ad-
dition to the trust, Mrs. Connor received insurance proceeds and the
sole ownership of survivorship property as a result of her husband's
death.' 3
Mrs. Connor, apparently dissatisfied with the gift in trust, filed a
timely dissent to the will. In support of her right to dissent, she argued
that since her statutory intestate share was greater than one-half of the
net probate estate, and that since the maximum marital deduction formula
limited the value of properties passing to her as a result of her husband's
death to one-half of the adjusted gross estate, she was entitled to dissent
even without a valuation of the properties.' 4
The North Carolina Court of Appeals pointed out the fallacy of Mrs.
Connor's argument: The net estate as determined for probate purposes
and the adjusted gross estate as determined for federal estate tax pur-
poses are not necessarily computed upon the basis of the same properties.
Insurance proceeds and survivorship estates may be included in the ad-
justed gross estate and are, therefore, deductible under the marital de-
duction if certain requirements are met, but they are never included in
the net probate estate. Accordingly, the value of the benefits passing to
Mrs. Connor as a result of her husband's death, an amount equal to
a maximum marital deduction, could have been greater than her in-
testate share, which was a portion of the net probate estate. If so, she
" 5 N.C. App. 228, 168 S.E.2d 245 (1969).
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056, allows a fifty per cent marital deduction from
the adjusted gross estate. For a definition of adjusted gross estate see INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 2053.
" 5 N.C. App. at 228, 168 S.E.2d at 246-47.
"Brief for Appellant at 7, 8, It re Estate of Connor, 5 N.C. App. 228, 168
S.E.2d 245 (1965).
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was barred from dissenting. The court remanded for a determination of
the two valuesY
At first impression, Connor seems to illustrate a successful imple-
mentation of a policy that demands both financial protection for a sur-
viving spouse and freedom for the deceased to distribute his property.
According to the result, Mrs. Connor may dissent only if she did not re-
ceive the statutory minimum by contract, will, and deed as a result of her
husband's death.
If dissent is ultimately permitted, however, the delicate balance of
policy is upset. Section 30-3 entitles a dissenting spouse to a full in-
testate share in addition to the benefits passing by deed and contract.
If the values of the insurance proceeds and joint estates are great and
the testamentary bequest relatively small, Mrs. Connor will receive a
substantial windfall that will deplete her husband's testamentary distribu-
tion to other beneficiaries.'" The statute's inflexibility is magnified by
the fact that the difference of even one dollar in outside property or in
the net estate could trigger such an inequitable result." Furthermore, an
identical distribution would have been effected had Connor died intestate,
except that Mrs. Connor would not have had to qualify for her windfall.,
The legislature has allowed the existence of properties passing outside
the net probate estate to defeat the policy behind the Act.
A greater deviation from the policy occurs if the surviving spouse
does not benefit from the property passing outside the net estate. In-
stead of receiving a financial windfall, the spouse may be effectively dis-
inherited. For example, if a large portion of a decedent's wealth has been
invested in life insurance or in income-producing interests and the spouse
is not a beneficiary, the net estate is diminished; and the surviving spouse
receives only the same portion of the net estate as if the outside property
15 5 N.C. App. at 235, 168 S.E.2d at 250.
'o If the net estate consisted of real property valued at 20,000 dollars and personal
property valued at 10,000 dollars, Mrs. Connor could dissent if she received less
than a value of 20,000 dollars by will, contract, and deed. See N.C. GE, . STAT.
§ 29-14(3) (1966), reprinted in full, supra note 5; and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (a)(1) (1966). If the properties passing by contract and deed were valued at 19,000
dollars and she were omitted from the will, upon dissent she would be entitled to
20,000 dollars in real and personal property plus the insurance proceeds and joint
estates, a net total of 39,000 dollars.
" For example, in the fact situation of note 16 supra, if the "outside properties"
were valued at 14,999 dollars, Mrs. Connor could dissent. But if they were valued
at 15,000 dollars, the dissent would not be allowed.18See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (1966).
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did not exist. Doubtless many a spiteful spouse has employed this tech-
nique to deprive his survivor of a fair measure of financial protection.'0
These deleterious inconsistencies-the possibility of a windfall on
one extreme and effective disinheritance on the other-are caused by
inadequate legislative attention to interests in property that vest by op-
eration of contract and deed. Such distortions of sound distribution
policy can and should be corrected. Mrs. Connor's construction of the term
"net estate" provides a solution. She based her argument upon the assump-
tion that the net probate estate included the value of all benefits passing to
her as a result of her husband's death.2" The court in Connor, of course,
was shackled by section 29-2. However, a net estate legislatively enlarged
to include all interests passing to anyone as a result of a decedent's death
to the extent the decedent owned them in fee at death, or contributed
to their purchase price, would provide the flexibility lacking in the
present statutes. All inconsistencies would be resolved whether the de-
ceased died testate or intestate.
Suppose, for example, that a decedent died testate survived by only
one lineal descendant and left an enlarged net estate valued at 30,000
dollars. The surviving spouse could dissent from the will if the value
of benefits passing to her2' was less than 15,000 dollars.22 If the spouse
were omitted from the will, but received 14,000 dollars in insurance pro-
ceeds, upon dissent she would be entitled to an intestate share valued at
15,000 dollars.2 3 Because the surviving spouse has already received the
insurance proceeds, a contribution of only 1,000 dollars in real and per-
sonal property would be required from the other beneficiaries to complete
the allotment. The possibility of a windfall would be eliminated, and
disruption of the testamentary distribution would be minimized.
If the decedent above had died intestate, the surviving spouse would
receive the same portion of his wealth even if another person were the
beneficiary of the insurance policy. Thus, if the enlarged net estate were
valued at 30,000 dollars, the surviving spouse would again be entitled
'" See Effland, Estate Planning: Co-Ownership, 1958 Wis. L. 1Ev. 507; Gold-
man, Rights of the Sponse and the Creditor in Intervivos Trusts, 17 U. CiN. L. REv.
1 (1948); Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest in a Life Ingurance Policy, 31 YALE
L.J. 343 (1922).
'
0Brief for Appellant, In re Estate of Connor, 5 N.C. App. 228, 168 S.E.2d 245
(1969).2 Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (1966), both a surviving husband and a sur-
viving wife are entitled to dissent. "Her" is employed in the text for convenience
and not for limitation.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-14(3), 30-1 (a) (1) (1966).
"
3See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3(a) (1966).
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to an intestate share of 15,000 dollars in real and personal property.24
If the spouse were the beneficiary of life insurance proceeds amounting
to 15,000 dollars, for example, she would receive no additional money.
But if 15,000 dollars of the proceeds went to other persons, the surviving
spouse would be entitled to an undiminished intestate share. As long as
there are properties passing by intestate succession valued at an amount
sufficient to equal an intestate share, the surviving spouse is not denied
a minimum provision. 5
Despite the advantages discussed above, one objection may be made to
enlarging the net estate. The Intestate Succession Act provides an in-
testate share for the lineal descendants" and, in certain situations, for the
parents of the deceased. If a portion of the property passing to them
by intestate succession were appropriated to make up a deficiency in the
surviving spouse's minimum provision, the intestate shares of the bene-
ficiaries would be diminished pro rata. The enlarged net estate would
not have to be employed in this limited situation if the legislature found
the appropriation undesirable. But since the surviving spouse is the prin-
cipal beneficiary of the Intestate Succession Act, as only she can dissent
from a will, it would not be a radical deviation from the theory of the
Act to allow a lineal descendant's or parent's intestate share to be de-
feated. Furthermore, the threat of invasion of a child's or parent's share
would deter schemes to disinherit the surviving spouse by depleting the
enlarged net estate of properties that pass by intestacy.
The Intestate Succession Act does not now promulgate consistently
the policy of providing economic security for the surviving spouse within
a framework of freedom of property distribution at death. The flaws
can be remedied if the net estate is redefined to include the value of all
interests in property passing in any manner as a result of a decedent's
death, to the extent that they were contributed by the deceased.2
JERRY W. LEONARD
='Id.25If there were 14,000 dollars of intestate property, the spouse would receive all
of such property. Only a deficit of 1,000 dollars from a full intestate share would
result. Obviously an estate planner could entirely defeat a surviving spouse's
share by simply depleting the estate of property that can pass by intestacy. How-
ever, the legislature could remedy any remaining deficit by allowing an invasion
of the "outside interests."
2
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§29-15(1), (2) (1966).27N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15(3) (1966).
8 The problem of classifying gifts in contemplation of death would arise, but
they, too, could be included within the enlarged net estate as properties passing
"as a result of a decedent's death." See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d
966 (1937); MODEL PROBATE CODE § 33(b) (1946).
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Labor Law-Fre-Hearing Discovery of Employees' Statements
The principle of full disclosure through discovery has, at least since
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,1 become
fully entrenched in litigation conducted in federal and most state courts.
It has not, however, become an established principle in proceedings before
the National Labor Relations Board although the Board's adjudicative
hearings closely resemble court litigation2 to which discovery has been
so usefully applied. This fact appears on its face somewhat difficult
to justify. The expressed rationale for discovery in civil adjudications-
that it minimizes "gamesmanship" and surprise, identifies and simplifies
the issues, and tends in the long run to expedite the adjudicative process-
seems also applicable to Board hearings. As Professor Davis has stated
in his treatise on administrative law, "[p] robably no sound reason can be
given for failure to extend to administrative adjudications the discovery
procedures worked out for judicial proceedings."8
In the recent case of NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc.,4 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed itself to this important ques-
tion of discovery prior to labor hearings on petition of the Board to
adjudge Schill Steel in civil contempt for failure to comply with a
cease and desist order.' The company acquiesced in the Board's motion
that a special master be appointed to hear contempt proceedings, but
moved for a specific provision in the order that would allow discovery
of all statements taken by the Board in the course of its investigation
from witnesses whose testimony the Board intended to adduce at the
contempt hearing. The court rejected the Board's argument that such
discovery could lead to undue intimidation of witnesses by the employer
and held the statements subject to discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Noting that under the Board's own rules, statements
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
2An adjudicatory hearing is similar to a trial; the parties present evidence,
subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, before a tribunal which makes a deter-
mination of fact and law. 1 K. DAvis, ADMiNIsTRATivE LAw § 7.01 (1958).
'Id. § 8.15, at 589.
408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1969).
'The Fifth Circuit had previously handed down a decree on February 2, 1965,
enforcing the Board's orders of February 8, 1963, and August 20, 1963, that the
company cease and desist from certain named violations of sections 8(a) (1),
8(a) (3), and 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act. In the principal case,
the Board, alleging that the company had failed to comply with the court's decree,
petitioned the court to adjudge the company in civil contempt.
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of such witnesses were to be turned over anyway after they testified,6
the court concluded that discovery at the pre-hearing stage would not lead
to greater coercion7
The decision in Schill dramatizes the split between the federal courts
and the Board on the issue of pre-hearing discovery of employee state-
ments. The federal courts for several years have consistently recognized
the right to such discovery in original proceedings in federal court. For
example in a 1962 case, Fusco v. Richard W. Kasse Baking Co.,' the
Board's regional director filed a petition seeking to have certain unfair
labor practices enjoined. The respondent served on the regional director
a subpoena calling for him to testify and produce certain affidavits, reports,
and memoranda. The regional director declined to produce the material.
The court held that the discovery provisions of the federal rules were
applicable, but limited discovery to affidavits and statements of those
employees who were to appear as witnesses for the petitioner.' The
court in Fusco, and other federal courts'" since that decision, reasoned
that although the action is brought by an official governmental agency,
the agency is in no different position than any ordinary litigant and is
therefore bound by the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Contrary to the practice in the federal courts, the Board has consistent-
ly refused to allow any pre-hearing discovery in Board proceedings'"
despite repeated attempts by respondents to gain discovery privileges.
In view of the current trend of full disclosure in civil actions and in light
of the Schill decision, a re-examination of Board policy denying discovery
seems imperative. The focus will be on discovery of statements of wit-
nesses whom the Board plans to call for testimony at the hearing. Since
the investigation of unfair labor practices centers around such statements,
the contents, if discoverable, would be most beneficial to the respondent
in preparing its defense.
0 See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
408 F.2d at 805.
8205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962).0 Id. at 464.
" See, e.g., Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local 537, 334 F.2d 391 (10th Cir.
1964); Olson Rug Co. v. NLRB, 291 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1961); Madden v. Milk
Wagon Drivers Local 753, 229 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Fusco v. Richard
W. Kasse Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
" See, e.g., Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1960);
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 128 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960); Sealtest S.
Dairies, 126 N.L.R.B. 1223 n.3 (1960); Chambers Mfg. Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 721,
722 (1959).
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CURRENT BOARD PRACTICE
The rules and regulations of the Board expressly forbid any formal
discovery of a witness' statements or the information contained in those
statements without consent of the Board itself. This policy is reflected in
Board regulation 102.118:
No . . . employee of the Board shall produce or present any files,
documents, reports, memoranda, or records of the Board or testify
in behalf of any party to any cause... with respect to any informa-
tion, facts, or other matter coming to his knowledge, in his official
capacity or with respect to the contents of any files, documents, re-
ports, memoranda, or records of the Board ...without the written
consent of the Board .... 12
Nor does the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 which provides statutory
guidelines of the rules of evidence and procedure to be followed by the
various federal agencies, contain any provisions for discovery in the
administrative adjudicative process.
Employers have, of course, attempted informal means of discovery
to ascertain what employees have told the Board. But informal dis-
covery may be subject to strictly enforced limitations. For example, in
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.,'4 the Board held "that the Respondent's requests
[to his employees] for copies of the employees' statements to the General
Counsel constitute interference, restraint, and coercion within the meaning
of section 8(a) (1) of the [National Labor Relations] Act."'" In fact,
it is immaterial whether the statements are actually handed over. The
request itself is a violation."8
However, the Board has been more tolerant of employer interrogation
of employees.
[An employer is privileged to interview employees for the purpose
of discovering facts within the limits of the issues raised by a complaint,
where the employer or its counsel, does so for the purpose of preparing
its case for trial and does not go beyond the necessities of such prep-
aration to pry into matters of union membership, to discuss the nature
or extent of union activity, to dissuade employees from joining or re-
12 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(a) (1969).
185 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
143 N.L.R.B. 848 (1963), enforced, 341 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965).
1 Id. at 850.
'" Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1964).
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maining members of a union, or otherwise to interfere with the
statutory right to self-organization. 17
This ruling strikes a delicate balance between the legitimate interest of
the employer in preparing its case for trial and the interest of the em-
ployee in being free from unwarranted interrogation-a balance that an
employer risks upsetting each time he questions an employee. In Joy
Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB"8 the court recognized this danger:
Apparently this rule means that an employer may question his
employees in preparation for a hearing but is restricted to questions
relevant to the charges of unfair labor practice and of sufficient pro-
bative value to justify the risk of intimidation which interrogation as
to union matters necessarily entails; and that even such questions may
not be asked where there is purposeful intimidation of employees.
Such a standard assumes that interrogation of employees concerning
their union activities is, of itself, coercive, but that fairness to the
employer requires that a limited amount of such questioning be per-
mitted despite the possible restraint which may result. 9
The privilege is a narrow one, and "[a] ny interrogation by the employer
relating to union matters presents an ever present danger of coercing
employees in violation of their § 7 rights."2 Undoubtedly, such limita-
tions are justified. Moreover, if formal pre-hearing discovery of witness
statements were allowed, the justification for employer interrogation-a
type of informal discovery with hazards to all involved-would be
practically eliminated.
While denying discovery to others, the Board through its investi-
gative powers has the ability to ascertain facts relevant to a controversy
well before the hearing stage. This power is derived from section 11 (1)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, which provides that
[t]he Board or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and
the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or
proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in
question.2 '
'7 May Dep't Stores Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 94, 95 (1946).
18 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
'Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
.'Texas Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
-
1Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 11(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 161(1) (1964).
1970]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Such broad investigative powers have been strongly criticized by Pro-
fessor Davis in his treatise on administrative law;22 nevertheless, they
insure that the Board will be well prepared in advance of the hearing.23
ATTACKS ON BOARD POLICY
Attempts to assert discovery privileges in Board proceedings have
met with little success. For example, section 102.118(a) of the Board's
rules2' was attacked as a denial of due process in NLRB v. Vapor Blast
Manufacturing Co.25 However, the court held that the rules of the Board
restricting examination of documents did not deny procedural due
process and that the Board had responsibility "to formulate its own rules
for unfair practice hearings and to determine whether full discovery is
practicable in such hearings. 20
Other attempts to gain discovery have been based on section 10(b)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act, the last sentence of which
provides that unfair labor practice hearings shall "be conducted in ac-
cordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of
the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district
courts of the United States ... ."' The Board's position is that this
provision "clearly relates to evidence before the Board, and not to pretrial
privileges accorded parties to judicial proceedings."2 " This interpretation
has also received judicial endorsement.2"
The frustration experienced by parties to a Board proceeding is
exhibited by the fact that in at least one instance an attempt at dis-
covery has been made under the recently passed Public Information Act,80
22 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATV LAw § 3.01, at 160 (1958).
" For an analysis of the scope of administrative investigative powers see id.
§§3.01-.14 (1958).
2'See 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(a) (1969), supra note 12, and text immediately
preceding.
" 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
26 287 F.2d at 407.
"'Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1964).28 Del. E. Webb Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 377 n.2 (1951).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir.
1961); Raser Tanning Co. v. NLRB, 276 F.2d 80, 83 (6th Cir. 1960).
805 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. III, 1965-67). Subsection (a) (3) states in pertinent
part:
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable records
made in accordance with published rules ... shall make the records promptly
available to any persons.
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which has as its purpose the making of government records more readily
accessible to the public for inspection. In the first reported opinion 1'
under the Act, plaintiff employer brought suit to prevent withholding by
the Board of certain documents consisting of witnesses' statements. The
court denied the requested disclosure on the ground that the material came
under the Act's exemption immunizing investigatory files compiled for
law enforcement purposes. 2
Because of the courts' unqualified refusal to find any statutory or
constitutional basis for the claim that discovery should be granted, it is
not surprising that the Board has evinced considerable antipathy to such
disclosure. One attack on the Board's rules in this general area, how-
ever, has been successful although it met with stiff opposition from the
Board.
The attack was based on Jenwks v. United States,8 a criminal case
in which the defendant Jencks was prosecuted for filing a false non-
Communist affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board. Two
F.B.I. informers were crucial government witnesses. Jencks sought an
order requiring the Government to produce for inspection the reports re-
lating to those matters about which each informer had testified. The
trial court denied the order, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that once a witness has testified, a
defendant is entitled to an order directing the government to produce for
inspection by the defendant any reports made by the witness touching the
events and activities to which he gave testimony."' Since under Jencks
the statements are to be turned over to the defendant only after the witness
has testified, the net effect of the holding is to provide the defendant a
source for impeachment of the witness.
Relying upon the rule derived from Jencks, the respondent in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.35 sought the production of all documents that
might be relevant and material to the cross-examination of a hearing wit-
ness. The contention that regulations barring such disclosure had been
abrogated by Jencks was rejected by the Board, which held that the
decision should not operate to overturn statutes authorizing agencies to
adopt rules reasonably calculated to maintain their records inviolate.3 6
" Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D. Puerto Rico
1967).
s, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (Supp. III, 1965-67).
S353 U.S. 657 (1957).
' Id. at 668.
S118 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1957).
Id. at 1282.
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Subsequently the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit in NLRB v.
Adhesive Products Corp.37 considered the same question and on the
authority of Jencks reversed the district court, which had denied produc-
tion under the Board rule forbidding disclosure. 8 In the wake of the
Second Circuit's decision, the Board in Ra-Rich Manufacturing Corp.80
held that Jencks applied to its proceedings and thereby overruled its
position in Great Atlantic & Pactific Tea Co. Thus, for purposes of
cross-examination the Board affords parties the right to production of
pre-hearing statements made by witnesses who have already testified to
matters contained in those statements.4°
Nevertheless, the Jencks rule as applied to hearings before the Board
cannot be regarded as a substitute for discovery; it becomes operative
only after the hearings have begun and one or more witnesses have testi-
fied. The chief utility of the rule remains co-extensive with its original
purpose-to provide a respondent with a source of material upon which
to impeach a witness. Though of indisputable value, this right to obtain
witnesses' statements serves a purpose essentially distinct from the privi-
lege of becoming apprised of an opposing party's information before
adjudication in order to eliminate needless issues and prepare an effective
defense.
NEED FOR DISCOVERY IN 8(a) (3) PROCEEDINGS
A look at discovery against the background of one particular type of
Board proceeding may be enlightening. Section 8(a) (3) makes any dis-
criminatory treatment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging
union membership an unfair labor practice. 1 Charges under this provision
make up the great bulk of Board cases against employers. In 1967 there
"1258 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1958).
38 Id. at 408.
"0 121 N.L.R.B. 700 (1958).
40 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1969), as pertinent, reads:
[A]fter a witness called by the general counsel or by the charging
party has testified in a hearing upon a complaint under section 10(c) of the
act, the trial examiner shall, upon motion of the respondent, order the
production of any statement . . . of such witness in the possession of the
general counsel which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness
has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the sub-
ject matter of the testimony of the witness, the trial examiner shall order
it to be delivered directly to the respondent for his examination and use
for the purpose of cross-examination.
"' Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§158(a) (3) (1964).
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were 7,463 charges of discrimination-sixty-six per cent of the total
filings against employers.'
The key to sustaining a discrimination charge lies in the government's
ability to prove that the motive behind the employer's action was to
encourage or discourage union activity. In the typical proceeding the
government is fairly assured of a prima facie case of discrimination if it
can prove the following questions of fact: (1) that the employee was a
union member or adherent; (2) that the employer knew this fact; (3)
that the employer was anti-union; and (4) that the employee was treated
unlike non-union employees. For example, in a typical discrimination
case, the trial examiner's analysis of the government's case reads in
pertinent part as follows:
There is no doubt that Allen was quite an active union adherent,
and after the visit of Allen, McKinney, and Walker to Snipes' office
on September 25 there can be no question about Snipes' knowledge
of this fact. It has previously been found that the Respondent was
vigorously opposed to the Union's advent. The timing of Allen's
discharge within a few hours after Snipes became aware of Allen's
prounion sympathies is therefore suspect.43
Of course additional factors, if present, are also introduced by the govern-
ment to strengthen its case. It can fairly be said that the Board is quite
liberal in permitting inferences to be drawn from these surrounding cir-
cumstances.44
In discrimination cases under section 8(a) (3) the Board pays lip
service to the proposition that the burden of proof is on the government;
however, because of the relative ease with which inference is allowed,
the burden of going forward appears to shift to the employer to show
good cause for his actions." Undoubtedly the burden should be on the
"NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT,
Table 2, at 218 (1967).
"Wellington Mill Div. West Point Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 819, 835 (1963),
modified, 330 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
"See Miller Elec. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Blue Bell, Inc., 219 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Indiana Metal Prod.
Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 613, 616 (7th Cir. 1953); Interlake Iron Corp. v.
NLRB, 131 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 119
F.2d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 1941).
"' Jasper Nat'l. Mattress Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 75, 77-78 (1950). The Board stated
that after the government had established its prima facie case, "[i]t... devolved
upon the Respondent to come forward with reasonably convincing evidence to
show that the discharges were actually for nondiscriminatory reasons." Other
Board decisions have stated this proposition more explicitly. See, e.g., Pacific
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employer since the reasons for his actions are peculiarly within his knowl-
edge. However, once saddled with this burden, the question then becomes
whether it should often be made intolerable by denying the employer
discovery privileges. Such a situation is particularly disturbing because
overt acts of the kind that are a part of everyday business management
are laid open to inferences that may sustain the charge. As it stands
now, prior to the hearing the respondent has no idea on which of his
acts or conversations the government will base its case or introduce
for the drawing of inferences. The employer is in a very unenviable
position. He does not know to what facts his proof must be responsive;
therefore, he often cannot adequately prepare a defense. In view of the
large number of discrimination cases-about two of every three charges
against employers heard by the Board-discovery would appear to be
justified by this type of proceeding alone.
OBJECTIONS TO DIsCOVERY
Although witness statements have never been subject to discovery
in Board proceedings, it is conceivable that should they in the future be
held discoverable, the Board could protect them under the work product
doctrine. This doctrine excludes from discovery such items as a lawyer's
own notes and memoranda or anything else reflecting his mental im-
pressions, theories, or conclusions, including statements that he has
taken from witnesses. Although the work product doctrine was formu-
lated in civil cases, it would seem applicable to administrative hearings
that are basically adversary. The policies behind the work product rule
are based on the adversary process. 46
The leading case involving the work product doctrine is Hickman v.
Taylor,47 in which witnesses' statements were protected from discovery.
The basis for the Court's holding was that the plaintiff had made no
showing of necessity for the discovery. The Court stated that the peti-
tioner "has sought discovery as of right of oral and written statements
of witnesses whose identity is well known and whose availability to
petitioner appears unimpaired."4 After pointing out the numerous other
means available to petitioner to obtain the information sought, the Court
Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. 60, 61 (1950), where the Board held that "the burden of
going forward with evidence after the prima facie case of discriminatory char-
acter of discharge had been established necessarily falls upon the Respondent."
"
8See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
'"329 U.S. 495 (1947).
'8 Id. at 508.
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concluded that he was attempting "to secure the production of written
statements . . .without any showing of necessity or any indication or
claim that denial of such production would unduly prejudice the prepara-
tion of petitioner's case or cause him any hardship or injustice."4
There is, of course, no firm rule to use in determining the necessity
that must be shown for discovery of work product. However, Professor
Wright in his analysis of the case states that "[u]ndoubtedly the single
most important factor in measuring necessity or justification for discovery
of work product materials is whether the information in question is other-
wise available to the party seeking discovery." ° The courts, in effect,
should balance the competing interests of the parties involved. The court
in Hickman found that there was equal opportunity on the part of both
parties to prepare for trial.
Applying the above reasoning to an unfair labor practice proceeding,
discovery seems strongly justified; there are no alternative effective
means of discovery available to an employer. A great disparity exists
between the respective abilities of the parties involved as far as prepara-
tion for the hearing is concerned. Detailed information of alleged unfair
labor practices is to be found only from employees, to whom the employer's
access is severely restricted by Board decisions. Thus it appears that
the federal courts could find the requisite necessity for discovery. The
Court in Hickman intimated as much by stating that "production might
be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached
only with difficulty.""1 Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion
reiterated the position of the Court:
There might be circumstances, too, where impossibility or difficulty
of access to the witness or his refusal to respond to requests for in-
formation or other facts would show that the interest of justice require
that such statements be made available.52
In sum, it is unlikely that the work product rule would impair dis-
covery of witnesses' statements in a Board proceeding. Furthermore,
the need for ascertaining the truth seemingly outweighs any harm result-
ing from work product disclosure.
Thus far, the Board has sucessfully based its denial of discovery rights
Id. at 509.C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 82, at 317 (1963).
329 U.S. at 511.52Id. at 519.
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on a more pragmatic objection than assertion of the work product rule.
A Board investigation is unique in that most of the statements taken
during its course are obtained from employees-a fact distinguishing
Board adjudicatory proceedings from civil cases in a way significantly
related to the appropriateness of discovery. There is a seemingly genuine
fear by the Board that if discovery of witnesses' statements were allowed
beforehand, such disclosure could lead to undue intimidation by the
employer.53
The point is well taken that an employee who is asked to cooperate
with the Board by giving a statement to its investigator is in a particularly
delicate situation. Indeed, the real danger of granting discovery appears
to be the prohibitive effect on an employee's willingness to give state-
ments; the employee may choose to remain silent, and the Board's ability
to conduct effective investigations would become more difficult. The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Texas Industries, Inc. v. NLRB 4
remarked that
[I]t would seem axiomatic that if an employee knows his statements
to Board agents will be freely discoverable by his employer, he will be
less candid in his disclosures. The employee will be understandably
reluctant to reveal information prejudicial to his employer when the
employer can easily find out that he has done so.15
While such a rationale seems perfectly valid, the risk of such dis-
closure and its prohibitive effect appear to be present under current
Board procedure. Under the Jencks rule, a witness' statement is avail-
able to the respondent after the witness has testified. Thus, if discovery
were allowed only of statements of witnesses whom the Board planned
to have testify at the hearing, it would follow that the prohibitive effect
would be no greater than under the Jencks rule. The Fifth Circuit
took this view in Schill to reject the Board's argument that discovery
would lead to intimidation. The court stated that it was "unable to see how
the danger of coercion or reprisal becomes greater if we require that the
statements to the Board of witnesses who testify be turned over at the
discovery stage rather than during the course of the hearing.""0 This
reasoning also appears valid in proceedings before the Board.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Schill Steel Prod., Inc., 408 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1969).
' 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964).5 Id. at 134.
ra 408 F.2d at 805.
[Vol. 48
EMPLO YEES' STATEMENTS
STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS AGAINST INTIMIDATION
AND A PROPOSAL
Some protection against intimidation is provided employees by statu-
tory prohibitions. Pertinent is section 8 (a) (4) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act making it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has
filed charges or given testimony under this Act."sr It is not unreason-
able to believe that the great majority of employers who have been charged
with an unfair labor practice will not subject themselves to a second
such charge by discriminating against an employee who files charges or
makes statements to the Board. But undoubtedly there are a handful
who would continue to resist the provisions of the Act at any cost. The
Board's concern in this area reveals a lack of faith in the remedy of
section 8(a) (4) provided for such an occurrence. Perhaps there is good
cause for the Board's concern; since coercion is in itself a separate un-
fair labor practice, it calls for a separate proceeding against the employer.
Consequently, if an employee is fired for filing charges with the Board,
it may be quite some time before his rights are asserted in court,
especially if appeals are taken.
A practical solution to the problem would be to provide an immediate
means of relief to an employee who feels that he has been prejudiced
under section 8(a) (4). Such relief could be made available by sec-
tion 10(l) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, which provides
that immediate injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order may
be granted for certain unfair labor practice charges." Amendment of
17 Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a) (4), 29 U.S.C.
§158(a)(4) (1964).
"0Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(1) (1964) reads in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (A), (B), or (C) of section
8(b), or section 8(e) or section 8(b) (7), the preliminary investigation of
such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases
except cases of like character in the office where it is filed, or to which it is
referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to
whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such
charge is true and that a complaint should be issued, he shall on behalf
of the Board, petition any district court of the United States ... within any
district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged
to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for
appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board
with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary
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this section to include section 8(a) (4) in the list of unfair labor prac-
tices for which injunctive relief is available would be a big step in
providing the employee with more protection against coercion by his
employer. Such a strengthening of the remedy against intimidation
would complement adoption of pre-hearing discovery of employees' state-
ments.
CONCLUSION
It seems anomalous that discovery of employees' statements to the
Board is allowed in original proceedings in federal court but not for
hearings before the Board itself. Since the main argument by the
Board against discovery is fear of employer intimidation, the solution
would appear to be a strengthening of the remedy against such intimida-
tion to complement the adoption of discovery procedures.
On April 13, 1961, the Administrative Conference of the United
States was established by executive order to consider administrative law
problems and make recommendations. The Conference officially endorsed
discovery in Recommendation No. 30 in 1963: "The Conference approves
the principle of discovery in adjudicatory proceedings and recommends
that each agency adopt rules providing for discovery to the extent and
in the manner appropriate to its proceedings.""9 Over five years have
passed and the Board has not yet acted on this recommendation. It is
obvious, therefore, that if a change is to be made, it must come about
through amendment of the National Labor Relations Act by Congress.
Hopefully such action will be forthcoming.
F. FiNc = JARRELL
Military Law-Jurisdiction of Courts-Martial To Try Servicemen for
Civilian Offenses
Since the days of the Continental Army, the question of how much
judicial authority should be vested in the military has been the subject of
continuing debate. The Constitution gave Congress the power "[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other
provision of law.
1 Recommendation No. 30 of the 1963 Administrative Conference of the United
States, quoted in Fuchs, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 15
AD. L. REv. 6, 45 (1963).
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Forces"' but did not further define this power, and Congress has liberally
dispensed judicial power to the military by enacting the codes of military
laws that have governed the armed forces.2
The codification of military law presently in effect is the Uniform
Code of Military Justice3 (UCMJ), which became effective May 31,
1951. When passing the UCMJ, Congress had before it a group of cases
that arose during World War II in which serious offenders escaped trial
because there was no court having jurisdiction by the time their offenses
were discovered.4 Furthermore, Congress was faced for the first time
with large numbers of military dependents accompanying servicemen
abroad.5 To meet these problems, Congress retained from the Articles of
War court-martial jurisdiction for the military over certain civilians0 and
enlarged military jurisdiction over discharged servicemen7 and active-
duty personnel.
Expanded court-martial jurisdiction under the UCMJ was rapidly
attacked by both ex-servicemen9 and civilians, 10 and their attacks were
mostly successful." The Supreme Court in these cases based its diminution
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2W. AYcocK & S. WuaREL, MLITARY LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUsTIcE 11-15 (1955) [hereinafter cited as AYcOcK & WURFEL]; Bishop,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regudars, Re-
servists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 319-27 (1964).
"10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
'United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955). See AYcocK
& WURFEL 43-44.
'Aycocy, & WuRFEL 59-63.
' Compare Article of War 2, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. II, § 1, 41 Stat.
787 with UCMJ art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1964).
7 UCMJ art. 3(a), 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964) provides:
Subject to section 843 of this title (article 43) no person charged with
having committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this chap-
ter, an offense against this chapter, punishable by confinement for five years
or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United
States or of a state, a Territory, or the District of Columbia, may be relieved
from amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the termination of
that status.
Article of War 94, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch. II, § 1, 41 Stat. 805-06, pro-
vided for court-martial jurisdiction after discharge only for fraud, larceny, or
embezzlement committed against the government while on active duty.
' Compare the proviso to Article of War 92, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, subch.
II, § 1, 41 Stat. 805 with UCMJ art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1964).
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
"
0McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) ; Grisham
v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1-957).
" Only Mrs. Covert was unsuccessful on her first attempt. Reid v. Covert, 351
U.S. 487 (1956).
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of military jurisdiction on the fact that the defendants were not military
personnel and therefore were not properly "in the land or naval forces"
so as to be excluded from the fifth and sixth amendment rights to indict-
ment and trial by jury. 2 But the Court's language seemed to preclude
its ever withholding military jurisdiction over active-duty servicemen.1"
The lower courts in both the federal and military appeals systems con-
sidered the question closed after the statement in Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton that "[t] he test for jurisdiction . .. is one of statts,
namely, whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a person
who can be regarded as falling within the term 'land and naval Forces.' "14
In subsequent cases the question of military jurisdiction over active-duty
personnel, when raised, was summarily dismissed.'"
The Supreme Court, without overruling the previous cases, decided
in O'Callahan v. Parker"0 that an active-duty serviceman was not auto-
matically subject to court-martial jurisdiction. The Court rejected so
much of the Singleton "status" test as would give automatic jurisdiction
and stated that active-duty status is necessary, but not alone sufficient, to
vest military jurisdiction.' 7 The Court furnished a list of seven, or
possibly eight, factors indicating that the defendant O'Callahan was so
severed from the military at the time and under the circumstances of his
alleged offenses that he must be considered a civilian for jurisdictional
12 U.S. CoNST. amend. V provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for
a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces .... ." The exception
has been extended by implication to the right to trial by jury contained in the
sixth amendment. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866).
" When the offense was cognizable in a civil court, the military's jurisdiction
was concurrent. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23, 30 (1957). See also Peek
v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964),
in which an active-duty soldier committed an armed robbery of a military courier on
a military post with a weapon issued him by the Army. The soldier objected to
trial in the federal district court on the grounds that the military had preferential
jurisdiction. His contention was held to be without merit.
"'Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960).
"Branford v. United States, 356 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1966) ; Owens v. Markley,
289 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1961); Pickens v. Cox, 282 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1960);
Thompson v. Willingham, 217 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Pa. 1962); United States v.
Schafer, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 83, 32 C.M.R. 83 (1962); Herrington, A.C.M. 18339, 33
C.M.R. 814 (1963); Panchisin, A.C.M. 17156, 30 C.M.R. 921 (1961).
16395 U.S. 258 (1969). For the procedural history see O'Callahan v. Parker,
256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966), appeal dismissed, 372 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1967),
aff'd on rehearing, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 393 U.S. 822 (1968);
military appeal reported, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967).
17 395 U.S. at 266-67.
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purposes. The charges against O'Callahan grew out of an attempted rape
perpetrated in the city of Honolulu, Hawaii-not "on a military post or
enclave .... -18 At the time the crime was committed, O'Callahan was
on leave in the city. 9 The victim was a fourteen-year-old girl vacationing
in Hawaii who had no military connection whatsoever ;20 she was not a
person "performing any duties relating to the military."'" The offense
was committed in peacetime; the civil courts were open and available;
and the offense was committed within the territorial limits of the United
States.22 No question of military authority, security, or property was
involved in the case.3 Finally, although the fact was not mentioned in
the holding, O'Callahan was in civilian clothes when he allegedly at-
tempted to rape the girl.24 This combination of factors was persuasive
to the Court in its finding that the case did not arise "in the land or
naval forces" and that O'Callahan was entitled to a grand jury indict-
ment under the fifth amendment and a jury trial under the sixth amend-
ment.
25
If the Court's statement that these offenses were not "committed on
a military post or enclave" 20 is strictly construed, it will mean that the
military can exercise jurisdiction over any offense committed by an active-
duty serviceman on post without considering the other factors, but that
civil courts have jurisdiction over all off-post offenses. The Court of
Military Appeals27 now will apparently sustain military jurisdiction over
all on-post offenses committed by servicemen,2 s and also will uphold mili-
"1 Id. at 273.
1d. at 259-61, 273.
0 O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360, 361 (3d Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court
did not mention this total lack of military connection in the statement of facts.21395 U.S. at 273.
2 d.
" Id. at 274.
"'Id. at 259.
20 Certiorari was granted to consider the limited question of whether court-
martial jurisdiction over essentially civilian crimes is a denial of the fifth and
sixth amendment jury rights. 395 U.S. at 261. The Court mentioned other pro-
cedural deficiencies of courts-martial-possible command influence, ad hoc judicial
bodies, vague statutes, a preference for discipline rather than justice-that may
have influenced the decision. Id. at 262-66.
2
0 Id. at 273.
" The Court of Military Appeals is the highest appellate court in the military
justice hierarchy; it consists of three civilian judges who hear appeals from all
services. 10 U.S.C.A. § 867 (Supp. 1969).
" United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 561, 40 C.M.R. 272, - (1969);
United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). See HEAD-
QUARTERs, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-69-24, Oct. 2, 1969, 1-6
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tary jurisdiction over off-post offenses in limited circumstances. 2  The
Court of Military Appeals seems to be correct in its interpretation of
jurisdiction over on-post offenses inasmuch as the military commander
is totally responsible for discipline and morale on his installation and
thus has a significant interest in exercising jurisdiction. Military in-
terests may extend to off-post offenses as well, and the territorial boundary
of the post should not become an automatic jurisdictional barrier. Spe-
cific examples of the correct exercise of military jurisdiction over off-post
offenses are more easily considered in connection with the other factors
in O'Callahan since in such cases at least some of these other factors
must be present to justify military jurisdiction.
The Court in deciding O'Callahan did not clearly define what relation-
ship must exist between the accused's service duties and his offense for
the military to exercise jurisdiction. If all other factors are the same, the
absence status of the accused should make little difference in determining
whether the offense is "service connected"; however, the duty status of the
accused at the time of the offense bears directly on connection with the
service. The Court did not confine itself strictly to on-duty offenses, but
spoke of a "connection"8 0 between the accused's duties and the crime.
Presumably, then, when the off-post offense is inseparable from the
accused's duties, military jurisdiction is appropriate. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals has not yet directly addressed itself to the situation in which
an on-duty serviceman commits an off-post offense,8 ' but it should permit
the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case.
If the victim must actually be performing military duties at the time
[hereinafter cited as DA PAm 27-69-24], digesting the following cases from the
Court of Military Appeals: United States v. Henderson, No. 22,128, Sept. 26,
1969 (carnal knowledge committed off post not subject to court-martial jurisdic-
tion); United States v. Smith, No. 22,180, Sept. 26, 1969 (contra, when carnal
knowledge committed on post); United States v. Riehle, No. 22,040, Sept. 26, 1969
(no court-martial jurisdiction over off-post auto theft) ; United States v. Paxiao,
No. 22,230, Sept. 26, 1969 (contra, when auto theft committed on post); United
States v. Shockley, No. 21,667, Sept. 26, 1969 (court-martial jurisdiction over sod-
omy committed on post; contra, off post); United States v. Williams, No. 22,176,
Sept. 26, 1969 (court-martial jurisdiction over bad checks cashed on post; contra,
off post) ; United States v. Crapo, No. 21,866, Sept. 26, 1969 (court-martial juris-
diction over robbery where force and violence occurred on post; contra, off post).
SE.g., off-post narcotics offenses. See p. 388 & note 47 infra.0 395 U.S. at 273.
81 In the only reported case in which this factor was specifically discussed, the
offender was either off duty or on leave when he committed each of his offenses.
United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). The court
did not give the date of Borys' offenses, but the case apparently applies O'Callahan
retroactively. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
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of the offense, few off-post cases will come before courts-martial: The
only military persons regularly performing duties off post are military
policemen, investigators, vehicle drivers, recruiters, and the like. On the
other hand, if the victim need only be connected with the military in some
fashion, many more off-post crimes committed by servicemen will be
tried in military courts.
Thus far, the Court of Military Appeals has followed the language
of the Supreme Court to the letter, even to the extent of finding that
carnal knowledge of a military dependent off post does not invoke military
jurisdiction. The court stated in United States v. Henderson" that the
victim's "service connection was natal and not legal and, as such, [was]
insufficient to bring her personally within the ambit of the Uniform
Code." If by this language the Court of Military Appeals meant that
off-post offenses committed against other servicemen who are off duty,
but still within the ambit of the UCMJ, are subject to court-martial
jurisdiction, its interpretation should be sustained. However, by ex-
cluding dependents from the category of victims whose status allows court-
martial jurisdiction, the Court of Military Appeals did not give sufficient
attention to the impact on the military community of crimes perpetrated
against dependents. That husbands and fathers are often absent for ex-
tended periods places on the military system an additional burden of pro-
tecting dependents; offenses by servicemen against dependents should be
considered to have the same military significance as offenses against other
servicemen.
Three factors in the Court's resolution of O'Callahan-that he offense
occur in peacetime, that the civil courts be open, and that the offense be
committed within the territorial limits of the United States 4-- are ob-
viously concomitants of one another. If civil jurisdiction is to vest only
over those cases that occur within the territorial limits 5 of the United
States, then "civil courts" must mean the state and federal courts.86 Since
" No. 22,128, Sept. 26, 1969, digested in DA PAm 27-69-24 at 1.
" Id. (the quotation is extracted from the court's opinion).
395 U.S. at 273.
= The Court of Military Appeals has indicated that this interpretation will be
followed. United States v. Goldman, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 516, 517, 40 C.M.R. 228,
- (1969). Chief Judge Quinn so stated in his dissent in United States v. Borys,
18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 551, 40 C.M.R. 257, - (1969) (dissenting opinion).
"But see the dissenting opinion in United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
547, 551-53, 40 C.M.R. 257, - (1969), the key rationale of which is that the
Hawaiian courts at the time of O'Callahan's alleged offenses were federal courts,
and that therefore the words "civil courts" in O'Callahan mean only federal
courts.
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
these courts will always be available, except in times of imposition of
martial law or of actual invasion, the only question remaining is the
meaning of the term "peacetime." One judge on the Army Court of
Military Review37 has stated in several cases that the Vietnam conflict-
a time of war for purposes of removing the statute of limitations on
offenses of unauthorized absence 3 -- is a sufficient time of war for court-
martial jurisdiction under O'Callahan.39 Although the Court of Military
Appeals has not explicitly decided the question, apparently the court has
assumed that the Vietnam conflict is not a time of war. It has dismissed
several cases arising after O'Callahan on the grounds of lack of court-
martial jurisdiction.40 Had the Court of Military Appeals found the
present conflict to be a time of war, presumably it would have sustained
jurisdiction. The court is probably correct in its assumption: The
existence of a distant war, declared or undeclared, has little relevance to
a crime committed within the territorial United States by an active-duty
serviceman." Absent declared war, and probably not even then so long
as the actual fighting remains distant, offenses committed within the
United States should be deemed "peacetime" offenses.
The final factor that the Court outlined in O'Callahan was that the
offense charged did not concern military authority, security, or prop-
erty.42 If "security" means the physical integrity of the installation and
the documents and equipment thereon,43 few problems of interpretation
UThe Courts of Military Review are the intermediate appellate courts in the
military. These courts review only the cases arising in the branch of the service
that they serve. 10 U.S.C. §866 (1964) established these courts, which were
formerly called Boards of Review.
"Anderson, C.M. 416112, 38 C.M.R. 582 (1967).
"
9 White, C.M. 420140, Aug. 12, 1969; Vipond, C.M. 420264, July 23, 1969, both
digested in HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-69-23;
Sept. 25, 1969, at 4, 5 [hereinafter cited as DA PAM 27-69-23]; Konieczko, C.M.
419706, June 19, 1969 digested in HEAD)QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
PAMPHLET 27-69-20, Aug. 14, 1969, at 10.
"
0 See those cases cited note 28 supra, that were dismissed for lack of court-
martial jurisdiction.
"' The only authoritative case in point appears to be Caldwell v. Parker, 252
U.S. 376 (1920), holding that the civilian courts had concurrent jurisdiction over
a murder committed by an active-duty serviceman in the state of Alabama during
World War I. This case arose under the Articles of War, which forbade military
trials of defendants charged with capital crimes committed within the United States.
The Court indicated that there was a sufficient time of war for the exercise of
military jurisdiction, but that such jurisdiction was not exclusive. But see Ex parte
King, 246 F. 868 (E.D. Ky. 1917).
12 395 U.S. at 274.
" The Court of Military Appeals has not gone beyond this definition. See DA
PAM 27-69-24, at 2-4, 6-7, digesting United States v. Smith, No. 22,180, Sept. 26,
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should arise. "Property" is self-explanatory. "Military authority," how-
ever, is a rather complex concept. If by the phrase "flouting of military
authority" 44 the Court means purely military offenses such as dis-
obedience of a lawful order or assaulting a superior in the performance of
his duties, then the same objections arise as when "military victim" is
construed too literally. Situations immediately come to mind in which
an off-duty individual could commit an offense against his direct superior,
also off-duty, and be subject only to civil law under a restrictive in-
terpretation of "military authority." Yet civilian courts cannot consider
the implications of the offense on military effectiveness, and the services
must prevent off-duty activities from interfering with command struc-
tures. The danger exists, of course, that the phrase "flouting of military
authority" could be used to justify prosecuting off-base political activism
or other disapproved, but not illegal, conduct.4 5 This phrase should be
broadly construed when an offense is committed against another service-
man, but not when the crime is essentially victimless, as in narcotics
cases or when non-illegal conduct, such as political activity, is involved.
Whether the accused was in civilian clothes at the time of the offense
is also a pertinent consideration. The Court of Military Appeals has
1969; United States v. Shockley, No. 21,667, Sept. 26, 1969; United States v.
Paxiao, No. 22,230, Sept. 26, 1969; United States v. Harris, No. 22,028, Sept. 26,
1969.
"395 U.S. at 274.
' Since there is no specific provision in the UCMJ under which enlisted per-
sonnel could be prosecuted for such activities, the charge would have to be brought
under art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964), which provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of the good order and discipline in the armed forces, all
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and
offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty,
shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special or summary court-martial,
according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at
the discretion of the court.
The "crimes and offenses not capital" clause refers only to those crimes denounced
by Congress in the United States Code and thus would not apply in the situation
under consideration. AYcocK & WuRFEL 311-12. Prosecution could be brought
under either the "to the prejudice of the good order and discipline" clause or the
"discredit to the armed forces" clause. However, there could be no prosecution
under art. 134 for an offense separately denounced in the UCMJ. United States v.
Norris, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 239-40, 8 C.M.R. 36, 39-40 (1953); United States v.
Haywood, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 376, 377, 9 C.M.R. 6, 7 (1953); AYcocx & WtrFEL
313. Depending upon the particular activity involved, an officer can be prosecuted
under art. 88, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1964), for contempt toward officials, and under
art. 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964), for conduct unbecoming an officer. United States
v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
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found the lack of uniform to be significant.4" Where other considera-
tions are inconclusive, that the offender was uniformed could tip the
balance in favor of military jurisdiction; but the presence of the uniform,
without more, should not be enough to sustain court-martial jurisdiction.
Narcotics present a special problem since Congress has not in the
UCMJ specifically prohibited their use or possession. Traditionally, nar-
cotics offenses have been punished as violations of the general article
prohibiting conduct to the "prejudice of the good order and discipline in
the armed forces."47 An alternative method has been the issuance of an
order forbidding use and possession and prosecution for disobedience of
the order.48 Because an off-post narcotics violation has no classical
"victim" and will* most likely occur while the offender is off duty and
in civilian clothes, a strict reading of O'Callahan often will not allow
the military to exercise jurisdiction. The Court of Military Appeals has
decided, however, to sustain court-martial jurisdiction over all off-post
narcotics offenses.49 In reaching this result, the court in narcotics cases
apparently has considered the factors of whether there is "no military
significance" and the offense is "not service connected" separately from
the others set forth in O'Callahan. It seems obvious that these phrases
have no meaning except that which is given them by the facts of the case.
O'Callahan should be as binding on military jurisdiction over narcotics
offenses as it is in all other cases.
Under O'Callahan, civilian courts are assured exclusive jurisdiction
over a serviceman only when he is accused of an offense committed off
post within the United States in peacetime while he was not on duty,
and if it involves no question of military authority, property, or security.
In civilian courts a serviceman charged with a felony is guaranteed a
grand jury indictment and trial by his peers, a court and counsel owing
allegiance only to their own consciences, the remedy of a declaratory
judgment if he is prosecuted under an invalid statute, and "an atmosphere
conducive to the protection of individual rights ... ."0 Another sig-
"'United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969).
" United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, 24 C.M.R. 135 (1957) ; United
States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954).
" See, e.g., United States v. Castro, No. 22,046, Sept. 26, 1969, digested in DA
PAm 27-69-24, at 4; United States v. Koepke, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 39 C.M.R.
100 (1969).
"'See United States v. Castro, No. 22,046, Sept. 26, 1969, digested it DA PAM
27-69-24, at 4. See also United States v. Boyd, No. 22,120, Sept. 19, 1969; United
States v. Beeker, No. 21,787, Sept. 12, 1969, both digested in DA PAM 27-69-23,
at 1, 3.10 395 U.S. at 266.
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nificant advantage to the serviceman defendant, not mentioned by the
Supreme Court in O'Callahan, is that vesting exclusive jurisdiction in
the civil courts over certain offenses removes the double jeopardy to which
he was subject when the civil and military courts had concurrent juris-
diction. 1 With exclusive civil jurisdiction, the only legal action that
can be taken by the military is a prosecution for any period of un-
authorized absence generated by civilian confinement.52
The holding of O'Callahan, however, is not limited to serious offenses,
which entitle the offender to a jury trial. The Court simply stated that
the defendant "could not be tried by court-martial but rather was entitled
to trial by the civilian courts."53 By this statement it presumably meant
to require exclusive civil jurisdiction over all offenses that satisfy the
elements of O'Callahan. Since there is as yet no right to a jury in trials
of "petty" offenses,54 the military offender tried in a civilian court for a
petty offense is faced with severe military consequences without having
gained the advantage of a jury trial. Because civil authorities with
exclusive jurisdiction over a petty offender can no longer turn him over
to the military for trial, he will either make bond or be jailed. If he is
able to make bond and return to his unit before being declared absent
without leave, his subsequent return to civil authorities for trial, and any
sentence served, will not be considered a punishable unauthorized ab-
sence,5 but he will have to make up the lost time at the end of his enlist-
ment.5"
The military petty offender who is unable to make bond before his
authorized absence expires is in more serious trouble. If he is held in jail
beyond his authorized absence period and is later convicted, even if he
meanwhile returned to duty, the initial absence becomes unauthorized,
although the period of confinement is not ;57 both periods, however, must
be made up by an equal amount of additional active duty.58 As for the
"'E.g., United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 548, 40 C.M.R. 257, -
(1969) (civilian acquittal followed by military conviction); Herrington, A.C.M.
18339, 33' C.M.R. 814 (1963) (simultaneous murder trials by civil and military
courts, both resulting in convictions).
'" MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 165 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as MCM (1969)].
Is 395 U.S. at 274.
" Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
61 MCM 165 (1969).
5G10 U.S.C. § 972 (1964).
7MCM 165 (1969).
810 U.S.C. § 972 (1964).
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petty offender who is unable to make bail at any time before trial, upon
conviction his absence becomes unauthorized from the time that his pass
or leave expired ;59 as of that time his pay and any family allotment stop ;60
the period of confinement is "bad time" that must be made up ;"1 and upon
returning to duty he will be subject to military prosecution as an un-
authorized absentee for the period of confinement by the civil authorities.
2
Conversely, if the serviceman were initially returned to the military
for disciplinary action, he would not have to answer for unauthorized
absence (unless he were held by civilian authorities past his authorized
absence period) ; he could not lose more than two-thirds of his pay for
whatever the period of punishment adjudged ;63 his family allotment could
not be added onto his pay before computing the forfeiture and would
continue unabated ;" and he would incur no "bad time" to make up unless
confined by the military as punishment."
The ragged division of jurisdiction resulting from O'Callahal will
cause the military and civilian bench and bar considerable difficulty until
firmer jurisdictional lines are hammered out in new cases, and the de-
cision may result in injustice to individual defendants in test cases.
Nevertheless, two valuable safeguards are afforded the serious offender
by the holding in O'Callahan. First, the decision provides for the appli-
cation of the procedural safeguard of the jury system to those cases in-
volving servicemen that the military should have little interest in prose-
cuting; second, by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the civil courts,
O'Callahan reduces the possibility of double jeopardy for service per-
sonnel that was always present under concurrent jurisdiction. But until
the Court extends the right to a jury trial to all civilian criminal de-
fendants, 66 or until the UCMJ and the military's financial regulations
are altered to mitigate the military consequences of a civilian conviction,
- MCM 165 (1969).
60 MS ComP. GEN. (1959), digested in 9 DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES Pay and Allowances § 21.3 (1959-60) ;
36 COMP. GEN. 173 (1956), digested in 6 DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE
ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES Pay and Allowances § 18.1 (1956-57).
01 10 U.S.C. § 972 (1964).
"MCM 165 (1969).
08Id. 15(b), 16(b). This statement assumes that any petty offense will not
be tried by a general court-martial.
"Id. 126(h) (2).
"10 U.S.C. § 972 (1964). Restriction to certain limits, a common punishment
for minor offenses, is not "bad time" under this statute.
" Some states do provide for a jury trial for all defendants charged with crimes.
See, e.g., N.C. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 12, 13.
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those offenders whose crimes are classified as petty offenses under pre-
vailing constitutional standards should not be deprived of the potential
collateral advantages of a military trial and should be excluded from the
O'Callahan rule.
RoGER GROOT
Patents-The Overruling of the Licensee Estoppel Doctrine
The favored status once enjoyed by patentees before the United States
Supreme Court has undergone considerable change in this century. Many
of the older concepts have been re-examined in light of the current state
of the patent system and the competing demands of other areas of the
law. For example, the exclusiveness of the patent grant is repugnant to
the free-competition teachings of antitrust policy. These factors have
prompted searching reappraisals of the privileges historically inherent
in the grant; in some cases, privilege-bestowing decisions of the past
have fallen.
More than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court held that one
who had derived benefits from the use of another's patent was estopped to
deny its validity when sued by the owner for a share of the profits.' The
effect of the estoppel doctrine was to shield many questionable patents
from attack. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins the Supreme Court recently dis-
approved this venerable doctrine. The Court stressed the strong public
interest in general circulation and use of ideas not entitled to patent
protection3 and reasoned that the estoppel doctrine was often a bar to
the most logical contestant of patentability.4
Adkins, while employed by Lear, had designed an apparatus increasing
the accuracy of gyroscopes. While his patent application was pending, he
licensed Lear to use his invention in return for royalties. After paying
royalties for approximately two years, Lear decided that the discovery by
Adkins had been fully anticipated by a prior patent and announced that
it would no longer pay royalties on production at one of its locations. Lear
later discontinued payments altogether. Shortly thereafter, Adkins finally
"Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1855).289 S. Ct. 1902 (1969).
2Id. at 1910-11.
'Id. at 1911. The high costs of patent litigation and the specter of possible
treble damages for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964) can effectively deter
a third party from attacking a patent that he desires to use. Although the same
hardships may confront the licensee, he has more to gain since he is already util-
izing the patent and is saddled with royalty payments.
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obtained his patent and sued Lear for breach of the license agreement.
The licensee sought to prove its claim of invalidity of the patent, but the
California Supreme Court invoked the estoppel doctrine to preclude Lear
from asserting this defense.5
The estoppel doctrine had been widely applied by both federal and
state courts.' One theory that has been offered in justification of estoppel
is that one receiving bargained-for benefits under a contract cannot con-
test the validity of those benefits.7 Another theory compares the estopped
party to an agent who, having collected money owed his principal, cannot
contend that there was no debt and refuse to turn over the funds.8 In
other cases, an analogy has been drawn from the doctrine that a tenant
in possession cannot dispute the title of his landlord.0
The harshness of the estoppel doctrine was met in many jurisdictions
by various exceptions. One of these, the repudiation exception, permitted
a licensee to repudiate the license agreement, give notice to the licensor,
and then contest the validity of the patent.' 0 Continued use of the patent,
however, would give rise to a cause of action for infringement." Another
exception, eviction, generally applied only to exclusive licensees 12 and
arose when the patent was declared invalid in a suit between the patentee
and a third party.'3 Since the exclusive licensee contracts for a monopoly,
the determination of invalidity ousts him from that position because
outsiders can then use the invention. The result is a failure of considera-
tion for the license agreement,' 4 and the licensee can assert the eviction as
"Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1967),
rev'd, 89 S. Ct. 1902 (1969).6 E.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950); Moore v. National Water-Tube Boiler Co., 84 F. 346 (C.C.D.N.J. 1897);
Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Oldberg Mfg. Co., 234 Mich. 317, 207 N.W. 828
(1926); Davis Co. v. Burnsville Hosiery Mills, Inc., 242 N.C. 718, 89 S.E.2d 410
(1955) ; see 4 A. WALIER, PATENTS § 403 (Deller's 2d ed. 1965).7 Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289, 293 (1855).
aId.
' White v. Lee, 14 F. 789, 790 (C.C.D. Mass. 1882) ; Wilder v. Adams, 29 F.
Cas. 1216, 1217-18 (No. 17,647) (C.C.D. Mass. 1846).
" Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F.2d 346 (N.D. Ohio 1922) ; Crew v. Flanagan,
242 Minn. 549, 65 N.W.2d 878 (1954). See Note, The Doctriw of Licensee
Repudiation in Patent Law, 63 YALE L.J. 125 (1953).
"At least one state required the repudiating licensee to make post-repudiation
use of the patent to allow the licensor the option to sue for infringement. Elgin
Nat. Watch Co. v. Bulova Watch Co., 281 App. Div. 219, 118 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1953).
2Appleton Toy & Furniture Co. v. Lehman Co. of America, 165 F.2d 801 (7th
Cir. 1948).
" Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933).
"An exclusive licensee contracts for both a monopoly in the use of the patent
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a defense if sued by the licensor for royalties accruing subsequent to the
determination that the patent is invalid.
Other exceptions to the estoppel doctrine were carved out by several
landmark Supreme Court decisions, some of which left little doubt as to
what the ultimate disposition of the doctrine would be.' 5 In Westinghouse
Electric & Manufactuwring Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.,"6 Formica had
assigned his invention to his employer, Westinghouse. Prior to approval
of the patent application, the inventor terminated his employment and
started his own business, the Formica Company. The patent issued sub-
sequently to Westinghouse. Meanwhile, the Formica Company had be-
gun manufacturing substantially the same product covered by the patent.
Sued for infringement, Formica, although estopped from contesting the
patent's validity, was allowed to show that its only novelty was dependent
upon its encompassment of a two-step process of manufacturing. Since
Formica's product was not novel because it was manufactured by a one-
step process that embraced prior art, it did not fall within the protection
of Westinghouse's patent. The Court said: "Of course, the state of the
art can not be used to destroy the patent and defeat the grant, because
the assignor is estopped to do this. But the state of the art may be used
to construe and narrow the claims of the patent, conceding their validity.
' 'l7
Although the case involved an assignment and assignor estoppel, courts
have readily applied the Formica "narrowing" exception to license situa-
tions." This limitation upon the estoppel doctrine resulted in an anomaly
because it allowed attacks only on patents possessing some novelty while
leaving entirely worthless ones unaffected. 9 However, in many instances
and freedom from an infringement suit by the patentee. A non-exclusive licensee,
however, contracts only for freedom from an infringement suit; by definition, he
has no monopoly. Thus, where a third party succeeds in having the patent declared
invalid, the non-exclusive licensee still has his freedom from an infringement suit.
For a discussion of the eviction concept, see Note, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 1101 (1948).
"As the Court said in Lear: "Given the extent to which the estoppel principle
had been eroded by our prior decisions, we believe it clear that the patent owner-
even before this decision-could not confidently rely upon the continuing vitality
of the doctrine." 89 S. Ct. at 1913 n.19. See also Note, Estoppel to Deny Validity-
A Slender Reed, 23 N.Y.U. IxTRA. L. REv. 237 (1968).
10266 U.S. 342 (1924).17 Id. at 351.
"
8E.g., New Wrinkle, Inc. v. John L. Armitage & Co., 277 F.2d 409 (3d Cir.
1960); Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 174 F.2d 541 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 892 (1949).
"o [I]f a patent had some novelty Formica permitted the old owner to defend
an infringement action by showing that the invention's novel aspects did not
extend to include the old owner's product; on the other hand, if a patent
had no novelty at all, the old owner could not defend successfully since he
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it necessarily restricted the scope of protection previously enjoyed by
many patentees.
Twenty-one years after Formica, the Court made additional inroads
into the estoppel doctrine. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Manufacturing
Co.,20 the Court held that an assignor of a patent, sued for infringement
by the assignee, could defend by showing that the alleged infringing device
was copied from a prior patent now expired. The assignor had made the
invention sued upon, had assigned his patent application to a third
party who in turn assigned it to Scott, and subsequently had begun
his own company that produced and sold essentially the same product
covered by the patent. Necessarily admitting that the patent that he
had assigned was worthless, the assignor contended that his machine
was a copy of a prior patent issued in 1912. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, reversing the district court, which had invoked the
estoppel doctrine, held that the Formica "narrowing" exception allowed
the assignor to show the prior art to limit the claims of the assigned
patent; and since the earlier expired patent completely anticipated the
assigned patent, the latter was limited to no claim at all.2 The Supreme
Court affirmed the holding of no infringement, but on new grounds. It
pointed out that once a patent expires, the invention is dedicated to the
public. Therefore, the estoppel doctrine could not prevent one from using
the invention of an expired patent because
[t]he public has invested in such free use by the grant of a monopoly
to the patentee for a limited time. Hence any attempted reservation
or continuation in the patentee or those claiming under him of the
patent monopoly, after the patent expires, whatever the legal device
employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws.2 2
This exception to the estoppel doctrine has since been applied to license
cases. 23 Thus, while Formica avoided the estoppel doctrine by allowing
a licensee to show his device to be outside the scope of the licensor's nar-
would be obliged to launch the direct attack on the patent that Formica
seemed to forbid.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 89 S. Ct. 1902, 1908 (1969).20326 U.S. 249 (1945).
2 Automatic Paper Mach. Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 147 F.2d 608 (3d Cir.),
aff'd sub mwm. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).
22326 U.S. at 256.
" E.g., Hall Laboratories, Inc. v. National Aluminate Corp., 224 F.2d 303
(3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Hooker Chem. Corp. v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Tenn. 1964) (dictum).
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rowly construed patent, Scott evaded the doctrine by permitting licensees
to prove that they were using solely the ideas of an expired patent.
Another exception to licensee estoppel was grounded specifically upon
antitrust policy. In Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,2" the
Supreme Court was faced with a license agreement containing a naked
price restriction, lawful under the Sherman Act only if supported by a valid
patent.25 The licensor-patentee had sued for royalties and an injunction
restraining sales outside the terms of the license agreement. Reversing the
lower court's invocation of the estoppel doctrine, 6 the Supreme Court held
that the estoppel rule, whether state or federal, must yield to the public
policy of the Sherman Act precluding enforcement of such unlawful agree-
ments.27
Five years later, the Court went further in deciding Edward Katzinger
Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co.2" and MacGregor v. Westing-
house Electric & Manufacturing Co.,"9 both of which also involved license
agreements with price restrictions. Unlike the licensor in Sola, who had
sought to enforce the provisions of the license controlling prices, the
licensors in Katainger and MacGregor were seeking only royalties; in-
deed, the licensors had made no attempt to enforce the price-fixing
clauses.30 The Court held that the entire agreement was tainted because
the price-fixing and royalty provisions ware not severable: "Consequently,
when one part of the consideration is unenforceable because in violation of
law, its integrated companion must go with it."3 Therefore, the licensees
were allowed to attack the validity of the patents. The above exceptions
and others that were developed to the estoppel doctrine indicated judicial
recognition of the conflict between the stability of contracts and the
patentees' privileges on one side, and, on the other, the right of public
access to ideas not protected by a valid patent.
The public right of free access to technological improvements falling
short of patentability was set out in two far-reaching companion cases,
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.32 and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
" 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
25 id. at 175.
"' Jefferson Elec. Co. v. Sola Elec. Co., 125 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd,
317 U.S. 173 (1942).
-'317 U.S. at 175, 177.
28329 U.S. 394 (1947).
29329 U.S. 402 (1947).20Id. at 412 & n.4 (dissenting opinion).
"329 U.S. at 401.
92376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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Stiffel Co.3" Although these were infringement suits not involving
licenses, the Court in Lear relied heavily upon them. In both cases,
patentees brought actions in an Illinois district court. They alleged that
the defendants were selling articles identical in design to those of the
patentees and that these actions constituted infringement and unfair
competition. The defendants contended that the patents were invalid; the
district court so held but applied the state law of unfair competition and
granted injunctions and ordered accountings for damages. The unfair
competition holdings rested upon customer confusion over source of the
products. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in both
cases."' On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that while
a state may impose certain requirements such as labeling to prevent mis-
leading consumers, state prohibition against copying unpatented articles
is incompatible with federal patent laws. Justice Black stated that "[m] ere
inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to
support an injunction against copying or an award of damages for
copying that which the federal patent laws permit to be copied."3' The
analogy to licensee estoppel is clear: Whether the estoppel doctrine is a
matter of federal or state law, it cannot, by barring potential litigants,
extend patent protection to ideas that federal patent policy demands shall
have no protection.
The Supreme Court had previously indicated in Altvater v. Freeman2 0
that the federal courts in infringement cases should not hold patents valid
if such a holding is unnecessary to disposition of a case. The Court,
citing an earlier case,8 7 indicated that because there would not be any
justiciable controversy8 it was improper upon a determination of no in-
fringement to proceed further and hold the patent valid. On the other
hand, even if a court finds no infringement, it may proceed to find the
patent invalid, for such a determination serves the public interest."0
" 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
" Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376
U.S. 225 (1964); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th
Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
1 376 U.S. at 232. For a discussion of these cases and the impact of federal
patent and copyright policy on the law of unfair competition, see Treece, Patent
Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel & Compco Cases, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 80
(1964); Comment, Does Stiffel Stifle the Law of Unfair Competitionf, 37 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 86 (1964).
36319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943).
8 Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
If an alleged infringer can prove that he is not infringing, he has no reason to
attack the patent's validity.
"' Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
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Lear's contribution to the demise of patentee privileges is not limited
to the overruling of the estoppel doctrine. Besides allowing Lear to attack
the patent on remand, the Court made significant new law-and raised
profound new questions-in the area of license contracts generally. Adkins
had filed his initial patent application in 1954; the license agreement was
consummated in 1955; and the patent issued in 1960.40 The Court was
faced with a provision in the contract calling for Lear to pay royalties
until such time as the patent was held invalid. Acknowledging the bene-
fits derived by Lear from the pre-patent licensing, the Court declared that
Lear would not be liable for royalties accruing after the 1960 patent
issued if he could prove it invalid.41 The parties' contract was deemed
to be "no more controlling on this issue than is the State's doctrine of
estoppel, which is also rooted in contract principles."'4 The Court was
concerned with the frustration of federal policies that would result if
licensees were required to continue royalty payments while challenging
patents in the courts. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, cited
the probable dilatory legal tactics by licensors, the incentive to attack
patents that early freedom from royalties would provide licensees, and
the undermining effect that similar contract provisions would have on the
federal policy favoring full and free use of ideas in the public domain.43
The Court also raised, but did not decide, the question whether Adkins
was entitled to 1955-1960 pre-patent royalties. Determination of such
an issue ultimately will depend upon "whether, and to what extent, the
States may protect the owners of unpatented inventions who are willing
to disclose their ideas to manufacturers only upon payment of royalties.""
The Court deferred decision until the state courts could consider the
problem.
Our decision today will, of course, require the state courts to re-
consider the theoretical basis of their decisions enforcing the con-
tractual rights of inventors and it is impossible to predict the extent to
which this reevaluation may revolutionize the law of any particular
State in this regard.... Given the difficulty and importance of this
task, [our definition] should be undertaken only after the state courts
have, after fully focussed inquiry, determined the extent to which
they will respect the contractual rights of such inventors in the future.
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 89 S. Ct. 1902, 1904 (1969).
,
11d. at 1911-13.
12 Id. at 1912.
'Id. at 1912-13.
" Id. at 1913.
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Indeed, on remand, the California courts may well reconcile the
competing demands of patent and contract law in a way which would
not warrant further review in this Court.45
The pronouncements on royalties were not necessary to disposition
of the case; indeed, as Mr. Justice White, concurring in part, indicated,
these issues were not even before the Court.4" That these questions were
nevertheless reached has implications worth probing. Since Stiffel and
Compco prohibit patent-type protection for ideas not shielded by the patent
laws, do they not also prohibit the states from enforcing contracts for
payment to inventors in return for disclosures of unpatented ideas? Mr.
Justice Black, concurring in part and dissenting in part, answered in the
affirmative.4 7
Since jurisdiction over suits involving royalty contracts, absent
diversity, lies exclusively with the state courts,4 it was appropriate to
allow them preliminary consideration of this problem. However, this
consideration may well be perfunctory in view of the Supreme Court's
inclinations to restrict patent protection together with the limitations im-
posed by the Stiffel-Compco mandate. If invalidity of the patent disallows
royalties after it issues, there seems to be little reason to allow royalties
for the period prior to issuance. Moreover, since issued patents are
presumed valid49 and represent a property right,0° payments for their use
until they are actually adjudicated invalid arguably rest on stronger ground
than do payments for use of ideas not yet patented.
An appealing argument might be made that until a patent grant is
issued, the invention is beyond the reach of federal law and, therefore,
the rights of contracting parties should be defined exclusively by the
states. However, this contention is apparently foreclosed by the hold-
ings in Stiffel, Compco and Lear that because the federal patent laws
deny protection to some ideas, there must be free access to them.
Privileges of the patent grant were affected by Lear in three ways.
'
5 Id.
,Id. at 1915.
"
T Id. at 1914. justice Black was joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Douglas.
, Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S.
613 (1882); see Note, The Jurisdiction of State Courts over Cases Involving
Patents, 31 CoLum. L. Rnv. 461 (1931).
"' Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695-96 (1886); H. Wenzel Tent & Duck
Co. v. White Stag Mfg. Co., 199 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1952); 35 U.S.C. § 282
(Supp. III, 1968).
" James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1881).
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First, the final rites administered to the estoppel doctrine will allow more
patent attacks. Second, excusing post-patent royalties if attacks are
successful will provide licensees additional incentive to litigate. Finally, the
decision portends a probable loss of royalties for the pre-patent period
as well. Apparently, the Supreme Court's past benevolent attitude toward
the patent system has given way to a disposition of bare tolerance; no
doubt, additional incursions into patentees' privileges will be made. The
ultimate result will depend upon the extent to which the patent system
and conflicting policies, such as those of the antitrust laws, can peace-
fully coexist.
JAMES E. CLINE
Poverty Law-Unconstitutionality of Residence Requirements for
Welfare Assistance
The United States Supreme Court in Shapira v. Thompson1 recently
held that one-year waiting period requirements as a condition precedent
to receiving public assistance violate the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment by discriminating between two classes of citi-
zens on the basis of residence.' In three separate cases' district courts,
holding the residence requirements unconstitutional, had found that the
appellees, the applicants rejected for public assistance, were eligible for
benefits in every respect except for the requirement of residence for a
full year prior to application. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower
courts that the interests promoted by the classification and asserted by
the appellants were either interests that cannot be constitutionally pro-
moted by government or that are not "compelling" state interests.4
The appellants' primary justification for the waiting periods was pro-
tection of the budgetary integrity of state public assistance programs.
They defended the residence provisions on the fiscal grounds that people
who require welfare assistance during their first year of residence in a
1394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id. at 638-42.
' On certiorari the Court consolidated Harrell v. Tobriner, 279 F. Supp. 22(D.D.C. 1967) ; Smith v. Reynolds, 277 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; and Thomp-
son v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967). The inclusion of the case from
the District of Columbia was based on Boiling v. Sharpe, 374 U.S. 497 (1954),
in which the Court held that the fifth amendment's due process clause incorporated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 394 U.S. at 641-42. See
also Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967),
which was not appealed.
'394 U.S. at 627.
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state are likely to become continuing burdens on state welfare programs,
that migration of indigents who would enter the state solely to obtain
larger benefits would be discouraged by residence requirements, and that
an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of
their contributions to the community through tax payments should be
permitted. Administrative and related governmental objectives allegedly
served by the waiting periods were (1) facilitating the planning of the
welfare budget; (2) providing an objective test of residence; (3) mini-
mizing the opportunity for applicants' fraudulent receipt of payments
from more than one jurisdiction; and (4) encouragement of early entry
into the labor force. These justifications were dismissed by the Court
as either without basis in fact or impermissible because less drastic means
are available to obtain the same objectives.' Indeed, the Court found
"weighty evidence that exclusion from the jurisdiction of the poor who
need or may need relief was the specific objective of these provisions. '"
There are two separate tests that the Court uses to determine whether
a state classification violates the equal protection clause; the nature of the
rights that the classification allegedly infringes determines which of the
two is applied.7 If the rights affected are "fundamental," the classifica-
tion can only be sustained if it is justified by compelling state interests. s
On other hand, the traditional attitude is to uphold state classifications
affecting nonfundamental rights unless the Court finds that the classifica-
tions are arbitrary.
Waiting-period requirements create two classes of needy resident fami-
lies indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of resi-
dents of a year or more and the other of residents of less than a year in
the jurisdiction. The majority in Shapiro held that this distinction in-
fringed upon the fundamental right of interstate travel and thus that only
compelling state interests could justify the classifications.10 After the
'Id. at 627-38.
'Id. at 628. The Court found that residence requirements date from Eliza-
bethan Poor Laws, which were based on the concept that each local community
should care for its own indigents. Id. at 628 n.7.
" Id. at 660-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).8 Apparently, the requirement that a classification based upon a "suspect"
criterion must be supported by a state's compelling interest arose in Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). That case involved racial classifications, which
have since been regarded as inherently "suspect." See Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the
Court by invalidating property requirements for voting added "wealth" to the list
of those which are suspect; in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23. (1968), the cri-
terion of political allegiance may have been added.
'E.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
10 394 U.S. at 634.
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Court concluded that the appellants neither used nor needed the one-year
waiting period for the suggested governmental purposes, it stated that
the residence requirement did not even meet the traditional equal protec-
tion test of whether a state classification is rational. Justice Harlan in
dissent disagreed with this evaluation of the right to travel and argued
that the less-rigid test of an absence of arbitrariness was appropriate."
In recent years the equal protection clause has been expanded to in-
validate many state limitations upon certain classes of citizenry, especially
those limitations affecting fundamental rights. The Supreme Court in
Kramer v. Union Free School District' overturned a New York voting
requirement providing that residents who were otherwise able to vote in
state and federal elections were eligible to vote in school district elections
only if (1) they owned or leased taxable real property within the district
or (2) were parents of children enrolled in the public schools. Even as-
suming that New York may legitimately limit the franchise in school dis-
trict elections to those primarily interested in school affairs, this particular
requirement is invalid because it does not accomplish this purpose with
sufficient precision to justify denying any qualified voter his franchise.
In the broader field of public welfare, the Court invalidated a Louisi-
ana wrongful death statute denying benefits to illegitimate children.'"
The Court based its decision on the traditional equal protection test and
found invidious the denial of the same claim for relief to illegitimate
children as allowed legitimate children.' 4 A ceiling upon grants to wel-
fare recipients regardless of the size of their families has been held by
several district courts to violate the equal protection test of arbitrariness.'5
Discrimination against families with many children cannot be justified
solely by the state interest of saving money. Although a state has a valid
interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs, "[t]he saving
of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification."' 6
In Shapiro the waiting periods affected the right of interstate move-
ment; the majority opinion categorized this right to travel with the pre-
ferred, fundamental freedoms of the first amendment. The right to
" Id. at 661-62 (dissenting opinion).
'-'395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"- Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
" Id. at 72. The Court said that "llegitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no
relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother." Id.5 Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D. Me. 1969) ; Dews v. Henry,
297 F. Supp. 587 (D. Ariz. 1969); Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450
(D. Md. 1968). The Court recently granted certiorari to hear cases involving
maximum family grants. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1969, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
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interstate travel free from state restrictions, prior to the implementation
of the fourteenth amendment, had been recognized in Crandall v. Nevada.'
The Supreme Court in Crandall forbade the state of Nevada from levying
a tax upon commercial vehicles as they passed through the state. Al-
though the Court expressly refused to rely on the commerce clause, it
nevertheless held the tax invalid as an interference with vital govern-
mental functions because, among other things, it denied citizens free ac-
cess to governmental centers. 8 In Edwards v. California'0 the Court
invalidated a statute making it a misdemeanor for any person knowingly
to aid in transporting an indigent into California. A majority found that
the statute imposed an unconstitutional state burden on interstate com-
merce. The burden on commerce was immediate and absolute in Ed-
wards since indigents were excluded rather than deterred; the unconsti-
tutional action was solely that of the state.2" In Shapiro the majority held
that section 602(b) of the Social Security Act21 does not authorize state
residence requirements, but only permits the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare to approve welfare grants to those states with no more
than one-year limitations. Even if the majority assumed congressional au-
thorization of waiting periods, the provisions insofar as they permit such
requirements would be violative of constitutional restrictions on state
action limiting freedom of interstate travel.22
Professor Chafee has proposed that "liberty" under the due process
clause includes the liberty of movement. 23 The Supreme Court, until
173 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
18 Id. at 43.
1- 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
"°In two concurring opinions four justices thought that the statute violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 177-86.
2-142 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1964). This section provides that:
The Secretary shall approve any [state assistance] plan which fulfills the
conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall
not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of eligibility for aid to
families with dependent children, a residence requirement which denies aid
with respect to any child residing in the State (1) who has resided in the
State for one year immediately preceding the application for such aid, or
(2) who was born within one year immediately preceding the application,
if the parent or other relative with whom the child is living has resided in
the State for one year immediately preceding the birth.
2 394 U.S. at 641. In Edwards, the Court relied on the commerce clause to
invalidate a state restraint on interstate travel. Id. The majority in Shapiro in-
validated congressional authorization of the District of Columbia's welfare re-
quirements even though the power to regulate commerce was granted solely to
Congress. Id. Thus, the commerce clause is obviously not the basis of the right
to travel discussed in Shapiro.
3 Z. CHAFEE, TiiRE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 192(1956).
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Shapiro, had applied this "liberty of movement" argument only to pro-
tect the right to travel abroad from infringement by the federal govern-
ment. Kent v. Dulles,24 which held that the Secretary of State was not
authorized to withhold a passport because the plaintiffs refused to sign
affidavits concerning their membership in the Communist Party, stated
by way of dictum, "[t] he right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which
the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law .... -2" Subse-
quent cases involving federal restrictions on travel have included similar
statements attributing the source of the right to travel to the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.26
Aptheker v. Secretary of State27 is the only ease prior to Shapiro in
which the Court invalidated a congressionally imposed restriction on
the right to travel. However, Aptheker involved a flat prohibition upon
certain travel and a claim that the congressional restriction compelled
choice between right to travel and the first amendment right to freedom
of association. 8
Whether the Supreme Court finally holds the commerce clause, the
due process clause, or the privileges and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment to be the constitutional source protecting freedom of
interstate travel, the ultimate concern is to what extent the state or fed-
eral government may impinge upon this right.29 For example, is not the
right to travel affected, if not chilled, by one state's offering higher welfare
benefits than another?
The decision in Shapiro leaves uncertain the validity of other state-
imposed waiting periods or residence requirements for determining
eligibilities to vote,30 to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt,
and to exercise other similar privileges and rights.31 Assuming a waiting
" 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
2r, Id. at 125.
"See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1965) (upholding a restriction
on travel to Cuba as not violative of due process.)
. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
'8 Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
.' The Court in Shapiro did not justify the right to travel by the commerce
clause. Indeed, if it had, it could possibly have upheld the District of Columbia
residence requirements even though it invalidated those of the states. See note 22
mspra.
"' The Court recently avoided a direct decision on Colorado's six-month resi-
dence requirement for voting in national elections. The Court held the question
"moot" because of the occurrence of the election and the subsequent reduction of
the residency requirement from six months to two months. Hall v. Beals, 38
U.S.L.W. 4006 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1969).
" A California system for determining tuition at state colleges based on resi-
dency classification has recently been upheld as not arbitrary. See Kirk v. Board
of Regents, - Cal. App. 2d - , 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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period for the applicant in each case, is there such a difference affecting
the right to travel between the denial of a license to practice a profession
and the denial of welfare benefits so that one classification is valid and
the other "invidious"? Is the right to vote, which the Constitution pro-
tects from certain forms of discrimination,"2 less fundamental than the
right to travel, which is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution?
So it would seem: The Supreme Court in Carrington v. Rash 3 recently
stated, "Texas has unquestioned power to impose reasonable residence
requirements on the availability of the ballot.")8 4
Residence requirements in welfare programs do not reflect the economic
need of an increasingly mobile work force. 8 Such requirements are op-
posed to democratic principles because they make second-class citizens of
Americans who follow the tradition of seeking a better life for them-
selves and their families. Of paramount importance, they are contrary to
the social philosophy recognized in this country for more than thirty
years. "The Social Security Act of 1935 embodied the philosophy that
every person in the country should have an access to an income sufficient
to meet the essential needs of life." 6
Although the disposal of welfare residence requirements may have
been demanded by the Constitution and socio-economic policies, the con-
sequences may not be entirely beneficial. It is possible that a few wel-
fare-minded states now will suffer a greater burden. 7 If these states are
compelled to limit their welfare programs or to enact proportionately
greater taxes, in the final analysis the overall welfare system may have
been deterred rather than promoted. On the other hand, the abolition of
residence requirements should encourage greater federal participation in
welfare programs."8 Federalizing the welfare system might eliminate the
present disparity between state welfare payments, spread the cost of wel-
" U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV & XIX.83380 U.S. 89 (1965).
"' Id. at 91. In Carrington the Court invalidated a provision in the Texas Con-
stitution that denied the right to vote to members of the armed forces who moved
their homes to Texas during their military duty and who remained in the service
while there.
"See Note, Welfare Benefits-A Constitutional Right to Change Residence?,
7 J. FAmILY L. 660, 665 (1968).
38 Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes-I, 51 IowA
L.Rv. 1080, 1090 (1966).
" See Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Cate-
gorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 567, 618 (1966).
88 Note, The Constitutionality of Welfare Residence Requirements, 22 Sw. L.J.
341, 349 (1968). For President Nixon's proposals outlining welfare reform, see
N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, § c, at 10.
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fare equally throughout the country, and possibly lead to more efficient
administration.3
Although Justice Harlan in Shapiro labeled the majority's holding an
unwise extension of the equal protection clause,4" it seems that if this
trend toward expansion continues, state classifications that deny a right
or privilege to one portion of its citizenry will be subject to closer scru-
tiny than in the past. There is no indication what classification the Court
will next regard as "inherently suspect."
GEORGE HACKNEY EATMAN
Torts-Extrinsic-Fact Test in the Law of Slander
The law of defamation has provoked many caustic comments from
legal writers. Sir Frederick Pollock notes that "no branch of the law
has been more fertile of litigation than this [defamation] ...nor has
any been more perplexed with minute and barren distinctions."1 Dean
Prosser calls defamation "a senseless thing, for which no court and no
writer has had a kind word for upwards of a century and a half. It has
been denounced many times in whatever scathing terms the vivid imagina-
tion of learned and literary authors could invent ...."2
The confusion that tends to invade this area of the law is apparent in
a recent North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Beane v. Weiman Co.3
In an action for slander by a former employee against her former employer,
her former employer's president, and two other company employees, the
plaintiff alleged that a company official had been informed by the two
other employees that plaintiff had called their wives and reported that
they were consorting with other women. The official told plaintiff that
one of the other employees was essential to the company and that he
had no choice but to terminate plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff further
alleged that these words were spoken by the employee-defendants with
" One suggested approach calls for the use of a negative income tax. See
Tobin, Pechman, & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE
L 1 (1967).
L. 39 4 U.S. at 659 (dissenting opinion).
F. POLLOCx, THE LAw op TORTS 237 (12th ed. 1923).
-'Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rnv. 839 (1960). In a lighter vein
A. P. Herbert noted that "the law of libel is almost incomprehensible, except to
those who have studied it from their cradles, and even for them it is a labyrinth
of uncertainties, of false clues, blind alleys, and unexplored passages." A. P. HER-
BERT, UcooxO LAw 129 (1936).
5 N.C. App. 276, 168 S.E.2d 236 (1969).
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malice and for the purpose of harming plaintiff's reputation and employ-
ment, that they had been repeated with malice by the company official
within the scope of his employment, and that the words had caused injury
to the plaintiff in her occupation. A demurrer to the complaint was
sustained by the lower court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed.
4
The separate actions for slander and libel have their roots deep in
the common law. An early jurisdictional clash with the ecclesiastical
courts resulted in the development of certain categories of words where
pecuniary loss would be presumed and the common law courts would have
jurisdiction.5 Three categories of slander developed within which the
plaintiff could recover without proof of damage: (1) words imputing a
crime involving moral turpitude; (2) words imputing a loathesome
disease; and (3) words affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade,
profession, or office. In all other cases the plaintiff could not get his case
to the jury without alleging and proving his pecuniary loss.' Incontinency
of an innocent woman has been added by statute as a fourth category
in most jurisdictions. 7 The courts referred to words falling within the
categories as slander per se and those not within the categories as slander
per quod. s
At common law the utterance could be within the categories by its
apparent meaning or only by reason of extrinsic circumstances. The
plaintiff was allowed to plead and prove facts not apparent upon the face
of the publication by way of "inducement." He could then establish the
defamatory sense of the publication with reference to such facts by "in-
nuendo." 9 Such an innuendo was required whenever the plaintiff relied
on extrinsic facts to give the words a defamatory meaning. In such a
case the plaintiff was required to plead the words, the extrinsic facts,
and knowledge of those facts by one or more of those persons to whom
the words were published.' If by this method the plaintiff could estab-
IId. at 276-77, 168 S.E.2d at 236-37.
'W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS 772 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PRossER];
Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99, 110-12; Veeder, The
History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 CoLum. L. REv. 546, 555-60
(1903).
GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 143 (6th ed. R. McEwen & P. Lewis 1967)
[hereinafter cited as GATLEY]; M. NEwELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL 6-7 (4th ed.
1924) [hereinafter cited as NEwELL] ; PROssER 772-80.
'E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-4 (1965).
8 Henn, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14, 17-18 (1961).
-GATLEY, supra note 6, at 94-95; PROSSER, supra note 5, at 766.10GATLEY, supra note 6, at 94.
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lish that the words were within any of the categories, the words were
held to be slander per se without the requirement for allegation of special
damages.
The law of libel, however, developed along different lines. The
potential threat of the written word was recognized early by the English
monarchy, and this realization led to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Star Chamber in certain cases of written defamation. The special cate-
gories that emerged in slander did not develop in libel since the early
emphasis was not on limiting the action but on expanding it as part
of a general censorship program.'- Recovery is still allowed in England
and in a minority of the American jurisdictions for all libel with no
requirement that plaintiff plead and prove damages.' 2 However, the
majority of American jurisdictions have deviated from the common law
rule." The majority allow recovery without proof of special damages
only in those cases in which the defamatory nature of the writing is
apparent on its face or in which the plaintiff can show, by resorting to
extrinsic facts, that the writing falls within the four special slander cate-
gories. In all other cases in which only extrinsic facts show defamation,
the plaintiff must plead and prove special damages.'
"'Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 99, 116-22; Veeder,
The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUm. L. Rlv. 546, 562-71
(1903).
" Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 843 (1960). The Restatement
of Torts states that "[O]ne who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes
matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel
is liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputation results there-
from." RESTAIEMENT or Toms § 3-569 (1938).
"
3See, Henn, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 14 (1961); Prosser,
Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960); Prosser, M~ore Libel Per Quod,
79 HARv. L. Rnv. 1629 (1966). But see Eldredge, Spurious Rule of Libel Per
Quod, 79 H.Av. L. Rav. 733 (1966). For a discussion of this problem in North
Carolina see Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 674 (1955). The most recent statement of the
North Carolina position is found in Robinson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 273 N.C.
391, 159 S.E.2d 896 (1968).
" Dean Prosser's proposed revisal of the Restatement of Torts would read as
follows:
§ 569. Liability Without Proof of Special Harm.
(1) One who publishes defamatory matter is subject to liability without
proof of special harm or loss of reputation if the defamation is
(a) Libel whose defamatory meaning is apparent from the publication itself
without reference to extrinsic facts, or
(b) Libel or slander which imputes to another
(i) A criminal offense, . . .
(ii) A loathesome disease, ...
(iii) Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office,...
(iv) Unchastity on the part of a women .....
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The extrinsic-fact test, which determines if the plaintiff must plead
and prove special damages, evolved solely in the law of libel. The two
categories of libel were labelled per se and per quod.15 Libel per se
required no special damages; libel per quod did. But the double meaning
of these two terms created a situation ripe with possibilities for con-
fusion by the courts.
The categories of words held to be slander per se have long been
recognized in North Carolina." The court in Beane quoted with approval
from Penner v. Elliott,l' an earlier North Carolina slander case in which
the North Carolina Supreme Court said that "[w]e must look to the
common law, under the guidance of our own decided cases ..."s and
the words held to be slander per se included "[a] ccusations of crime or
offenses involving moral turpitude, defamatory statements about a person
with respect to his trade, occupation or business, imputations of having
a loathesome disease, and the like."' 19
The confusion arises in the law of slander in North Carolina when
the plaintiff must resort to extrinsic facts to show the defamatory mean-
ing of the utterance. There is authority for the proposition that North
Carolina adheres to the common law rule allowing the plaintiff to resort
to extrinsic evidence to bring the utterance into one of the slander per
se categories without his having to show special damages. The common
law rule was stated in an early case, Watts v. Greenlee,20 in which the
court, considering a charge of incontinency, ' 21. said that "[w] ords not in
themselves actionable may be rendered so . . . by something extrinsic,
with the aid of innuendo."22
In certain cases the plaintiff may be forced to rely on extrinsic facts
such as an unusual meaning of the utterance or facts known to the hearer
to prove defamation. If the defamatory meaning thus alleged is subject
(2) One who publishes any other libel or slander is subject to liability only
upon proof of special harm ....
Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rnv. 839, 850 (1960).
" E.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 785, 195 S.E. 55, 59
(1938); see Henn, supra note 8, at 22.
1 E.g., Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935) (injury to trade);
Oates v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 205 N.C. 14, 169 S.E. 869 (1933) (crime
involving moral turpitude); McKee v. Wilson, 87 N.C. 300 (1882) (crime and
use of office).
225 N.C. 33, 33 S.E.2d 124 (1945).I81d. at 34, 33 S.E.2d at 125.10/d.
2013 N.C. 115 (1829).
21Id. at 118-19.
"
2id. at 117.
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to permissible inference, the case is for the jury. For example, the plain-
tiff resorted to extrinsic facts in Oates v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,2"
a case involving an accusation of crime. The court allowed the introduc-
tion of the "circumstances of the publication" and "the hearer's knowledge
of facts which would influence their understanding of the words used '24
without requiring an allegation of special damages.
Scott v. Harrison25 contains another exposition of the majority posi-
tion with respect to extrinsic evidence in the law of slander. The plain-
tiff, a high school principal's wife, alleged that defendant had said that
the plaintiff had been forbidden to go on the premises of a school at
which her husband had been principal. 6 Justice Seawell in a well-
reasoned opinion criticized the arbitrary categories of slander, but re-
affirmed the position of the categories in North Carolina law.' In ap-
proaching the problem of extrinsic evidence, he said that "[iln the com-
plaint under consideration none of the charges of slander is laid with an
'innuendo' attaching any special meaning to the words used other than
that which is obvious, and under the ordinary meaning they are not action-
able per se."'2 1 Clearly, "innuendo" would have been allowed to bring
the words within the common law slander categories.
A hint of confusion and deviation from the common law is contained
in the early case Pegram v. Stoltz.29 In an action for slander, the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant called him "a perjured man" for falsely
swearing as to his residence before a board of registrarsY0 The court first
concluded that the crime alleged was not infamous; thus the accusation
was not within that category of slander.3" The court, discussing the in-
troduction of extrinsic evidence, stated that
[W]hen the words spoken are such as do not on their face import
such degradation as will of course be injurious . . . then the plaintiff
must aver some special damage, which is called laying his action with
a per quod, and must show by proof that he has in point of fact
sustained a loss before he can recover 3 s
28 205 N.C. 14, 169 S.E. 869 (1933).
'Id. at 17, 169 S.E. at 871.2 215 N.C. 427, 2 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
Id. at 428-29, 2 S.E.2d at 1-2.
Id. at 430, 2 S.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 430, 2 S.E.2d at 2.
"76 N.C. 349 (1877).
:o Id. at 349-50.
"Id. at 352.
"Id. at 351.
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This statement can be regarded as surplusage in the decision of the case
since extrinsic circumstances could not have brought the accusation within
any of the slander per se categories. The implication is present, however,
that extrinsic circumstances would not have been allowed to prove the
words actionable per se.
The North Carolina Supreme Court continued its deviation from the
common law in Deese v. Collins,2 in which the allegation was that the
defendant had charged the plaintiff, a white man, with having Negro
blood."4 The court relied on the common law slander categories to hold
that the allegation was not slander per se."5 The court also implied that
extrinsic evidence would not have been allowed to bring the utterance
within the slander categories by quoting with approval8" from Pegram, but
again this part of the opinion can be considered dictum since extrinsic
evidence would not have aided the plaintiff. In Badame v. Lampke,8' cited
by the court of appeals in Beane, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
confirmed its confusion of the common law of defamation. The words
complained of in this case were directed toward a businessman and clearly
fell within one common law category of slander per se.28 Relying on Deese
v. Collins,9 the court expressly imported the extrinsic-fact test, a libel
distinction, into the law of slander by stating
[I]f the injurious character of the spoken statement appears, not on its
face as a matter of general acceptance, but only in consequence of
extrinsic, explanatory facts showing its injurious effect, such utterance
is said to be actionable only per quod, and in such cases, the injurious
character of the words must be pleaded and proved, and in order to
recover there must be allegation and proof of some special damage.40
The court concluded in this case that the defamation was apparent on its
face. 41
In Beane the court relied both on Penner v. Elliott,42 which is authority
for application of the traditional common law slander test, and on Badame
191 N.C. 749, 133 S.E. 92 (1926).
S4 Id. at 749, 133 S.E. at 92.
Id. at 751, 133 S.E. at 92-93.36Id. at 750, 133 S.E. at 92.8'242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955).88Id. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 468.
'8191 N.C. 749, 133 S.E. 92 (1926).
,0 242 N.C. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 467-68.
'
1 Id. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at 468.
40225 N.C. 33, 33 S.E.2d 124 (1945).
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v. Lampke, 8 which requires use of the extrinsic-fact test. The court could
have decided that the words did not fall within the category of injury
to trade and employment and thus might have relied solely on the tradi-
tional slander test of Penner in its resolution of the case on the facts before
it. It is impossible to determine if the court actually intended to give
effect to the extrinsic-fact test in concluding that the words were actionable
per quod. The vagueness surrounding the court's holding serves only
to amplify the confusion that exists in the law of defamation in North
Carolina.
The apparent application in Beane of both the traditional slander test
and the extrinsic-fact test has definite implications for plaintiffs in future
slander cases. If both tests are to be applied in North Carolina to deter-
mine what will be slander per se, future plaintiffs will have to allege and
be able to prove special damages in all cases in which the utterance does
not on its face fall within the four slander categories. These requirements
present a formidable hurdle for plaintiffs in cases in which proof of special
damages is difficult.
The most plausible explanation for use of the extrinsic-fact test in
libel is that a limited number of people will understand the defamatory
nature of the writing if it is not apparent on the face. This same con-
sideration should apply to the law of slander, and thus the North Caro-
lina courts are serving a useful function in the area of defamation if they
are attempting to require special damages to make actionable oral state-
ments that on their face do not fall within one of the four traditional
categories.44 The possibility of abuse has always existed in cases in
which the words were held to be slander per se since the jury had dis-
cretion to award damages without evidence of the plaintiff's actual loss.
As a measure to prevent petty suits and as an aid in first amendment
protection, the application of the extrinsic-fact test to supplement the
traditional category test will be valuable in the law of slander.
The confusion of the North Carolina courts over the extrinsic-fact
test arises not so much from the importation of this test from the law of
libel into that of slander as it does from the inconsistent application of
48242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955).
"The application of the extrinsic-fact test in North Carolina slander cases has
been more restrictive than the application of the same test in libel actions in a
majority of American jurisdictions. In libel, the majority allow the introduction
of extrinsic facts to bring the writing within the traditional slander categories with-
out requiring proof of special damages. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L.
Rav. 839, 850 (1960).
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the test in slander cases. In addition, there appears to be confusion over
whether the extrinsic-fact test was a determining factor in those cases in
which it was stated as the applicable law. These areas of confusion should
be clarified in the next appropriate case to insure that plaintiffs are able
to foresee recovery with some reasonable degree of certainty and to make
clear whether the extrinsic-fact test will always be applied when oral
statements are not actionable on their face.
LANNY B. BRIDGERS
Torts-Liability of Physicians for Violation of Certification
Requirements in Commitment Process
The right of a mentally ill woman not to be restrained against her will
was the concern of the court in Di Giovanni v. Pessel.1 In affirming an
award of punitive damages against a physician whose false affidavit was
a substantial factor in the commitment of the plaintiff to a mental hos-
pital, the court aptly reflected intolerance toward the wilful and injurious
dereliction of a statutorily imposed duty. Unfortunately, convoluted
reasoning obscured the expression of this judicial intolerance.
The civil rights of the mentally ill have received close scrutiny in recent
years,2 and legislation has reflected concern for those rights." Generally,
statutes authorizing involuntary commitment require a judicial hearing
before commitment can be effected; commonly, these statutes require
medical certification as to the insanity of the individual involved before
commitment can be ordered. In case of an emergency whereby the indi-
vidual must be restrained immediately and there is insufficient time for
104 N.J. Super. 550, 250 A.2d 756 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1969).
2 See, e.g., R. FARMER, THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1967); F. LIND-
MAN & D. MCINTYRE, JR., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1961)
[hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & McINTYRE]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, FEDERAL SEcuRiTY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION
OF THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952); R. Rocic,
M. JACOBSEN, & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND DISCHARGE OF THE MENTALLY
ILL (1968) [hereinafter cited as RocK]; Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I (1961); Curran, Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1953) ; Comment, The New Mental Health Codes:
Safeguards in Compulsory Commitnent and Release, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 977 (1967).
'See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§21-501 to -591 (1967). In its report to the
Senate when the bill was under consideration, the Senate Judiciary Committee ex-
pressed the hope that the act would serve as a model for revision of state hos-
pitalization laws. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROTECTING THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL, S. REP. No. 925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1964).
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a hearing, judicial review is required shortly after hospitalization. For
one who is successfully committed, mandatory periodic review of his condi-
tion by medical authorities or habeas corpus assures that his confinement
is not continued after he regains his sanity.4
Despite this concern for the rights of the mentally ill, courts have
-found inherent difficulties in disposing of suits against doctors whose
alleged nonfeasance or misfeasance of statutory examination provisions
has resulted in an unjustified constraint, for the individual right of free-
dom must be balanced with the public interest and medical realities. More-
over, fitting the particular facts to a traditional cause of action may be
difficult. False imprisonment at first glance would seem to be an appro-
priate action since it evolved as a means to protect individual freedom
of movement.5 However, as will be demonstrated, this theory is limited
by the effect of a court order in those cases involving judicial hospitaliza-
tion. Malicious prosecution," abuse of process, conspiracy, and defama-
tion are other traditional theories upon which a plaintiff might rely in
seeking relief against a doctor who abuses his authority during a com-
mitment proceeding. But these actions also have inherent limitations,7
the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this note.
Another difficulty is that involvement by the judiciary in the commit-
ment process can raise a problem of privilege. For example, some courts
have accorded the certifying physicians an absolute immunity from any
'See Ln nmAN & MCINTYRE 15-40;, RocK 41-46.
5W. PnossEu, LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 54 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
I Malicious prosecution is similar to, and sometimes confused with, false im-
prisonment. It comprehends the malicious institution of a groundless action and
is directed against the one who instituted that action. To recover under malicious
prosecution, the plaintiff not only must show that the defendant instituted the
-groundless action, but he also must prove that the former proceeding terminated
in his favor and that the defendant maliciously and without probable cause insti-
tuted the action. See PROSSER § 12, at 61-62, § 113, at 853-55, § 114, at 870-75.
See generally Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. Rv. 285
(1969). The dissenting opinion in Di Giovanni scored the majority for failing
to distinguish between malicious prosecution and false imprisonment; the majority
o pinion asserted that it was improbable that Dr. Pessel could be held liable for
malicious prosecution since he did not initiate or instigate the proceedings. 104
N.J. Super. at 564-68, 577, 250 A.2d at 763-65, 771.
'See generally as to abuse of process, PROSSER § 115, at 876-78; Byrd, Malicious
Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. Rnv. 285, 286-91 (1969); as to con-
spiracy, Cook v. Robinson, 216 Ga. 328, 116 S.E.2d 742 (1960); as to defamation,
Fisher v. Payne, 93 Fla. 1085, 1092, 113 So. 378, 380 (1927); Jarman v. Offutt,
239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954). For a general discussion on liability con-
nected with commitment proceedings, see Note, Civil Liability of Persons Partici-
pating in the Detention of the Allegedly Mentally Ill, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 193.
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civil action by virtue of their participation in a legal proceeding," and
others have granted a qualified immunity.9 The act of examination has
been held on at least one occasion to be a prerequisite to acquiring any
immunity.10 One court has characterized the nature of charges involving
alleged nonfeasance or misfeasance of the certification requirement as a
libel action from which the physicians would be absolutely immune by
virtue of their privileged status as witnesses in a judicial proceeding.'
Di Giovanni spawned difficulties even though the facts were un-
disputed. The plaintiff, Mrs. Di Giovanni, had suffered from a deteri-
orating mental condition for over a year. During this period, she had
been examined and treated on several occasions by Dr. Pessel, an in-
ternist, who last saw her in March, 1965. Aware that her condition was
growing worse he suggested to plaintiff's family in July, 1965, that she
be hospitalized for psychiatric treatment. The family instituted commit-
ment proceedings shortly thereafter.' 2
One of the New Jersey statutes governing hospitalization of the men-
tally ill' 3 requires examination of the patient by two physicians at the insti-
tution of the action for commitment. The physicians must certify that the
patient is insane; and, of critical importance in the Di Giovanni case, every
certificate must "set forth the date of the making of the personal examina-
tion of the subject of the action, which must be made in every case by
the physician signing the certificate not more than ten days prior to the
admission of such person to the institution .. . ."" In addition the ob-
served condition must be described in the certificates."
Accordingly, the family of Mrs. Di Giovanni obtained certification
from a psychiatrist, Dr. Borrus, who stated that she needed hospitalization
8 E.g., Dabkowski v. Davis, 364 Mich. 429, 111 N.W.2d 68 (1961); Linder v.
Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 295 N.W. 299 (1940).
'E.g., Christopher v. Henry, 284 Ky. 127, 143 S.W.2d 1069 (1940) (logic and
good faith perform a prominent part in determining liability).
"' See Beckham v. Cline, 151 Fla. 481, 10 So. 2d 419 (1942). Compare Suke-
forth v. Thegen, - Me. -, 256 A.2d 162 (1969) with Dunbar v. Greenlaw, 152
Me. 270, 128 A.2d 218 (1956).
1 Fowle v. Fowle, 255 N.C. 720, 122 S.E.2d 722 (1961); Bailey v. McGill,
247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957), noted in 36 N.C.L. Rnv. 552 (1958). See
also Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954).
12 104 N.J. Super. at 556-58, 250 A.2d at 759-60.
11 N.J. STAT. ANx. § 30:4-29 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1969). For the pur-
pose of this note the amended statute does not vary substantially from the former
statute.
I Id. § 30:4-30 (1964).
I 5Id. § 30:4-37 (1964).
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"for her welfare, observation, and treatment."' 6 Because of difficulty
in arranging another examination by any local psychiatrist, they pre-
vailed upon Dr. Pessel to provide the other certificate. He agreed to
furnish it without examining her, on condition that a psychiatrist confirm
his diagnosis. In August he falsely certified that he had examined Mrs.
Di Giovanni within the requisite period and had found her in need of
immediate restraint for her own safety and the safety of her relatives. 7
The family then obtained an order of temporary commitment from a
local municipal court,'" and the seventy-three-year-old lady was committed
to a mental hospital operated by Carrier Clinic. She was discharged about
one month later and subsequently brought actions against the clinic
and the two doctors for malpractice and false imprisonment. The trial
judge, after the presentation of all evidence, granted Carrier's motion for
summary judgment, dismissed the malpractice claims against the two
doctors, but ruled as a matter of law that the doctors were liable for false
imprisonment. He further ruled that the plaintiff's indisputable need for
psychiatric treatment preempted recovery of compensatory damages and
that the jury would be asked only to determine the amount of punitive
damages9
On appeal the Superior Court affirmed the judgment for Carrier,20
affirmed the dismissal of the malpractice claims,21 and reversed the
ruling against Dr. Borrus22 while affirming judgment against Dr. Pessel.
One justice wrote the court opinion for all holdings except the ruling
against Dr. Pessel, from which he dissented (dissenting opinion). Another
wrote the court opinion affirming the ruling against Dr. Pessel (majority
opinion), and the third justice wrote an opinion concurring in the result
(concurring opinion).
Since the facts were undisputed, it remained for the justices to deter-
mine whether the trial judge was correct in finding false imprisonment
"0 104 N.J. Super. at 570, 250 A.2d at 767.
" Id. at 556-58, 568, 250 A.2d at 759-60, 766.8 N.J. STAT. AxN. § 30:4-37 (1964).
s" 104 N.J. Super. at 554-55, 250 A.2d at 758.
20 id. at 554, 559-61, 250 A.2d at 758, 761-62. The court found no proof of
negligence and no false imprisonment because the municipal magistrate authorized
the confinement.2 11 id. at 561-63, 250 A.2d at 762-63. There'was no proof of a standard of
medical practice to which Dr. Borrus allegedly failed to adhere and no proof
of injury as to Dr. Pessel.
2Id. at 563-64, 250 A.2d at 763. Defective notarization of the affidavit was
held insufficient to impose liability.
23 Id. at 568, 250 A.2d at 766.
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as a matter of law. In contemplating the issue of false imprisonment, the
court followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts which defines the
elements of the action in this manner:
An Actor is subject to liability to another for false imprisonment
if
(a) he acts intending to confine the other or a third person within
boundaries fixed by the actor, and
(b) his act directly or indirectly results in such a confinement of the
other, and
(c) the other is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.24
The majority summarily declared that "[ilt can scarcely be denied that
the essential elements of this tort thus defined in the Restatement have
been established in the case of Dr. Pessel."25
The court then faced the question whether any legal justification for
the constraint of Mrs. Di Giovanni's person existed. Legal justification,
of course, would defeat recovery under false imprisonment.20 To dis-
count the possibility of this defense, the court advanced two theories.
First, it stated that Dr. Pessel's conduct in knowingly making a false
certificate was legally indefensible and sufficient of itself to justify the
award of punitive damages." Second, it asserted that the plaintiff's condi-
tion was not sufficient as a matter of law to justify involuntary commit-
ment. In reference to the latter theory, New Jersey courts have narrowly
limited the degree of mental illness warranting immediate involuntary
restraint. As described in the majority opinion, "[t]he general test as
to the nature of the insanity warranting immediate involuntary restraint
is whether there is a danger that the patient may injure herself or some
other member of the public."' 28 The proof did not manifest this degree of
2
'RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
104 N.J. Super. at 571, 250 A.2d at 767-68.
Id. at 571-72, 250 A.2d at 768. See Kraft v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 220
Ore. 230, 244, 348 P.2d 239, 243 (1959); Mailey v. De Pasquale's Estate, 94 R.I.
31, 34-35, 177 A.2d 376, 379 (1962).
104 N.J. Super at 571, 250 A.2d at 768.
" Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-37 (1964) merely demands the doctor to exercise
his judgment whether the condition of the patient is sufficient to warrant restraint.
Under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-63 to -64 (1964), need of observation and treat-
wient is the standard for commitment. These statutes are typical of the vague
guidance legislatures have provided for determining the degree of mental illness
that warrants involuntary commitment. This vagueness is disturbing in a
libertarian sense, for freedom is too precious to be subjected to the caprice of am-
biguity. Significantly, the United States Congress has authorized the District
Court for the District of Columbia to order involuntary hospitalization only if a
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insanity in Mrs. Di Giovanni's case although she obviously needed certain
treatment; but, according to the majority opinion, the fundamental in-
quiry was whether the treatment needed necessitated involuntary confine-
ment. Dr. Borrus did not indicate such a necessity in his affidavit; neither
did the record of her hospitalization, which was considered to be of con-
trolling significance. 9 Since involuntary restraint was not necessary and
the doctor's conduct was legally indefensible, there was no legal justifica-
tion for the restraint, the court seemed to reason."
Nowhere in the majority opinion is there a discussion of the effect
of the -court order of temporary commitment, but it should have been of
threshold concern because a valid court order negates the unlawfulness
of restraint essential in an action for false imprisonment. Such an order
provides legal justification for confinement, and hence a resulting im-
prisonment is not false; it is legitimate31 For this reason, involuntary
hospitalization resulting from a valid court order will not give rise to an
action for false imprisonment, even if the order had been obtained by
giving false information to the court.2  The concurring justice con-
cluded without elaboration that the magistrate's order of temporary com-
mitment should not insulate Dr. Pessel from responding in damages for
false imprisonment.3 3 The dissenting justice disagreed strongly and
asserted that the majority was rejecting the settled rule. 4 And indeed,
mentally ill person, because of his illness, is likely to injure himself or others if
allowed to remain at liberty. D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-545 (1967). For a view that a
fixed standard should not be developed, see Rocx, supra note 2, at 256-60. LiND-
MAN & McINTYRE, supra note 2, at 40, conclude that statutes should clearly ex-
press the degree of mental illness justifying involuntary hospitalization. For a
general discussion of this problem, see Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MicH. L. REv. 945, 954-60 (1959).
29 104 N.J. Super. at 573-74, 250 A.2d at 768-69.
'
0 Id. at 571-74, 250 A.2d at 767-69 (semble).
9 1Whitten v. Bennett, 86 F. 405 (2d Cir. 1898) ; O'Shaughnessy v. Baxter, 121
Mass. 515 (1877) ; Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N.J.L. 57, 58 (Sup. -Ct. 1881) ; Melton
v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700, 703, 36 S.E.2d 276, 277-78 (1945) (by implication);
35 C.J.S. False Im4prisonment § 16 (1960). See Kraft v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 220 Ore. 230, 244, 348 P.2d 239, 243 (1959) ; Mailey v. De Pasquale's Estate,
94 R.I 31, 34-35, 177 A.2d 376, 379 (1962); 32 Am. Jun. 2d False Imprisonment
§§8, 66, 85 (1967).
" Mezullo v. Maletz, 331 Mass. 233, 237, 118 N.E.2d 356, 359 (1954); Pate
v. Stevens, 257 S.W.2d 763, 766-67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See also C. BuRDIcK,
THrE LAW oF TORTS 303, 309 (4th ed. 1926); PROSSER § 12, at 62; 32 Am. JuR. 2d
False Inprisonment § 66 (1967).
104 N.J. Super. at 577, 250 A.2d at 771.
Id. at 564, 250 A.2d at 763. The dissent also disputed the matter of plaintiff's
condition and concluded that the proofs did evince a need for confinement. Id. at
566-67, 250 A.2d at 765.
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by focusing on the indefensibility of Dr. Pessel's conduct and the actual
condition of Mrs. Di Giovanni to the exclusion of the effect of the court
order, the majority does appear to reject the great weight of authority
and to establish its own notion of legal justification. Perhaps the pre-
vailing justices felt that the role of the magistrate was too perfunctory
to be considered a judicial act of the kind that should protect the doctor
from false imprisonment. If so, they could understandably ignore the
court order," but they did not articulate this view except possibly in-
ferentially by the general tone of their opinions.
The court perhaps could have shown absence of legal justification for
the confinement by asserting that the court order was invalid because
of the inadequate certification of Dr. Borrus. His certificate did not
manifest any emergency conditions justifying the immediate confinement
of Mrs. Di Giovanni;36 therefore, because of the previously discussed
judicial limitation on immediate involuntary restraint, his certificate was
insufficient to support an order of temporary commitment. The magistrate
could not validly issue the order without two proper affidavitsY7 Hence
his order arguably was invalid and did not provide legal justification for
the imprisonment. But this line of reasoning could lead to other compli-
cations. If it were accepted, Dr. Pessel could plausibly contend that the
magistrate's impropriety constituted an intervening, superseding cause
of the false imprisonment. 8 Since the certificates, in addition to the
order, constitute the warrant and authority for admission and detention
for a temporary period,"9 Carrier Clinic might not be so readily freed
Be LINDMAN & McINTYRE, supra note 2, at 23; cf. Sukeforth v. Thegen, - Me.
-, 256 A.2d 162, 163 (1969). Just how much discretion the magistrate has under
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-37 (1964) is not clear. Technically, his order of temporary
commitment institutes the inquiry into the sanity of the individual involved, but
his order follows in sequence the certification by the physicians. It seems logical
that he would not issue an order of temporary commitment without probable cause
to do so. Significantly, the plaintiff conceded, and the court apparently agreed,
that the magistrate's order authorizing the initial confinement of Mrs. Di Giovanni
was sufficient for Carrier to act upon. Although the majority felt that Dr. Pessel
could not rely on that order as a defense since he was aware of the defect in
procedure, the status accorded the order in regard to defendant Carrier indicates
that the magistrate's discretion is sufficient to constitute a meaningful judicial pro-
ceeding and is not perfunctory. 104 N.J. Super. at 559, 563, 577, 250 A.2d at 761,
763, 770.
104 N.J. Super. at 573, 250 A.2d at 768.
, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-29, -37 (1964).
"See PenneU v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163, 166-67 (1883); Niven v. Boland, 177
Mass. 11, 12-13, 58 N.E. 282, 282-83 (1900).
"' N.J. STAT. AN. § 30:4-37 (1964).
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from liability.40 Furthermore, one could argue that the magistrate should
be liable because he acted without legal authority by virtue of the same
defect.4 - These arguments serve to emphasize the need for legislative
attention in elucidating the degree of mental illness warranting invol-
untary hospitalization of the mentally ill.
After discussing the problem of legal justification, the court, next
examined the possibility of the existence of any immunity that might pro-
tect Dr. Pessel. Where a false imprisonment comprises an element of a
legal proceeding, a privilege is accorded the person who institutes that
proceeding. The privilege is the same as that of any person charged with
malicious. prosecution: He is not liable for any confinement, even though
illegal, and is shielded from liability for malicious prosecution by the
strenuous evidentiary requirements of that action. The basis of the
privilege is the public policy of encouraging private actions to enhance
public order. The court reasoned that the doctor did not fall into the
category of one who institutes or instigates the action and could not
thereby avail himself of the privilege. Neither could he be said to-fall
within the protected categories of judicial officers and those relying on the
judicial process, as Carrier Clinic, since he was cognizant of the fatal
defect. Too, public policy would be ill-served by-extending an immunity
to one who flouted the law as did Dr. Pessel4
Patently, the inexorable objective of the court was to enforce the
statutory provisions for involuntary commitment and to secure the
plaintiff's rights under those provisions. It is unfortunate, however, that
the court found it necessary to examine false imprisonment at length in
relation to the violation of the certification requirement. A prosaic, tech-
nical discussion of cause of action, legal justification, and privilege detracts
from the court's objective. This methodology raises the spectre of the
"forms of action [ruling] us from their graves."'' The same end could
have been achieved more simply, directly, and clearly by holding the
doctor liable for violation of a statutory duty that proximately resulted
in an injury-the unwarranted restraint of liberty. The gist of this
" Cf. Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 79 N.E.2d 459 (1948).
"See Pennell v, Cummings, 75 Me. 163, 166-67 (1883) (by implication); cf.
Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 404, 79 N.E.2d 459, 464 (1948) ; C. BurmicK, THE
LAW op TonTs 304 (4th ed. 1926).
"See note 6 supra.
"Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 574-77, 250 A.2d 756, 769-70
(Super. Ct., App. Div. 1969).
"1 F. MAITLAND, TE FoRms OF ACTION AT COmmON LAW 2 (1954).
1970]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
civil action is the familiar concept of duty, violation of duty, injury, and
causation. If the legislature intended the statute to protect an individual
or class of individuals, an injurious breach of that statute should be action-,
able.45 The concept of "negligence per se" is closely analogous in that it
affords recognition of a standard of care legislatively dsigned for the
protection-of a clas§ of'persons, an unexcused violation of which will be
considered actionable negligence if it results in the contemplated type of
harm.4"
The dissenting and majority opinions expressed agreement that Dr,
Pessel's conduct constituted negligence, 47 and they reflected the idea that
an unnecessary confinement could be considered an, injury resulting from
that negligence.48 Although "negligence" 'seems somewhat of a misnomer,
due to the intentional and designed nature of his violation of the statute,40
the readiness of the court to so term it is pertinent 0 Since the majority
viewed the doctor's conduct as a substantial factor in causing the confine-
ment and viewed the restraint as unwarranted, the court had an adequate
basis to find liability with less effort and superficiality."',
The theory of liability just suggested is particularly applicable to
the certification statute involved in Di Giovanni inasmuch as its implicit
purpose, along with the other relevant statutes, is to assure that only
" See J. SALmOND, T3E LAw oF TORTS 467-74 (12th ed. 1957). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288 (1965).
See generally PROSSER § 35, at 202-03; 38 Am. JUR. Negligence § 158 (1941).
"104 N.J. Super. at 562-63, 571, 250 A.2d at 762-63, 767.
"id. at 566, 571, 250 A.2d at 765, 767.
IsPrice v. Phillips, 90 N.J. Super. 480, 485-86, 218 A.2d 167, 169 (Super.
Ct., App. Div. 1966); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1(7) (1966).
"The attitude o.f the New Jersey court is in sharp contrast to that of the
North Carolina Supreme Court manifested in Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286,
100 S.E.2d 860 (1957). One writer has suggested that a negligence action would
be appropriate under the circumstances in Bailey. Note, Torts-Physiians and
Surgeons-Liability for Signing a Certificate of Insanity Without Proper Exanina-
tion of the Alleged Lunatic, 36 N.C.L. REv. 552 (1958). However, the North
Carolina court in a repeat performance refused to recognize a negligence action
in Fowle v. Fowle, 255 N.C. 720, 122 S.E.2d 722 (1961).
"In Jackson v. Parks, 216 N.C. 329, 4 S.E.2d 873 (1939), involving a wrong-
ful commitment to a mental hospital, the court used language that is apropos. It
discounted the significance of whether the plaintiff, after arguing malicious prose-
cution in the court below, had changed his theory to abuse of process. "We do not
see how a choice either way in technical nomenclature could shorten the arm of the
Court in its attempt to reach justice between the parties .... [The complaint] is
sufficient . . . however the alleged mistreatment of the plaintiff may be legally
tagged. . . ." Id. at 332, 4 S.E.2d at 874. See also Keller v. Butler, 246 N.Y. 249,
254, 158 N.E. 510, 512 (1927); PRosSER § 1, at 3-4; Smith, Torts Without Par-
ticular Names, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1921).
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mentally ill persons ini real need of restraint are deprived of their liberty.
The impoiftance of requiring doctors to comply with such safeguards de-
mands stringency in enforcement; as the court recognized, an intentional
violation is indefensible."' Those courts that accord an extensive privilege
to certifying -physicians notwithstanding their wilful violation of their
duty to examine the subjects of the proceedings create a paradox-the law
immunizes defiance of the law. Criminal sanctions hardly seem appropri-
ate for conduct similar to Dr. Pessel's, which lacked malevolence or
wantonness. Professional discipline from the appropriate state medical
organization affords no relief to an improperly committed person. Fur-
thermore, it is very questionable whether courts should leave the enforce-
ment of state law to professional organizations.
Of course, under any theory of liability doctors would be protected
from spurious suits in which a negligent examination is alleged by the
arduous requirements of proof of medical malpractice.53 Actual necessity
for restraint because of danger to self and others should be a good defense
in a suit for wrongful commitment, for restraint would not be unwarranted
substantively even if it were obtained by procedural imperfection; hence
there would be no significant injury for which recovery would be merited.54
Holding Dr. Pessel directly liable for his intentional violation of the
certification statute would have provided perspicuous warning to certify-
ing doctors and would have boldly manifested the willingness of the
judiciary to enforce legislation protective of individual rights. Such a
holding also would have furthered the retreat from the "forms of action"
11 Di Giovanni v. Pessel, 104 N.J. Super. 550, 572, 250 A.2d 756, 768 (Super. Ct.,
App. Div. 1969); cf. Warner v. State, 297 N.Y. 395, 404, 79 N.E.2d 459, 464
(1948).
See Williams v. Le Bar, 141 Pa. 149, 21 A. 525 (1891) (per curiam).
' Miller v. West, 165 Md. 245, 248, 167 A. 696, 698 (1933) ; cf. Christopher v.
Henry, 284 Ky. 127, 136, 143 S.W.2d 1069, 1074 (1940). One could readily
speculate that the court in Di Giovanni might have allowed a monetary recovery
in order to effectuate an adamant policy of strict adherence to the certification
requirement even if the plaintiff had been so mentally ill as to be dangerous
to herself and others. This speculation is logical if concern for the conduct of
the doctor loomed larger than concern for the grief caused the plaintiff. It seems
doctrinaire, however, to consider one who is mentally ill to the degree warranting
immediate restraint to deserve compensation for an involuntary hospitalization
brought about through a faulty process. The policy of the certification statute is
nonetheless served by the actual result reached on the facts of Di Giovanni.
Even if the decision is limited to its facts, no rational doctor would risk violating
the statutory commitment procedure on the fortuity that the individual concerned
was actually insane to the requisite degree.
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mentality. Despite its beclouding semantics, the decision is exemplary
insofar as it represents judicial intolerance of the wilful and injurious
dereliction of- statutorily imposed duty; it remains for another court to
achieve the same result in a more straightforward manner.
WILLIAm B. CRt7MPLER
